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ABSTRACT
Explaining legislative behavior in the Mexico represents a puzzle given the state of
existing theory. Despite a ban on consecutive reelection, Mexican legislators engage in
many behaviors thought to be the result of seeking reelection. Furthermore, existing
theories of progressive ambition also cannot explain the tendency of many Mexican
legislators to seek less prestigious offices after serving for a single term. This dissertation
develops a novel theory of political ambition that accounts for the movement up and
down the career ladder by Mexican federal legislators, and highlights several behavioral
implications of the pursuit of political careers in a context where reelection to the same
office is not possible. To test the theory, I collected data on the past and future career
choices of all federal deputies who served from 1997 to 2009, as well as data on bill
sponsorship, pork-barreling, and roll-call voting. The empirical chapters then examine the
influence of electoral competition on careers and behavior, career patterns among
deputies and the factors that shape and constrain particular career paths, how porkvii

barreling and bill sponsorship relates to the individual career goals of deputies, and how
the pursuit of a political career in this environment encourages frequent party switching.
The findings indicate that federal deputies are loyal to those who put them in office and
to those who control their future careers. Furthermore, where deputies seek future office
matters, as it shapes their behavior while in office.
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CHAPTER 1: Introduction: Ambition and Democratic Representation
The concept of political ambition lies at the heart of democratic theory. When James
Madison in Federalist 51 claimed “[a]mbition must be made to counteract ambition” to
argue for the separation of powers, he recognized that the institutional design of a
representative democracy must fundamentally deal with the individual goals of ambitious
actors to foster representation, accountability, and protect citizens against an abusive
government. Over a century and half later, Joseph Schlesinger (1966, 1) wrote is his
classic work on political careers in the United States that “[a]mbition lies at the heart of
politics.” Without political ambition, there cannot be electoral competition, a necessary
component of a healthy democracy. Also, without ambition, no variation in the design of
democratic institutions can induce representatives to represent citizen interests. Finally,
absent political ambition, citizens cannot hold representatives accountable, since
representatives have no desire to stay in office and thus, citizens have no mechanism by
which to punish or reward a representative’s behavior.
Electoral institutions play a critical role in this process, as they structure the
opportunities available to ambitious politicians, they shape the way representatives
behave and how citizens hold them accountable (Black 1972; Rohde 1979; Carey and
Shugart 1995). One particular electoral institution, reelection, is largely taken for granted
in most theories of democratic representation. Reelection provides an avenue for
ambitious politicians to develop long political careers (Schlesinger 1966; Black 1972;
Rohde 1979; Maestas et al. 2006), fosters an “electoral connection” between
representatives and constituents (Mayhew 1974), and the threat of periodic elections in
the future is one of the primary mechanisms voters have to reward or sanction their
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representatives (Przeworski, Stokes and Manin 1999). For example, the goal of reelection
plays a crucial role in many theories of U.S. congressional behavior, from explaining bill
sponsorship

behavior (Campbell 1982; Schiller 1995; Koger 2003), position taking

(Mayhew 1974; Hill and Hurley 2002; Rocca 2007), roll-call voting (Miller and Stokes
1963; Fiorina 1974; Erikson 1978; Hill and Hurley 1999), and the organization of
committees (Cox and McCubbins 1993; 2005), to decisions legislators make on serving
particularistic vs. general interests (Arnold 1990) and the costs and benefits of pursuing a
particular type of political career (Black 1972; Maestas et al. 2006).
However, what happens when the goal of reelection is removed? Are ambitious
individuals still attracted to politics? How does one develop a political career without the
possibility of reelection? Do representatives still have an incentive to represent? Can
voters still hold representatives accountable? These are not just abstract questions, as not
all institutional environments allow for or encourage reelection. For example, term limits
are now a regular feature of state-level politics in the U.S. (Carey, Niemi, Powell, and
Moncreif 2006), Mexico and Costa Rica prohibit consecutive reelection for all elected
offices, while Ecuador and the Philippines used to (Carey 1996), several other countries
prohibit consecutive reelection to sub-national office (e.g. Nicaragua, Colombia), while
in still others (e.g. Argentina, Panama), reelection rates are so low that seeking reelection
to the same office is not often a viable goal (Altman and Chasquetti 2005; Jones et al.
2002; Otero Felipe 2008). Across Latin America, legislators are largely inexperienced,
with most legislators serving only two terms before moving on to other positions,
suggesting that even when reelection is possible, it is not often probable (Martínez Rosón
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2008, 240; 2011). In short, the concept of the single-minded reelection-seeker, at least
across Latin America, may be the exception rather than the norm.1
Since much of political science resorts to assuming reelection as a major goal to
explain a wide variety of behavior and outcomes, much less is known about how
individual politicians will behave or how democracy works without reelection. Some
have suggested democratic representation and accountability can still occur, even without
reelection, as long as voters focus their energy on selecting a “good type” (prospective
voting) rather than “sanctioning poor performance” (retrospective voting) (Fearon 1999).
Yet, Fearon’s model has not been tested, nor do we have much theoretical or empirical
insight on how politicians will behave when the goal of reelection is removed.
For example, many studies of legislative behavior assume reelection as the
primary goal driving legislative behavior (e.g. Mayhew 1974), while others recognize
that legislators may have multiple goals besides reelection, such as seeking influence
within the legislature or pursuing policy goals (Fenno 1973). Even if one assumes
legislators have multiple goals outside of reelection, these additional goals are intricately
tied to the possibility of reelection and to one another. Seeking influence within a
legislature is predicated on the assumption that legislators can accumulate seniority over
time, while the ability of an individual legislator to pursue policy goals becomes
increasingly difficult if they cannot establish any influence within the legislative body,
nor have the experience and expertise that comes with multiple terms. Thus, without
reelection, it is unclear from a theoretical standpoint why legislators would do anything at
all.
1

For more data on legislative reelection rates in Latin America, see:
http://americo.usal.es/oir/legislatina/reeleccion.htm, accessed June 12, 2012.
3

One possible solution to this problem of understanding how representation works
without reelection is to assume political actors are progressively ambitious, or seek
alternative office after serving a term in another position, rather than staticly ambitious,
i.e. seek reelection to the same office one or more times (Schlesinger 1966; Black 1972;
Rohde 1979; Samuels 2003). Earlier studies of legislative politics in Latin America
highlighted the importance of ambition and careers for understanding legislative
behavior, but recognized the difficulty of applying the ‘Mayhewian’ model of singleminded reelection-seekers outside the United States to countries with much more
complicated political career paths and varying types of electoral institutions (Morgenstern
2002a; 2002b; Weyland 2002). In addition, a critical assumption of progressive ambition
theory is that ambitious actors desire to move up the career ladder to more prestigious
positions. Existing theory provides little explanation for why a seemingly ambitious actor
would seek a less prestigious future office, as is often the case in Mexico and in a number
of other Latin American countries (Langston and Aparicio 2008; Martínez Rosón 2011).
Research on the consequences of progressive ambition is certainly not new, and a
number of studies have attempted to look at how representatives behave differently based
on whether or not they pursue static or progressive ambition (e.g. Herrick and Moore
1993; Leoni, Pereira and Rennó 2004; Maestas 2000; 2003; Maestas et al. 2006; Micozzi
2009; Padro I Miquel and Snyder 2006; Samuels 2003; Victor 2011). Yet, much research
on the relationship between elections, ambition and representation takes place where it is
possible for individual representatives to pursue static and progressive ambition. In the
U.S., many legislators at the state and federal-level pursue reelection, or static ambition,
for multiple terms until opportunities arise that allow them to obtain higher office. Since
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U.S. legislators typically have little control over exogenous opportunities to seek higher
office (such as the vacancy of a sought-after office due to retirement or the ambitions of
another legislator), the consequences of progressive ambition on legislative behavior may
be muted. Term limits at the state-level in the U.S. make it easier to look for the
consequences of progressive ambition, although term-limited legislators still have the
potential to seek reelection for several terms before pursuing higher office and since not
all legislators are term-limited at the same time, it may be somewhat difficult to
disentangle the effects of progressive ambition versus static ambition. In Brazil, where
legislative turnover is high and scholars have argued progressive ambition better explains
legislative behavior, nearly 2/3 of legislators still pursue reelection (Leoni, Pereira and
Rennó 2004; Samuels 2003: 39). In Argentina, where progressive ambition has also been
argued to be a better characterization of the ambitions of legislators, researchers are faced
with a closed-list proportional representation electoral system, making it potentially
difficult to determine a linkage between individual representatives and voters regardless
of the type of ambition they display (Micozzi 2009).
Thus far, studies of political ambition have lacked empirical data from cases
where static ambition is not a possibility and electoral systems do not complicate the
existence of a principal-agent relationship between voters and representatives. Even in
studies that have attempted to address this issue (e.g. Taylor 1992; Carey 1996), the lack
of systematic career path data and data on legislative outputs has hampered the
development of convincing theoretical models of behavior in this particular institutional
context. Furthermore, theoretical studies of ambition have ignored explanations of career
paths that are neither static nor purely “progressive.”

5

In order to understand what happens in a democracy when we relax the
assumption of reelection, I turn to the case of Mexico, where institutional design forces
politicians to choose either between discrete or progressive ambition. Since consecutive
reelection is prohibited for all elected offices, and most valuable bureaucratic posts are
political appointments coterminous with the terms of elected office, individuals who wish
to pursue a career in public office in Mexico must possess progressive ambition. Because
of this institutional environment, the Mexican case provides an excellent opportunity to
examine the strategic behavior of ambitious politicians when reelection is not an option,
and the consequences of this behavior.
This dissertation has two major goals. The first goal is to develop a theory of
political ambition that explains how rational, ambitious politicians pursue their goals
when they cannot seek reelection. The second major goal is to determine the behavioral
consequences of the pursuit of progressive ambition in this environment. In order to
accomplish these goals, I collected a wide variety of data from the Mexican Chamber of
Deputies over the period 1997-2009, including the prior and future career paths of over
2000 legislators who served during this time period, and individual level data on bill
sponsorship, roll-call voting, and pork-barreling activities during the negotiation of the
annual federal budget. I complement this information with interviews of former and
current legislators, legislative staff members, and academic experts.
The Chamber of Deputies provides an ideal window into the pursuit of ambition
and its consequences in the Mexican case, as it lies somewhere in the middle of the
opportunity structure for ambitious politicians. Many federal legislators attempt to move
on to higher office, such as becoming senators, governors, big city mayors, and even
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President. Federal legislators also enter the Chamber with a wide variety of experience.
The time period was selected for three reasons. I begin the study in 1997, as several
important types of data needed to test the theory become much more difficult to obtain
prior to 1997. 1997 is also a reasonable starting point for the democratic period in
Mexico, and this study is primarily interested in studying political ambition within a
democratic context.2 I end the study in 2009 in order to be able to study where federal
legislators who left office in 2009 pursued future office. Finally, there is a large literature
suggesting that prior to 1997, the Mexican Chamber of Deputies was primarily a rubberstamp legislature, engaged in very little activity, and was not particularly influential in
the policy process (e.g. Ugalde 2000; Casar 2002; Nacif 2005; Jiménez Badillo 2006).
The loss of majority control of the Chamber in 1997 by the ruling Institutional
Revolutionary Party led to rapid and important changes in executive-legislative relations
where now one observer notes, the “Congress proposes and the president disposes (Nacif
2005, 3).”
The Mexican case also provides a number of other benefits for understanding the
nature and consequences of progressive ambition in a comparative context. First, Mexico
uses a mixed-electoral system where the majority of legislators must win office through
single-member districts, making it possible for citizens to identify their representative,
2

When authoritarianism ends and democracy begins in the Mexican case is certainly not
a clear-cut affair since the transition towards democracy was a slow-going affair that
spread unevenly at the sub-national level over a long period of time (e.g. Cornelius,
Eisenstadt and Hindley 1999; Eisenstadt 2004; Greene 2007). Most studies start at some
point in the 1990s, although 1997 was the date the ruling PRI first lost majority control of
Chamber of Deputies, and not until 2000 did the PRI lose majority control in the Senate
and lose the Presidency. The fraudulent presidential elections of 1988 were one of the
main catalysts that led to a number of important electoral reforms, starting with the 1991
mid-term elections that eventually allowed opposition parties to compete in a much more
open environment.
7

and for representatives elected at the district level to target specific constituencies without
the potential confounding factor of competing representatives such as in Brazil’s openlist proportional representation system. The Mexican case also provides the added benefit
of examining how varying electoral rules influence political ambition and behavior, since
the remaining large minority of legislators are elected through closed-list proportional
representation. The unique rules of Mexico’s mixed-electoral system (Kerevel 2010)
compared to most other mixed-systems, as well as the presence of both single-member
district and proportional representation elections, make Mexico an ideal case to examine
how variation in electoral rules alters the strategic decisions of ambitious politicians and
the consequences of these decisions. In all other studies of political ambition, the
electoral rules are constant, and thus provide little theoretical leverage on how electoral
rules constrain and shape the behavior of ambitious actors (e.g. Maestas et al. 2006;
Micozzi 2009; Samuels 2003). Throughout the dissertation, I consider the influences and
consequences of differing modes of election on the behavior of Mexican legislators.
Second, Mexico’s federal political system provides a number of opportunities for
ambitious politicians to pursue their careers, and variation in the size of states, the
number of opportunities available, and the nature of sub-national party competition
provide interesting variation to examine the consequences of progressive ambition and
how variation in electoral competition influences behavior. Existing studies of political
ambition consider the electoral environment (e.g. nature of party support in a particular
district/state) to be a critical factor in the decision-making calculus of ambitious
politicians (Rohde 1979; Maestas et al. 2006). Recent studies of Mexican politics have
emphasized the increased role for state governors in candidate selection and the

8

policymaking process (Langston 2010; Rosas and Langston 2011), therefore I am able to
consider how governors at the state level influence the careers and behavior of federal
legislators. Thus, Mexican federalism provides an excellent opportunity to examine how
various components of the electoral environment at multiple levels of governance
influence the decisions and behavior of ambitious politicians.
Finally, Mexico went through a transition towards democracy in the 1990s, which
involved a rapid change in the level of electoral competition, and had a profound effect
on the party system. Up through the 1980s, Mexico was easily characterized as a oneparty dominant regime with only small pockets of support for opposition parties around
the country. By the late 1990s, Mexico had a competitive three-party system, with a
number of other minor parties. In addition, prior to the 1997 mid-term elections, the
ruling PRI won nearly every single-member district race for the Chamber of Deputies,
with opposition parties only winning seats through proportional representation. From
1997 and on, the three major parties can all seriously compete for at least a subset of the
district races. These dramatic changes in electoral competition and the party system
provide an opportunity to examine how these changes influenced the decision-making
calculus and behavior of ambitious political actors over time (Canon and Sousa 1992).
1.1 Theoretical approach and potential criticisms
This dissertation adopts a rational-choice institutionalist (RCI) approach to
understanding political careers and legislative politics in Mexico. A pure rational choice
argument assumes purposive actors with pre-defined goals. These actors have choices
among a set of alternatives to reach those goals, and rational individuals are maximizers,
meaning that they will choose the best alternative available to attain their goal, weighing
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the costs and benefits associated with each course of action (Lichbach 2003; Geddes
2003; March and Simon 1981; Riker 1980; Downs 1957; Olson 1965). A number of
rational choice scholars have moved on from singular assumptions of universal
rationality based on human nature (Lichbach 2003; Simon 1985), towards rational choice
institutionalism. Rational choice institutionalist arguments still assume rational
maximizers, but recognize that the particular institutions under which they are
constrained shape the set of alternative choices from which rational actors can choose.
Institutionalists recognize that in many instances, political actors act on preferences that
are developed as a result of the institutional constraints under which they act, and that as
the institutional context changes, so do the observed preferences of actors (Immergut
1998). Institutions, in short, shape the strategies political actors will use to obtain their
goals, and the costs and benefits associated with any particular strategy (Geddes 2003;
Lichbach 2003).
Adopting a RCI approach to study legislative politics and political careers is not
particularly controversial, as nearly all studies of this nature, in the United States or
comparatively, adopt a similar theoretical approach (although see Weyland 2002). While
I argue that the RCI approach can teach us a lot about the behavior of Mexican
legislators, there are some potential limits to this perspective in its current form that
might warrant future research under alternative approaches or a refinement of the theory I
adopt in Chapter 2. First, not all Mexican politicians may be rational utility maximizers. I
argue that Mexican politicians are primarily office-seekers, and in the context of nonconsecutive reelection, they will act strategically in their current office to obtain a desired
future office. Thus, federal deputies have a set of predefined career goals, and while
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serving in the legislature, they act strategically by weighing the costs and benefits of
particular actions in order to achieve their goals.
However, other research on Mexican politics suggests that there exist a subset of
Mexican politicians that are “message-seekers” rather than “office-seekers” (Greene
2007). This difference is due to the unique history of opposition political party
development under a single-party regime for much of the 20th Century. Kenneth Greene
(2007) argues that as a result of the unfair playing field created by the Institutional
Revolutionary Party (PRI) combined with selective repression, members of opposition
parties (especially members of the National Action Party (PAN) and the Party of the
Democratic Revolution (PRD)) were committed activists more interested in spreading
their message and transforming society, rather than winning office. As electoral
competition became more free and fair in the 1990s, divisions opened up within
opposition parties between the committed activists and those interested in winning office
and developing a political career. Furthermore, politicians from the PRI in their rhetoric
often speak of party life and their careers in military-like terms, such as engaging in party
work as “working from the trenches,” or if speaking about where they will seek a future
position, they often suggest they will go where the party most needs them, as if they are
performing a service to the party, rather than pursuing their own self-interested goals.3
The extent to which message-seekers are still significant actors within political parties is
unknown, but it should be expected that message-seekers will engage in behavior
fundamentally different from that of office-seekers, regardless of the impact these actions

3

Based on general impressions over years of reading about Mexican politics. I don’t have
a particular citation to back up this claim at this point.
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have on their future career. Adopting a more historical or cultural approach to Mexican
legislative politics could highlight some of these larger differences.
Despite the possible presence of message seekers within the Congress it is still
plausible to assume that the overwhelming majority of legislators are ambitious officeseekers. The extent to which message-seekers continue to play an important role in
legislative politics is likely to work against many of my particular hypotheses regarding
legislative behavior, and therefore is unlikely to bias the findings in favor of any specific
hypothesis. The RCI approach can help explain a lot about Mexican legislative behavior,
as I attempt to do in this work, but it cannot explain it all. Hopefully other researchers
interested in how the particular historical development of party politics influences current
behavior in the democratic period, or how the political culture within each political party
and in congress influences careers and behavior, can draw from the insights of this work.
A second potential criticism of the RCI approach as applied here, is that it
assumes actors possess enough information to act strategically, know their own goals as
well as the goals of other relevant actors, and actors exist within a stable and well-known
environment with repeated interactions in order to develop efficient strategies (Geddes
2003; Lichbach 2003). This study begins at the tail end of the democratic transition in
Mexico, which raises two possible concerns with the application of a RCI approach. First,
politicians may possess highly imperfect information regarding what types of behavior
will be most useful in pursuing a future political career since they may have little
experience to draw from as examples. They may not have access to polling data, or the
electorate may be too volatile in a particular constituency to predict with any degree of
certainty how they will act in an upcoming election. Second, especially regarding the

12

earlier period of the study (1997-2003), many political actors may not have engaged in
enough strategic interactions to understand what types of behavior are the most efficient,
suggesting that many actors are still learning how to operate in a democratic and
competitive environment. Furthermore, the uncertainty regarding information and the
electoral environment may vary by state, by the types of office pursued, and the level of
previous experience held by any particular actor.
At this point, there is not a good strategy for accounting for this potential
uncertainty that Mexican political actors face. One potential solution would be to collect
more data from the 1991 – 1997 legislatures in order to trace how more drastic changes in
the competitive environment influenced individual deputies. While there is substantial
evidence post-1997 (presented in Chapter 3) that legislators were still engaged in a
learning process, after 2003 there is a certain stabilization in the behavior of legislators,
which has continued to the present. However, the extent of this differing level of
uncertainty between the 1997-2003 and 2003-2009 period should not be overstated. In
most of the chapters I present evidence for each legislative term and tend to find similar
patterns across all four legislative terms, which suggests Mexican deputies were quick to
adopt strategies to achieve their goals. Furthermore, if Mexican deputies did not possess
enough information to act strategically, the consequence of this uncertainty would likely
show up as null findings in the empirical results. Nevertheless, future research should
examine more carefully what types of information are available to deputies to engage in
cost-benefit analysis, and how it might vary across states, the level of experience, and the
desired future office of the deputy.
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In addition, the importance of democratization in the Mexican case and its
potential consequences for behavior should not be overstated, at least after 2000.
Institutionally, little has changed in Mexico from the authoritarian to the democratic
period, other than the important adoption of independent electoral management bodies in
the 1990s designed to guarantee free and fair electoral competition (Eisenstadt 2004).
The electoral rules, prohibition on consecutive reelection, the constitution, and the major
political parties have been largely constant throughout the transition. This stability in the
institutional environment, excepting a few minor changes, suggests that even after the
historic 2000 presidential election when the PRI lost control of the presidency for the first
time, political actors already had a grasp on the nature of the political environment in
which they were to pursue their goals.

The remainder of this introduction outlines the subsequent chapters and the
general arguments made throughout the text.
1.2 Outline
In the next chapter, I develop a rational choice theory of political ambition where
reelection is assumed not to be a possibility. This theory draws on the insights of the
classic theories developed for the U.S. context (Black 1972; Rohde 1979), but also draws
on recent modifications (Maestas et al. 2006) and is then adapted to account for the
particular institutional environment in Mexico. I demonstrate why, even in cases where
reelection is prohibited, most political actors will possess progressive ambition, rather
than discrete ambition. However, when reelection is prohibited, the concept of
progressive ambition changes. Previous studies of progressive ambition only consider
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movements from “lower” to “higher” office, such as from state legislature ⇒ House ⇒
Senate ⇒ Presidency in the U.S. case, or from legislative to executive positions in Brazil
or Argentina. I demonstrate why it is rational for progressively ambitious actors that
cannot pursue reelection as a viable strategy to choose to temporarily climb “down” the
career ladder only to climb higher later on, such as from House ⇒ state legislature ⇒
Senate if U.S. lawmakers were unable to pursue consecutive reelection. Finally, this
theory develops a number of empirical implications on what types of behavior one might
expect from ambitious politicians who cannot seek reelection, and how the electoral
environment and particular institutional rules, such as the electoral system and centralized
candidate selection, influence a rational actor’s decision-making and behavior.
In chapter 3, I examine how changes in electoral competition in Mexico coincided
with changes in the political careers of Mexican legislators and drastic changes in their
behavior. I argue in this chapter that general increases in electoral competition during the
transition towards democracy had profound effects on the political careers of Mexican
legislators. Increased competition altered the political opportunity structure of Mexican
politics by increasing the value of legislative seats and also by making municipal and
state-level offices valuable positions for pursuing successful political careers. Prior to
democratization, administrative office, rather than elected office, was more valuable for
climbing the political career ladder. I make the case that electoral competition altered the
political opportunity structure by introducing meaningful competition for elected offices
and also by increasing the importance of the Mexican Congress in the nationalpolicymaking process, altering the way strategic political actors used a congressional seat
to pursue their career goals. Increases in electoral competition also had a profound
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influence on the party system, by encouraging all parties to professionalize and reduce
their previous reliance on political amateurs. As the party system changed and became
much more competitive, the increased professionalization of the political parties as
vehicles to channel the ambitions of their members led to dramatic changes in behavior as
the increasing relevance of Congress in the policy-making process vis-a-vis the Executive
Branch was both a cause and consequence of strategic legislators using the tools at their
disposal to pursue their career goals.
Chapter 3 draws on secondary literature that examines the career paths and
legislative behavior prior to 1997 as well as aggregate data from the 1997-2009 period to
demonstrate how changes in electoral competition and the party system led to changes in
the career paths of legislators and their individual behavior. This chapter also introduces
some of the empirical data used in the following chapters. Understanding these structural
changes in the Mexican political system are crucial for setting up the subsequent chapters
and for interpreting some of the results.
Chapters 4 through 7 then test several implications of the theory developed in
Chapter 2. Chapter 4 makes the case that Mexican legislators are progressively ambitious.
Since Mexican deputies cannot pursue static ambition, it is also possible they pursue
discrete ambition. However, I demonstrate this is not the case, that the overwhelming
majority of Mexican legislators are professional politicians with a wealth of experience
and that many go on to other political offices after being elected to the Chamber of
Deputies. I find that most legislators pursue their careers at the sub-national level and
most of them seek future elected office rather than appointed positions. I also find
significant differences in the careers of legislators based on their mode of election.
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Chapter 5 examines the propensity of progressively ambitious legislators to target
their future constituencies through pork-barreling during annual federal budget
negotiations. Previous research on Mexican legislative behavior has suggested legislators
have few incentives to engage in constituency service or pork-barreling activities due to
the prohibition on consecutive reelection, party voting in the electorate, and strong party
control over the candidate selection process (Nacif 2002). Nevertheless, the theory from
Chapter 2 demonstrates why this should not be the case for progressively ambitious
legislators seeking to further their careers. In this chapter I find that legislators seeking a
future state-level office are more likely to engage in ‘pork-barreling’ behavior in order to
claim credit with their selectorate (Samuels 2003; Micozzi 2009). This chapter argues
that despite institutional rules that appear to eliminate incentives for legislators to be
responsive to constituents and seek a personal vote, Mexican legislators are progressively
ambitious and therefore use these interventions into the budget process as a form of credit
claiming to further their political careers after leaving Congress.
In addition to seeking ‘pork,’ federal deputies have a few other resources at their
disposal while in office to attempt to win a future office. The ability to sponsor legislation
is one resource that all legislators possess and as a result, progressively ambitious
legislators may draft bills to claim credit with future constituencies and to target specific
interest groups. Chapter 6 therefore examines the determinants of bill sponsorship
behavior and how bill sponsorship relates to the future career paths of federal legislators.
While a prohibition on reelection may have negative consequences on legislative
specialization, I argue in this chapter that legislators seeking a future legislative office (at
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the state level or in the Senate), have incentives to dedicate time to legislative work in
order to increase their chances of pursuing future legislative office.
Chapter 7 examines the consequences of banning consecutive reelection on the
Mexican party system as a whole through an examination of party switching across the
political careers of federal deputies. In this chapter, I argue that the ban on consecutive
reelection provides a unique opportunity to study party switching in a stable party system,
primarily because after every term of office, Mexican political actors must decide with
which party to affiliate to continue their careers. The lack of incumbency creates a
situation whereby all competitors for political office are challengers, and also
dramatically increases the number of potential competitors. I further elaborate the theory
of political ambition developed in Chapter 2, identifying party switching as a rational
strategy for career advancement. I then identify a number of empirical implications from
the theory, examining the frequency and motivations for party switching among Mexican
federal deputies. This chapter also fills a gap within the party switching literature by
examining a country with a stable party system and strong, highly disciplined and
programmatic political parties (Carey 2003; Klesner 2005; Rosas 2005; Samuels 2006),
and by examining switching throughout the political careers of Mexican federal deputies,
rather than focusing solely on switching within a legislature.
Chapter 8 concludes, addresses some of the large implications of the findings, and
identifies areas for future research.
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Chapter 2: A ‘Snakes and Ladders’ theory of political ambition: The implications of
pursuing a political career in the context of no reelection
A fundamental tenet of representative democracy is that citizens are allowed to
choose their representatives through periodic elections. Through elections, citizens can
make a choice regarding who will best represent their interests. The threat of future
elections is the major institutional mechanism by which citizens can control their
representatives, rewarding or punishing them depending on how they behave while in
office. Implicit in the relationship between elections and democratic representation is the
assumption that politicians are self-interested actors that pursue their own goals (Stone
1990). Self-interested political actors may seek power, fame, policy, wealth, or any
number of possible goals, but in order to achieve their goals, they should serve the
interests of those responsible for putting that actor in office and keeping them there. The
threat of periodic elections induces self-interested political actors to serve the interests of
their constituents in order that the politician may continue to pursue their own selfish
goals. In this way, elections are supposed to produce representation within a democracy.
For democratic representation to work, self-interested politicians must also be
ambitious. Without ambition, political office holders have no incentive to be responsive
to voters or act in the best interests of their constituencies. Thus, representatives who hold
discrete ambition, or do not desire to remain in political office after serving a single term
in a legislature have no institutional incentives to listen or respond to their constituents,
and citizens have no mechanism to hold their representatives accountable (Schlesinger
1966; Maestas et al. 2006).
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The importance of political ambition for ensuring representation, accountability
and electoral competition has not gone unnoticed, and a wide literature has developed to
explain the various career choices made by political actors (Schlesiner 1966; Black 1972;
Levine and Hyde 1977; Rohde 1979; Brace 1984; Maestas et al. 2006), as well as the
consequences of political ambition and particular career choices on different types of
behavior and key political outcomes (Canon and Sousa 1992; Herrick and Moore 1993;
Maestas 2000; 2003; Padró I Miquel and Snyder 2006; Victor 2011). However, much of
our understanding of political ambition and its consequences comes from the 20th century
United States,4 and only recently have scholars attempted to adapt the theoretical insights
from the U.S. literature on ambition to a comparative context (Altman and Chasquetti
2005; Barrie and Gibbins 1989; Botero 2008; Leoni, Pereira and Renno 2004; Martínez
Rosón 2011; Micozzi 2009; Samuels 2003). As one attempts to adapt existing theoretical
models of ambition to different contexts, it becomes clear that many assumptions that
underlie models of ambition developed for the U.S. no longer apply.
In this chapter, I develop an alternative model of political ambition for the
Mexican context, drawing on the insights from the U.S. literature, but also highlighting
several of the shortcomings and complications that exist when applying these models to
alternate institutional environments. I first review existing rational-choice models of
political ambition, and then develop an alternate model that more accurately reflects the
reality of the Mexican context. This model should also be applicable, with minor
modifications to account for different electoral institutions, to other contexts with strong
party systems and where progressive, rather than static, ambition is the norm. I then
4

Although see Kernell (1977) and Carson and Engstrom (2005) for studies of the 19th
century U.S.
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discuss in more detail several of the critical inputs in the model that influence the
decision-making calculus, namely individual behavior, the electoral environment, and
electoral institutions. The insights developed in this chapter serve as the basis for the
empirical analysis in the following chapters.
2.1 Existing rational choice models of political ambition
Early studies of political ambition adopted a rational-choice approach to explaining the
career decisions of political actors (Black 1972; Rohde 1979). In this work, a simple
model was developed whereby a potential candidate would seek office if the probability
of winning the office times the benefits of holding office was greater than the costs of
obtaining the office.
U(O) = PB – C
where,
U(O) is the utility of holding the office
P=the probability of winning office
B=the benefits of holding office
C=the costs of obtaining office
According to Black (1972), potential candidates will seek office when PB > C, and when
the utility of holding office is greater than the utility of some other career alternative,
U(O) > U(Ai), where U(Ai) represents all other possible career alternatives an individual
could pursue besides political office.
However, once an individual wins political office, they face three possible
choices: retire from office after a single term (discrete ambition), seek reelection to the
same office (static ambition), or to move on to an alternative, or higher, office
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(progressive ambition) (Black 1972; Rohde 1979). Since most empirical studies of
political careers find that politicians either pursue static or progressive ambition, and
rarely leave office after a single term, most work has focused on the decision to stay in
the same office (seek reelection) or to seek a different political office.
Rohde (1979) adopts a very similar approach to Black (1972) but assumes that all
political actors possess progressive ambition, or the desire to seek higher office. As
Rohde (1979, 3) suggests, all House members would accept a Senate seat or governorship
if it were offered to them without any cost or risk. However, not all members of the
House are risk-takers, and thus we see a large number pursue reelection as a safer
strategy of maintaining their political careers. In this model, political officeholders will
pursue higher office when the expected utility of holding higher office is greater than the
expected utility of holding the same office again (Rohde 1979, 4-5). Thus,
E(Uhigheroffice) = PhBh – Ch
E(Usameoffice) = PlBl – Cl
Political officeholders will only seek higher office when E(Uhigheroffice) > E(Usameoffice).
Maestas et al. (2006) build off the original models from Black (1972) and Rohde
(1979) by making a distinction between general decisions to seek higher office, and the
decision to enter a particular race. They question Rohde’s assumption that all
officeholders possess progressive ambition and therefore one must first explain the
possession of progressive ambition. Then, if an officeholder possesses progressive
ambition, it becomes important to explain the strategic decision of when to run, or when
to act on one’s ambitions. For Maestas et al. (2006), progressive ambition is a function
of the expected utility of holding a higher office.
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Progressive Ambition = f(E(Uhigheroffice) = PhBh – Ch + M)
The cost-benefit analysis is the same as before, but they also suggest that there may be
personal motivations (M) outside the cost-benefit analysis that influence the decision to
seek higher office. In this model, individuals who find the benefits outweigh the costs
possess progressive ambition and then face a second decision, when to run for higher
office.
In the second stage of this decision model, ambitious officeholders weigh their
electoral chances in a given race, the costs of giving up their current office, and their
general chances of winning the race, regardless of the particular circumstances
surrounding any given election (Maestas et al. 2006). For an individual who is
progressively ambitious, the decision to enter a particular race is still based on a costbenefit analysis (P(Enter)=PB – C), but the probability of winning (P) will change from
race to race, just as the costs (C) may change over time. For those without progressive
ambition (i.e. where the costs outweighed the benefits in the first stage), the probability
they would enter a race for higher office is zero.
This rational-choice approach to political ambition is a reasonable approximation
of the decision-making process for political actors in the U.S. context but includes a
number of assumptions that do not travel well to alternative institutional environments.
As others have argued, political goals are shaped by the available opportunities, and the
“political opportunity structure” is shaped by existing institutions (Schlesinger 1966;
Black 1972). In the U.S., seeking reelection (or static ambition) is a viable strategy for
pursuing a political career. Rates of reelection are high, and political actors have a real
choice between staying in their current office, or attempting to obtain an alternative
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office. In other contexts, reelection is either prohibited (i.e. Mexico, Costa Rica), or rates
of reelection are so low that reelection is either an extremely risky endeavor, or not a
viable option (Altman and Chasquetti 2005; Jones et al. 2002; Martínez Rosón 2008;
Morgenstern and Nacif 2002). In these cases, where reelection is impossible or unlikely,
E(Usameoffice) will be zero or very close zero because the benefits of maintaining the same
office will be zero where reelection is prohibited, or very close to zero when the
probability of winning the same office again are small.5 When that is the case, we should
see much more evidence of existing officeholders pursuing alternative offices since
E(Uhigheroffice) will always be greater than E(Usameoffice).
Alternatively, it might be possible in cases where reelection is unlikely that many
political actors possess discrete ambition and more closely resemble the ideal of a
“citizen legislator” (Carey 1996, 190-94). However, drawing on the insights of Maestas
et al. (2006) and Black (1972) I suggest it is unlikely, even in situations where reelection
is prohibited, that political actors possess discrete ambition. Assuming reelection is
prohibited, potential candidates will seek public office (U(O)) when the probability of
winning office (P) times the benefits of holding office (B) are greater than the costs of
obtaining office (C), or U(O) = PB – C, and when U(O) > U(Ai), where U(Ai) represents
all other career alternatives besides public office. If U(Ai) > U(O), then an individual will
not attempt to run for public office. However, if U(O) > U(Ai), and the actor makes this
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One might wonder why a politician who is unlikely to win reelection to the same office
would be likely to win an alternative office. For example, in Argentina, legislators rarely
seek reelection, but instead seek to pursue their careers at the sub-national level (Jones et
al. 2002; Micozzi 2009). The reason reelection is unlikely in this particular case is that
party leaders control access to the closed-list PR ballots, and for a variety of reasons, are
not interested in legislators building strong careers within the legislature. There, sitting
legislators have greater chances of competing for a sub-national office.
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decision knowing the existing political opportunity structure of their environment, it is
probable this actor will value holding a public office over some other alternative in many
cases. If that is not the case, then that individual is unlikely to have attempted to seek
public office in the first place. We do not have to assume this, but can test this
proposition with evidence on career paths of Mexican legislators. Mexico is an ideal case
to test the proposition that even where reelection is not possible, political actors are still
ambitious politicians that attempt to pursue long careers in public office since Mexico
prohibits consecutive reelection at all levels of elected office.6 One implication is that
most current officeholders are unlikely to be amateurs, and are also unlikely to return to
non-political office after serving a term in public office.
Thus, the decision to pursue progressive ambition likely takes place before an
individual decides to pursue a career in politics. In an environment where reelection is
prohibited or unlikely, nearly all political actors are likely to possess progressive
ambition. According to Maestas et al. (2006), once an individual possesses the ambition
for higher office, the strategic decision involves the decision on when to run. However,
this formulation assumes reelection is possible, since the decision on when to run
involves the costs of giving up the current office. Where reelection is not a viable
strategy, the costs of giving up the current office are essentially zero. For progressively
ambitious actors that cannot seek reelection, the important strategic decision is not so
much when to run but where to run. The decision of when to run for a particular office
still involves a temporal component, but since the ambitious actor has to run for some

6

In addition, the length of terms in Mexico’s highly politicized bureaucracy largely
coincide with the terms of elected office, since newly elected presidents, governors and
mayors often appoint their own supporters to these offices.
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office or retire at the end of their term, the decision on where to run at the end of a term
can have important consequences for the length and success of their career.
If we accept they are progressively ambitious and desire public office over some
other alternative, they must attempt to obtain a public or political office to maintain a
political career. A progressively ambitious politician may have a single goal in mind,
such as being governor or becoming mayor of their home town, but to achieve this goal,
they develop some sort of reputation with voters and connections to other important
political elites that will make it possible for this individual to reach their goal. One
potential strategy for this individual would be to just run for the office they desire most
and keep running until they win. However, if this individual has few political connections
and little visibility among voters, they are not likely to win or even get on the ballot.
Losing an election is not always the best way to win the same election in the future, and
therefore a progressively ambitious actor would likely enter public office at a lower level
to develop connections with other elites and visibility and support among voters in the
hope of winning their most desired office in the future.
Yet, in a system where reelection is prohibited and all politicians are pursuing a
similar strategy, it should always be more valuable to possess some type of political
office versus returning to private life for a short period of time since connections to
voters and other elites are the currency that matters for maintaining a political career. For
example, two federal legislators (A & B) from state X may desire to hold the mayor’s
seat of the largest city in the state.7 After serving one term in the federal legislature,
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This scenario is a real possibility in Mexico, as many large cities have multiple federal
representatives in the Chamber of Deputies (e.g. Ciudad Juárez, Ciudad Nezahualcóyotl,
Ecatepec, Guadalajara, Monterrey, Morelia, Tijuana), as well as a variable number of
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legislator A competes for mayor at time t and loses, while legislator B competes for a
state legislative seat at time t with a similar jurisdiction as the city and wins. Legislator A
may return to private life until the next election, or attempt to obtain an appointed
position in the state government or do party work. It may seem that legislator B took a
step backward in her political career, but she also now has (at least) two electoral wins
under her belt, can continue engaging in constituency service, and continue to develop
connections with voters and elites that may be useful for winning the mayoral seat at time
t+1. When the next election happens (t+1), legislator A and legislator B may both
compete for the same mayoral seat, but legislator B is likely to have greater political
capital at time t+1 than legislator A, and thus may have a greater probability of winning
the election.8
In the above example, each legislator made two decisions. Both legislators
possessed the same ultimate career goal (mayor), but made different decisions on when to
run for that particular office. Also, both legislators had to make a decision on where to
run after their legislative term was up, but made different decisions for which office to
compete. To formalize this decision process, let us assume a political environment where
there are three potential offices an ambitious actor can hold, federal legislator (F), state
other legislators elected through proportional representation who may have residency in
that particular municipality.
8
The assumption that Pr(Bwinning) > Pr(Awinning) is of course predicated on the assumption
that what legislator A did during time t and time t+1 had little value for advancing their
political career. If this assumption is false, then the strategy pursued by legislator A may
have been the optimal strategy given his particular circumstance. For example, legislator
A may have run in the election, possibly expecting to lose, but also knew that after the
election he would receive an appointment in the governor’s cabinet or become leader of
his party in the state. Both of these positions possess benefits for increasing connections
to voters and elites, potentially more so than being a state legislator. Running a campaign,
even if legislator A lost, still has the benefit of increasing name recognition, and is good
practice if A seeks to run for the same office in the future.
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legislator (S), and mayor (M) and this actor holds a preference ordering where M > F > S.
Let us also assume that this actor won their first election to one of these three offices, but
can only serve a single term before having to move on to another office. To continue
with the above example, a federal legislator at the end of their term faces the decision to
run for state legislative office (S) or mayor (M). According to this actor’s preferences,
they would most like to run for mayor at the end of their term. The expected utility of
holding the mayor’s office is based on the probability of winning the office(Pm), the
benefits of holding that office(Bm), and the costs incurred in running for that office (Cm).
The same can be said for the expected utility of holding a state legislative seat, except we
can also assume that Bm > Bs due to the actor’s preference ordering and the increased
power and visibility an executive has over a legislator. Thus,
E(Um) = Pm*Bm – Cm
E(Us) = Ps*Bs – Cs
Even if the actor prefers to be mayor over state legislator, they will run for state
legislator at time t if E(Us) > E(Um) depending on the values of P and C. We can assume
Cm>Cs in most cases, but Pm and Ps may change drastically from election to election. If
Pm is much lower than Ps, such as in a case where there is a strong alternative candidate
for mayor in the same party, or a different party, or the individual’s political party does
not allow them to run for mayor in a particular election,9 then it is perfectly rational for
this actor to run for state legislator at time t. They will only run for mayor when E(Um) >
E(Us). At time t+1, our individual now faces the choice between running again for
federal legislator or to run for mayor. If E(Um) > E(Uf), they run for mayor, but if E(Uf) >
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These particular scenarios are extremely common in Mexican elections.
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E(Um), they then run for federal legislator again. Therefore, even though we may know
the actor’s preferences, his decision on when and where to run are largely based on the
probability of winning office and the costs of running for office.
Because of the more complicated nature of pursuing a political career where
consecutive reelection is not a viable option, individual career trajectories are likely to
display a trend where for every two steps made up the career ladder, an individual may
take one step down due to changing circumstances that influence the probability of
winning and the costs of running. While individual politicians may possess a preference
for a linear career trajectory, such as moving from city councilor, state legislator, federal
legislator, mayor, senator, to governor, the inability to pursue reelection to the same
office will often lead ambitious actors to make short-term decisions throughout their
career that would appear to outside observers as a step down the career ladder, rather than
up. Much like a game of Snakes and Ladders,10 ambitious actors in this environment start
at the bottom of the career ladder, and may both possess the desire to be president.
However, to reach the highest office (or win the game), the path will not likely be linear
and may be drastically different for each actor, as they calculate the risk of each future
move, sometimes moving down the ladder, and sometimes moving up. The factors that
will likely influence the probability of winning and the costs of running for any future
office are individual, contextual, and institutional. Below I examine each factor
separately.

10

Or Chutes and Ladders, the two games are identical.
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2.2 Responding to constituent interests
At the individual level, an ambitious actor can use their current office to engage in
any type of behavior they see as likely to increase the probability of winning a future
office. For a legislator, this could involve constituency service, bill sponsorship, porkbarreling, speaking for certain interests, promoting the interests of a particular group, or
seeking leadership roles to increase their influence within the legislature and visibility
outside of it. While most work on national legislatures, and nearly all work on the United
States Congress assumes that legislators primarily seek reelection to the same office (e.g.
Mayhew 1974), assuming progressive ambition does not make legislators any less
strategic.
In many cases, representatives that are progressively ambitious seek future
constituencies that include the constituency that first elected them to office.11 Thus,
scholars who have studied this issue find that progressively ambitious legislators are not
only responsive to their current constituency, but to citizens of their potential future
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For purposes of this analysis, I assume progressively ambitious legislators seek future
constituencies that include their former constituencies. However, this assumption could
certainly be tested with available data. After analyzing career path data on over 2000
legislators, the number of legislators who move to different municipalities or states
during or after their term in office is extremely low. Residency and connection to the
constituency in which a politician is hoping to seek office is extremely important in
Mexican politics and therefore, it is not often an ambitious politician is willing to risk
their existing political capital in a particular area to move. The most common switch,
although still rare, occurs among politicians who move from their state of origin to the
Federal District. Some notable examples include the former Jefes de Gobierno
(commonly referred to as mayor of Mexico City, but equivalent in stature to that of a
governor) of the Federal District, Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas (1997-2000) who was from
Michoacán, and Andrés Manuel López Obrador (2000-06), who was from Tabasco. For
ambitious legislators who do not seek elected office, this assumption is somewhat less
likely to be true, especially if they engage in party work or obtain an appointment in the
federal bureaucracy. However, even in these cases, individuals largely return to their
states of origin.
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constituency since these constituencies typically overlap (Squire 1988; Maestas 2000;
2003; Samuels 2003; Micozzi 2009). For example, in the U.S., state legislators may seek
a position in the House of Representatives, while House members may seek a Senate seat.
Outside the U.S., Brazilian and Argentine legislators may seek to become governor or
mayor (Samuels 2003; Micozzi 2009). In all these cases, current and future constituencies
are likely to overlap, suggesting that representatives can only neglect constituent interests
at their peril if they wish to maintain a political career.
Thus, progressively ambitious legislators are likely to use the tools at their
disposal to increase the probability of winning a future political office. Federal legislators
who wish to pursue a subnational career are likely to attempt to direct resources and
effort towards serving future constituents. One way they can serve future constituents is
to provide constituency service, such as helping individuals gain access to federal social
welfare programs and other federal benefits, help resolve legal or administrative disputes,
or provide access to services such as education and health care.12 Constituency service in
a strong party system may not be done in order to secure a personal vote in a future
election, but could also be considered as working for the party in order to improve the
party’s reputation and to increase the likelihood that party elites in positions to supply
future ballot access or other positions will consider the individual legislator as a viable
and loyal candidate (Taylor 1992; Carey 1996). In either case, providing constituency
service to secure a personal vote or as party work, legislators are likely to engage in this
behavior as a strategy to pursue a future political career.
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Some examples of how Mexican legislators provide constituency service based on
interviews and reading of websites of currently serving federal legislators.
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Another way legislators can influence their probability of pursuing a sub-national
career is to secure federal resources for a particular electoral constituency, such as money
for a road, school or hospital. Legislators that are able to provide greater levels of
constituency service and claim credit for the transfer of resources to help a particular
constituency should have a higher probability of winning a future office in that
constituency compared to a potential opponent who cannot claim credit for these
activities.
However, due to the non-linear trajectory of most career paths in a system without
reelection, legislators in office may have a first preference of where they would like to
pursue future office, as well as a list of sub-optimal preferences within similar
constituencies. For example, a legislator in Mexico may wish to be mayor of their
hometown, but also has the possibility of obtaining a state-wide appointment or a statewide elected office, or a state-legislative seat with a constituency that may include other
municipalities besides their hometown. A federal legislator, recognizing that they may
not obtain their first preference after their term is over, may also adopt a strategy of
representing their entire state or directing resources towards multiple targets within the
state, since it is unlikely they will know with much certainty the exact position they will
compete for after the legislative term is over.
Previous political experience is also likely to influence the probability of winning.
In the U.S. literature, incumbency is a major factor in explaining the probability of
winning an election (Rohde 1979; Abramowitz, Alexander and Gunning 2006). However,
where reelection is prohibited, incumbency is impossible. Previous political experience is
a more general version of incumbency, and therefore, the more relevant experience an
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individual has, the greater probability they will have of securing desirable future posts
and the greater the probability they will seek a higher office than someone without
similar levels of experience. Due to the ‘two steps forward, one step backward’ nature of
career paths in a system without reelection outlined above, we should see that among
individuals who hold the same office (e.g. federal legislators), those with more relevant
experience prior to serving in the federal legislature (e.g. former mayor, governor,
senator, cabinet minister) will be observed to aim higher after leaving the federal
legislature compared to an individual with little to no relevant experience prior to
winning their current seat. The implication is that we should see variation in the future
career paths of federal legislators based on previously held office, rather than observe a
group of similarly situated individuals (e.g. federal deputies) pursue similar career paths.
2.3 The electoral environment
Contextually, an ambitious actor needs to take into account the competitive
environment in which they seek to pursue future office (Rohde 1979). In political systems
where reelection is the norm, incumbency is an important factor that will influence the
competitive environment. Potential candidates are less likely to try and compete against
an incumbent when the probability of winning is typically low (Jacobson 1989; Cox and
Katz 1996; Abramowitz, Alexander and Gunning 2006). For example, in the U.S., state
legislators are ideal potential candidates for House seats, but because most House seats
are held by incumbents, very few state legislators actually run for the House in any given
election. As Maestas et al. (2006, 196) highlight for the 2002 election, state legislators
ran in only 45 out of a potential 435 races, even though over 7500 individuals hold state
legislative office in the U.S. In political systems where elections are more competitive,
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we are likely to see greater numbers of potential challengers competing against
incumbents. However, the popularity, strength, and resources of the incumbent

(or

incumbent party) are likely to be a factor in the decision to enter a race. Thus, for
potential candidates in a system with reelection, incumbency is a potentially strong
deterrent to running for a particular office, as it reduces the probability of winning, and
likely also increases the costs of running.
However, in a system without consecutive reelection incumbency does not exist,
and in systems where reelection to the same office is unlikely or discouraged by party
elites, many races will take place between multiple challengers. Does this mean that in a
system without reelection it will be easier for current officeholders to run for another
elected office since there are never any incumbents? Not necessarily. The challenge in a
system without reelection is that there are no candidates who remain in their current
office, increasing the number of potential competitors for future office. For any given
election year, the number of potential competitors for a single office is likely to be
extremely large, since no officeholders have the luxury of keeping their same office and
waiting for a more favorable electoral environment to try their luck.13 In Mexico, nearly
all state legislative, federal legislative, and municipal elected offices have three-year
terms, and all officeholders cannot seek consecutive reelection to the same office.14 There
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Not all offices are renewed at the same time. However, there are incentives to leave as
soon as possible. For example, a federal deputy elected for the 2006-09 period may come
from a state where local elections are held in 2007 and 2010. They may leave their
legislative seat in 2007 to compete for a local office, or wait until 2010. However, leaving
in 2007 and losing is largely costless, except for campaign costs incurred and the loss of
salary during their leave of absence. If this individual loses the 2007 election, they can
come back to the Chamber and reclaim their seat to serve out the remainder of their term.
14
There is a movement at the local level to increase the terms of mayors from 3 years to
4 years. Coahuila has had 4-year terms since their 2005 elections, Hidalgo implemented
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are a total of 1139 state legislative seats in the country spread across 32 states, 500 seats
in the Chamber of Deputies, plus 2,439 mayoral seats (1 for each municipality) and a
countless number of city council seats that are renewed every three years. 15 In addition,
there are 128 seats in the Senate and 32 governorships that are renovated every six years.
While state-level elections are staggered, current officeholders at the state level have an
incentive to leave their current office and try to run for a federal office, and vice versa for
federal officeholders seeking state-level positions, since if they lose they can always
come back to serve out their term.16 In addition to individuals leaving office after their
term and current officeholders, potential candidates in a system without reelection also
face a large group of individuals with partisan and administrative appointments who are
seeking to run for elected office,17 as well as any past candidates who held or competed
for the position before and for one reason or another, failed to obtain a political or public
office in the most recent term.
4-year terms starting in 2011, and Veracruz just recently passed state-level constitutional
reforms in 2012 to adopt 4-year terms. Other states, such as Durango, are also
considering increasing mayoral terms from 3 to 4 years. For more info, see Arteaga
(2012), Avila (2012), Mota (2011), and Estrada (2012).
15
31 states and 1 Federal District. I count the Federal District as a state, the Jefe de
Gobierno position (mayor of Mexico City) as a governor, and the jefe delegacional
position (borough chief) as a mayoral position. I calculated the number of state legislative
seats by counting the number of state legislators elected in each of the 32 states in 2007,
2008 or 2009. Data taken from: “Integración de las legislaturas de los estados,” Cámara
de Diputados, http://www.diputados.gob.mx/cedia/biblio/archivo/edos/. The total number
of municipalities was taken from: Enciclopedia de los municipios y delegaciones de
México, http://www.e-local.gob.mx/work/templates/enciclo/.
16
Since all elected officeholders are elected along with alternates (suplentes), state and
federal laws allow officeholders to take leaves of absence to compete for alternative
offices. It is up to the officeholder whether or not they decide to return if they lose an
election. A similar phenomenon exists in Brazil, see Samuels (2003). Also see footnote 9
above.
17
Since most administrative appointments are held at the whim of the current elected
officeholders (i.e. mayor, governor, president), individuals who hold these positions for
all intents and purposes face the same term limits as the elected official.
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Therefore, without reelection, the potential and actual number of competitors for
any given position is likely to be extremely large due to the systematic need for ambitious
political actors to move on from their current position every three to six years. Potential
candidates must take into account who their potential competitors are for any given
position, as this environment will influence their probability of winning future office and
subsequently, their decision on which office to seek in the immediate future. Because of
this complicated electoral environment with a large number of potential competitors, we
should see current officeholders pursue a wide variety of future career paths after leaving
office, even if a particular group of officeholders may possess a similar set of goals, since
each individual will have a different probability of winning a desired future office, and
face different costs for obtaining that office. While we cannot know the most desired
office for each individual officeholder, nor calculate P and C, one observable implication
is that a group of similar officeholders will pursue widely different careers after their
term is up. If this reasoning is faulty, we would observe a majority of legislators seeking
a similar office, such as mayor of their town, or senator in general election years.
If one is running for an office that is considered “safe” for this individual’s
political party, the probability of winning is much higher than if the actor belongs to a
party that has never won that office before. Thus, the less competitive the district, the
greater the probability of winning for members of the governing party and the lower the
probability of winning for members of opposition parties. Similarly, the more
competitive the electoral district, the lower the probability of winning for all potential
candidates. Electoral competition is also likely to influence the cost of running. For
members of governing parties in uncompetitive districts, the cost of running may be
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lower (since victory is more certain) than if the same member was running in a highly
competitive district where victory for any party is more uncertain.
Federal legislators pursuing future office will likely consider these costs and the
probability of winning in any future election contest. However, the margin of victory of a
legislator is not likely to elucidate much information about where that legislator will
pursue future office in a system without reelection for a number of reasons. For one, any
future elected position will likely involve at least a slightly different constituency than the
one which elected the federal legislator, and thus, the margin of victory in the legislative
district will not provide much information about the legislator’s support in a new
constituency. More importantly, and described in more detail below, party elite control
over candidate selection weakens a direct link between voter support and internal party
support for a potential candidate. Margin of victory may provide information about
support for an individual candidate or support for a particular party in a district, but it
does not provide a reliable signal about an individual’s support among party elite
gatekeepers who control ballot access. Especially in “safe” districts for particular political
parties, party elites may not need to consider the popular support among voters for a
particular candidate and instead may be more likely to satisfy internal party
constituencies and factions when populating ballots. Legislators capable of winning in
more competitive districts, especially if they were able to unseat an incumbent party, may
have greater political capital within their political party, but may also desire future posts
where the probability of winning is higher and the cost of running lower, rather than
continue to compete in a highly competitive and uncertain electoral environment.
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In addition, partisanship is likely to influence the available opportunities open to
politicians seeking future office. For example, being a member of the governor’s party
will influence both the probability of winning and the cost of seeking some future post at
the state-level, influencing the decision on where to seek future office. Since governors
control a number of political appointments, members of the governor’s party leaving
office are likely to have an excellent chance of obtaining a political appointment in the
state bureaucracy without incurring much cost. Even if the benefits of holding an
appointed office are low, the probability of winning the office are high and the costs are
low, suggesting that for some members of the governor’s party, the expected utility of
holding a state bureaucratic position will be potentially higher than attempting to win
elected office.
A similar logic applies to members of the President’s party. Executives control a
large number of political appointments, and especially for federal legislators who are
already working at the federal level, the expected utility of holding a federal bureaucratic
appointment may be higher than attempting to run for elected office. However, since
most federal appointments are based on political considerations, and possibly the
possession of relevant experience, legislators who share the partisanship of the President
will be more likely to pursue and obtain federal appointments than members of
opposition parties, since the probability of securing a federal appointment for co-partisans
will be much higher than for opposition legislators. Thus, for members of the president’s
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party, we should see a large number seeking federal appointments after leaving office due
to the high probability of winning and the low cost of securing the appointment.18
2.4 Electoral institutions
The U.S. literature on progressive ambition makes two assumptions about the
nature of electoral institutions that must be addressed when moving to a comparative
context. In the American context, it is assumed that all politically ambitious actors run in
winner-take-all, plurality elections. It is also assumed that ambitious actors control their
own fate in terms of deciding to run for an office and that there are no barriers to ballot
access other than the support from voters (e.g. primaries) and the resources they possess
to campaign. In many other contexts, proportional representation is used to decide
elections, and party elites control access to the ballot. To develop a theory of progressive
ambition for Mexico, it is critical to take into account the mixed-nature of the electoral
system, i.e. the presence of both single-member districts, plurality elections and closedlist proportional representation, as well as the centralized control over ballot access by
party elites. These two factors have a significant impact on the probability of winning an
election, the costs of obtaining office, and independent effects on individual behavior that
are likely to have indirect effects on future career paths.

18

A legislator from the President’s party does not necessarily also have a greater chance
of winning elected office. The probability of winning elected office has more to do with
local and state-level circumstances, which may or may not be favorable towards the
President’s party. However, legislators from the governor’s party may in fact have greater
chances to win elected office, although the decision to pursue a local elected office versus
a state bureaucratic appointment comes down to comparing the benefits of each particular
office. Except for mayors of large cities and state congressional leaders, other local
elected offices hold potentially fewer benefits than a high level state bureaucratic
position, such as a cabinet or sub-secretary appointment.
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In the U.S., the electoral system and methods of candidate selection both
encourage a direct relationship between citizens and their representatives. In the
American context, incumbents periodically seek re-election from voters in single-member
districts. In the case of open seats or internal party conflict, primary elections are held in
which voters select between competing candidates. While not all voters in the U.S. can
participate in primaries, becoming a party member is relatively costless. Furthermore, it
is voters, not party elites, that determine ballot access for ambitious actors. Assuming a
potential candidate has the resources and enough support, they are free to contest primary
elections in the hope of obtaining a spot on the general election ballot.
Attempting to develop a theory of political ambition and its consequences in other
institutional contexts must deal with this critical assumption regarding the relationship
between voters and representatives. In many other political systems, various actors and
institutions serve as mediators between voters and representatives. Electoral rules serve
as one institutional mediator between voters and representatives, since in many countries
some form of proportional representation with multi-member districts is used, making it
difficult for representatives to identify a specific territorial constituency to which they
should respond and for voters to identify specific representatives they should hold
accountable. Political parties also serve as mediators between voters and representatives
(Schattschneider 1960). Regardless of the type of electoral system used, parties may have
direct control over ballot access or indirect control by restricting access to necessary
resources (e.g. campaign finance) to pursue a political campaign. When mediation
between voters and representatives occurs, representatives are likely to have greater
incentives to respond to party elites and other important party constituencies in order to
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maintain and further their political careers. These mediating institutions are also likely to
greatly influence the probability of winning office, and the costs of obtaining it.
2.4.1 The electoral system
Mexico uses a mixed electoral system whereby a proportion of officeholders run
in districts of small magnitude, and others reach office through closed-list proportional
representation in districts of high magnitude. The nature of the electoral system varies by
office and by level of government. For the Mexican Chamber of Deputies, 300 members
are elected through single-member district, plurality elections, and 200 members are
elected though closed-list proportional representation in five 40-member districts. State
legislatures employ a similar formula, although the percentage of proportional
representation seats varies widely by state. For the Senate, each party proposes twomember slates, and each state elects three members, for a total of 96 members elected at
the state level. The top vote-getting party sends their two members to the Senate, while
the second place party sends the candidate listed first on the two-member slate. In
addition, there are 32 senators elected by closed-list proportional representation on a
single national list. Voters for legislative office only receive one ballot to vote for district
(or statewide) candidates, unlike most other mixed-member electoral systems (Kerevel
2010). Mayors, governors and presidents must win a plurality of votes to win. For
mayoral races, city council seats are proposed as a slate along with the mayoral
candidate, thus voters do not get to vote individually for city council seats. A vote for the
mayor means a vote for that party’s slate of city council candidates. In addition, many
municipalities have proportional representation city council positions, and therefore
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losing parties in mayoral races also gain some representation on the city council, which
may or may not include losing candidates for mayor.
Although the Mexican electoral system is extremely complicated, for our
purposes here it suffices to focus on the difference between having to campaign for votes,
such as running in a district race for legislative office, or a municipal or statewide office
for mayor, governor or senator, and not having to campaign for votes, such as obtaining a
candidacy on a proportional representation list or a city council slate. Simply, in Mexico,
some candidates must campaign for a personal vote, while others do not (Carey and
Shugart 1995).
In many other mixed-electoral systems, such as Germany, Japan, and New
Zealand, the difference between candidates who run in district races and those on the
proportional representation lists are blurred due to the presence of dual candidacy and
best-loser provisions (Massicotte 2004; Ferrera, Herron and Nishikawa 2005; Pekkanen,
Nyblade and Krauss 2006). Dual candidacy refers to the practice of district candidates
also populating the proportional representation lists, where even if a candidate loses the
district race, they can still obtain office through the list vote. The best-loser provision in
Japan refers to the practice whereby the ranking on the proportional representation list is
determined by the smallest margin of loss for a party’s candidates. Candidates who lost
by the fewest votes in a district race are then ranked higher on the PR list than candidates
who lost by wider margins. In these cases, most candidates, regardless of how they
eventually reach office, must campaign for votes and thus the cost of obtaining office is
very similar for candidates who win district races and those who reach office through
proportional representation. In Mexico, dual candidacy is restricted by law and not
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widely used in practice (Kerevel 2010) and thus, there is a much more clear-cut
distinction between district and PR candidates, which has an impact on the individual
probability of winning and the costs of running.19
The factors that influence the probability of winning office are going to differ for
potential candidates depending on whether or not they seek or obtain a district candidacy
or a PR candidacy. For example, let us consider a federal legislator who is seeking a state
legislative seat after their term ends. Candidates seeking state legislative office are likely
to factor in their party’s performance in previous elections in their district, as well as the
party’s general performance in the state. Potential candidates who have the option of
running in a safe district should be more likely to seek a district candidacy, than a
candidate who is a member of a party that rarely or never wins in that district. The party’s
general state-wide performance is also important for candidates thinking of running for
state legislative office. Proportional representation seats are allocated based on the
percentage of votes a party receives across all district races, creating a negative
relationship between a party’s statewide performance and the number of proportional
representation seats they are likely to win. This negative relationship occurs because as
parties win a greater percentage of district seats, there are entitled to a fewer number of
proportional representation seats. For example, a party who won all the district races
would not win any proportional representation seats, while smaller parties who lost most
or all of the district races, but still obtained a percentage of votes above the
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Some Mexican states use dual candidacy and best-loser provisions for state legislative
offices, but little research exists on this particular topic to inform us on how widespread it
is, or its effectiveness (But see, Gonzalez and Milazzo 2011).
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representational threshold, would gain most or all of their seats through proportional
representation (Calvo and Abal Medina 2002).
Potential candidates from parties who dominate a particular electoral environment
are much more likely to seek a district race than a spot on the PR lists, since dominant or
majority parties are much less likely to win any proportional representation seats due to
legal caps on the number of seats a party can hold in the legislature. As a party’s
percentage of statewide votes declines, the more attractive a spot on the PR lists becomes,
unless they have the opportunity to run in a district where their party performs well. For
small parties (e.g. receive less than ~10% votes statewide), candidates who run in district
races are largely sacrificial lambs who are necessary for obtaining votes to be eligible for
PR seats, but have little to no chance of winning on their own.20
The costs of running are also likely to differ widely based on whether or not a
potential candidate seeks a district or PR candidacy. Since dual candidacy is hardly an
important factor in Mexican elections, candidates on the PR lists largely do not campaign
for votes. They may engage in behind the scenes work, but do not have to engage in
debates, organize campaign events, go door to door, give speeches, produce
advertisements or engage in clientelist practices.21 In contrast, a candidate running in a
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See Calvo and Medina (2002) for a discussion about how difficult it can be for parties
to coordinate effectively under this system, especially without previous experience. For
example, the PRD miscalculated in the 1997 elections for the Legislative Assembly of the
Federal District, by putting most of their experienced candidates on the PR lists. When
they swept the district races, their experienced candidates were unable to reach office
through PR.
21
Unfortunately, clientelism and vote-buying is a regular feature of Mexican elections for
all parties. Some examples might include free t-shirts and hats with campaign images on
them, organizing events where free services are offered, from haircuts to medical exams,
or even the direct handing out of money. Campaigns in rural areas might include
candidates giving away cement or fertilizer to potential voters. Where the money comes
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district race for votes must typically engage in all of these activities. If the race is
extremely competitive, the costs are likely to be even higher than if the race is not
competitive.
While all potential candidates would probably prefer to pay no costs to winning
office, political parties need candidates to run in these district races and therefore, the
benefits of holding office after winning a district election are likely to be different than
holding office won through a spot on the PR list. Candidates who can win district races
are likely to be valuable to political parties, and the act of winning a district election is
also likely to bring benefits to the individual officeholder. A winner of a district race is
likely to have greater name recognition and connections to voters in a given district. They
also have ties to a territorially-defined constituency which can be used to provide
constituency service and be used as an area where they can claim credit for their activities
while in office. These activities are likely to bring benefits to the individual officeholder
for their future political careers after their current term is over. Officeholders who
obtained their position through proportional representation are unlikely to accrue these
same benefits since they have no easily identifiable territorial constituency, have not
demonstrated they can win votes in an election, and voters are unlikely to know who they
are absent other unrelated factors.22
Legislators elected under PR pay fewer costs to reach office, especially when
there are district candidates doing much of the campaigning. For candidates at the top of
the list, the probability of winning office is extremely high, which suggests that political
from to pay for these activities is unknown. I have personally observed some of these
activities, as well as gleaned evidence of it from newspaper reports and interviews.
22
However, some legislators elected through PR obtain high profile leadership positions,
which can be useful for pursuing a future elected office.
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parties are strategic in who they place at the top of the list since they are fairly certain
these individuals will reach office regardless of the party’s overall electoral performance.
Especially in a system without reelection, party control over the top of the list provides
one mechanism for parties to place more experienced and loyal candidates in office who
can take charge of the party’s agenda and business inside the legislature. For legislators at
the top of the list, the probability they will secure an important leadership position once
they reach office is also much higher compared to district candidates or PR candidates
lower on the list (Kerevel 2010). These leadership positions are desirable as they often
come with added financial benefits, additional staff, and increased influence over policy.
These differential benefits, as well as the variation in the probability of winning
office and the costs of running, suggest that we will see differences in behavior among
officeholders based on their mode of election, as well as differences in the career paths of
officeholders by mode of election. There is already a large literature suggesting that
legislative behavior is likely to vary based on their mode of election, with legislators
elected through single-member districts much more likely to engage in personal-vote
seeking behavior compared to legislators elected through some form of proportional
representation (e.g. Lancaster 1986; Carey and Shugart 1995; Ashworth and Bueno de
Mesquita 2006; Heitschusen, Young and Wood 2005). Since the benefits of holding a
legislative seat won through a district race include the increased possibility of providing
constituency service, which serve to further individual career goals, we should expect to
see officeholders elected in single-member districts to engage in much more constituency
service and pork-barreling activity than officeholders elected through PR. However,
officeholders elected through PR should not be assumed to be any less ambitious, but
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since they are much less likely to use constituency service and pork-barreling as a way to
further their career goals, they should be more likely to use the other tools available to
them than district officeholders, namely bill sponsorship and influence within the
legislature through the obtainment of leadership posts.
Differences in behavior while in office are also likely to translate into differences
in career paths for officeholders elected through different methods. District officeholders
should be much more likely to build on the political capital accumulated through winning
an election by seeking office in the same or overlapping constituency in which they were
originally elected. In contrast, PR officeholders have no clearly defined constituency
other than their own party, and thus we should expect these individuals to pursue offices
where they do not need to gain the support of a clearly defined territorial constituency,
such as a bureaucratic appointment, future proportional representation seats, or to work
within the party organizations. Since PR officeholders may also be more likely to engage
in legislative work such as drafting bills and chairing committees, they should also be
somewhat more likely to seek a future legislative office since their skills will be
transferable, and parties in a system without reelection need to rely on a subset of skilled
legislators to conduct legislative business when building seniority in a specific legislative
chamber is not possible.
2.4.2 Candidate selection methods
The way in which candidates are selected to run for elected office is also likely to
influence the probability of an ambitious individual winning office and the costs of
running for office. In much of the existing literature on political ambition, candidate
selection is largely ignored. In the American context, incumbent officeholders rarely have
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to battle to secure a spot on the ballot, and even if there is an intra-party challenge to a
candidate’s placement, the decision is left up to voters to decide in a primary election. In
Brazil, where significant work has been done on ambition outside the United States,
incumbent officeholders possess the right to a spot on the ballot in future elections for the
same office, and also possess the right to use the same party label under which they won
office in the first place, regardless of what party leaders might want (Samuels 2003).
Thus, in most studies of political ambition that focus on current officeholders who either
seek reelection or seek alternative office, the issue of candidate selection is rarely
accounted for in explaining the strategic behavior of ambitious politicians. However, in
many other contexts, Mexico and Argentina included, being an incumbent is not
necessarily a sure way to secure a spot on the ballot in a future election (De Luca, Jones
and Tula 2002). Political parties control ballot access and may seek to satisfy a number
of different interests that may not always coincide with the individual goals of ambitious
politicians.
In competitive environments, elites responsible for selecting and supporting
candidates are likely to privilege electability over other factors, such as personal
relationships or ideological compatibility. In an uncompetitive environment, an ambitious
politician wishing to gain or maintain office must cater to party members or other elites
who control access to the ballot. When one party dominates a particular environment,
voters have little voice at the ballot box, other than to ratify decisions made by party
elites. Internal competition within the party for ballot access is likely to be related to a
number of factors, such as loyalty to the party or an individual, connections to particular
powerful elites, clientelist linkages, or as the result of a quota system for particular
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organized groups critical to the maintenance of one-party dominance (e.g. De la Garza
1972; Smith 1979). Thus, in uncompetitive environments, ambitious politicians have
little incentive to try and distinguish themselves from other competitors in front of voters
or the public in general, removing incentives for politicians to work hard and represent
their constituents, and instead cultivate the necessary relationships for gaining or
maintaining future office.
However, in a competitive environment, the logic changes, even if party elites
still control ballot access. Parties now must win elections to maintain or gain power, and
voters ultimately must ratify decisions taken by political parties. When electoral
competition is fierce, party members and elites may still desire to satisfy internal
requirements for ballot access but are much more likely to privilege a potential
candidate’s electability over the above mentioned factors, since the party gains little by
losing an election. Ambitious actors within this environment are likely to recognize that
not only will they have to satisfy a party’s internal constituency, but must also
demonstrate their ability to work for the general public. Politicians in office thus have a
greater incentive in competitive environments to represent their constituencies not only to
curry favor with voters, but also to demonstrate to party elites that they can work hard for
the party, can mobilize voters, and hopefully win future elections.
Evidence from Mexico supports this logic. Under the one-party dominant system
of the PRI prior to democratization in the 1990s, PRI candidates for office were typically
named by the President or other high-level leaders in highly undemocratic procedures
(Castañeda 2001; De la Garza 1972; Greene 2007; Langston 2001; Smith 1979; Wuhs
2006). Furthermore, candidates for legislative office were typically named to satisfy
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quota requirements for the labor, peasant, and popular sectors that made up the territorial
organization of the PRI (Smith 1979). Districts were pre-assigned to a particular party
sector, and then members of the various organizations would rotate in and out of
legislative office. Since there was little real competition for these seats, the internal
decisions of the PRI ensured victory for individuals granted ballot access up until the
early 1990s (Wuhs 2006). Due to this particular system of candidate selection and the
dominance of the PRI in nearly all levels of government, individual PRI legislators had
little incentive to engage in behavior that might help them win an election. Instead, they
served as representatives of their particular sector of the dominant party. Evidence of
legislative behavior during PRI-party rule underscores this point. Congress largely served
as a rubber stamp for policies emanating from the executive branch, and legislators
engaged in very little work (de la Garza 1972; Weldon 2002; Molinar Horcasitas and
Weldon 2009; Nava Polina and Yáñez López 2003), nor were legislative seats considered
valuable positions for pursuing a political career. A legislative seat occupied the lowerstrata on the political opportunity structure, and most of the important political elites and
future presidential candidates of the PRI regime rarely ever had any legislative
experience, instead considering a position in one of the federal government ministries as
key to reaching the highest levels of office (Smith 1979).
However, as the one-party dominant regime slowly collapsed, other parties
became more competitive and started to win elected office (Eisenstadt 2004; Greene
2007; Klesner 2005). One result of the increased electoral competition was a reform of
existing candidate selection methods, leading to greater local input and greater
participation from voters and local party members (Langston 2001; Wuhs 2006). Party
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leaders began to recognize that it was important to select candidates with a chance of
winning an election, rather than just selecting party loyalists (Freidenberg 2010). It is
important to note that the decentralization in methods of candidate selection since the
1990s has not been a linear process. Up to the present, the national party organizations
possess a great deal of power in deciding how local candidates are selected and as
Freidenberg (2010) has argued, there has been some movement towards more centralized
control in recent years. Nevertheless, what is clear is that where parties are competitive,
electability seems to be the overriding factor in candidate selection, rather than only
catering to internal party constituencies as the PRI did prior to democratization
(Freidenberg 2010).23
Candidate selection methods in Mexico have varied widely across time, across
parties, and even across districts in the same election within parties. All three major
parties, the PAN, the PRI, and the PRD, have statutory discretion in their ability to use
closed primaries, polling24, district or state conventions of party notables, or unilateral
nomination by the national party organizations to decide which candidates will appear on
the ballot (Corona Armenta 2004; Freidenberg 2010; Reveles Vázquez 2003a; 2003b;
Wuhs 2006).25 This variation in selection methods is also common in Argentina, another
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As Freidenberg (2010) highlights, decentralized candidate selection does not
necessarily mean electability. Local party structures could be controlled by relative
extremists within the party who have a tendency to select candidates who may not be
very competitive in a general election.
24
Public opinion polls run by the party organizations to survey preferences among party
members.
25
Furthermore, since the major parties typically run in coalition with other minor parties,
any statutory rules regarding selection methods no longer apply. How candidates are
selected is a key component of any coalition agreement and running in a coalition
increases the discretionary power of party leaders above and beyond any restrictions that
may exist in party statutes (Freidenberg 2010).
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country where legislative reelection is not the norm (De Luca, Jones and Tula 2002).
Methods of selection are typically negotiated between state and national party leaders.
Governors also have an enormous amount of control over candidate selection for their copartisans in the states (Freidenberg 2010; Langston 2010). In some cases, national party
leaders will impose candidates to avoid potential intra-party strife that could damage
them in the election, or to ensure that an electable candidate is chosen, rather than a party
ideologue, in key races (Freidenberg 2010). Where competition is less salient, because
the party already has a high probability of winning regardless of the candidate, then
parties often negotiate candidacies to satisfy the various factions within each of the major
parties to avoid major state- or national-level splits in the party (Freidenberg 2010).
Furthermore, the methods for selecting candidates on the PR lists varies by party,
although the process is much more centralized. Typically, national party leaders control
access to the top spots on the PR lists to ensure that their future congressional leaders will
reach office, and as rewards to other key members and intellectuals that have little chance
of winning a district race (Wuhs 2006; Freidenberg 2010; Kerevel 2010). Thus,
candidates for the PR lists are drawn from a somewhat different pool of potential
candidates, and are selected for reasons fundamentally different than for those used to fill
the district race slots. One implication of this difference in selection methods for the two
modes of election, is that officeholders should display different backgrounds prior to
entering office and pursue different careers after leaving office. Since PR candidates for
federal legislative office are likely to have greater ties to national party leaders
responsible for their selection, we should see a greater number of legislators elected
through PR to come from national party positions and the federal bureaucracy than
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legislators elected through district races. PR legislators are also somewhat less likely to
have the state-level connections to pursue future office at the sub-national level and
therefore we should see that PR legislators are less likely to pursue a sub-national office.
The nature of candidate selection in Mexico, combined with a prohibition on
consecutive reelection is likely to lead to conflicts between the individual goals of
ambitious politicians and the collective goals of parties who want to win elections (Carey
1996). On the one hand, individual actors should demonstrate a high degree of loyalty to
their political parties, since it is the party who largely determines future ballot access, or
access to other appointed positions in public office. Political party organizations should
be fairly strong, and individual members should display a high degree of loyalty to their
parties. However, an ambitious actor may have individual goals that occasionally conflict
with party goals. For example, a federal legislator from party A may wish to run for the
mayor’s seat of an important city after their term is over. Party leaders in party A at the
city, state, and national level may have one or several candidates in mind they think can
win the mayoral election, and this ambitious federal legislator may not be on the list of
potential candidates. However, the federal legislator may have been working throughout
their term to build up a constituency and name recognition in this city, and may feel they
have a good chance to win the mayoral election, regardless of the party label they run
under. Leaders in Party A now face a potentially difficult choice. They feel they have a
better candidate that is more likely to win the mayor’s seat, but if they ignore the
legislator also competing for the seat, some weaker party B may court the legislator to
run under their party label. If the legislator leaves Party A for Party B, Party A risks a
potential split in their own ranks, which may negatively influence them in the election.
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However, if the other candidate for party A is ignored in favor of the legislator, this other
candidate also faces the option of switching to Party B or some other political party. In a
multi-party system, even holding open primaries is unlikely to address this conundrum
faced by party A, since the losers of a primary election can still leave Party A for Party B
after the primary is over.26
Ambitious politicians in this situation are likely to desire most a spot on the
ballot. Without a spot on the ballot, the probability of winning the election is zero.
However, switching from Party A to Party B also entails a number of high costs. First,
the party label is likely to influence the probability of winning. Even if a potential
candidate is popular, they may face a much greater chance of winning the election if they
ran with Party A than if they ran with Party B. Second, since the political parties
themselves prize loyalty among their members, a potential candidate who has been
developing a political career with party A is likely to lose much of their political capital if
they switch parties. Other members of Party B are unlikely to trust the party switcher, and
members of Party A will likely hold a grudge against this individual if they ever attempt
to return to Party A after switching parties. Even if the party switcher wins the election,
they still face a choice at the end of their term on where to seek a different future office.
Since leaders of Party B now have control over the future of this individual’s career, they
may not trust the individual to work in the party’s interest due to the short time they have
been a party member, and also face resistance from other members of Party B who have
been loyal for much longer. Depending on the particular confluence of factors in any
given situation, the party switcher may be successful in developing a new political career
26

This is true assuming that primaries are run by the parties and not run by the state or all
held on the same day, which is the case in Mexico.
54

with Party B, or may face a shortened political career as leaders in Party B pass this
individual over for others. Of course, the individual could continue to switch parties
every election. Yet, because party loyalty is valued by all political parties, and excessive
switching may turn off voters, it is unlikely that ambitious actors in this particular type of
system would pursue a continuous strategy of party switching over multiple elections.
As a result, the costs of switching parties could be extremely high and signal the
end of one’s political career if the ambitious actor does not make a wise decision.
Because of the potentially high costs of switching parties, we should see a high degree of
party loyalty where reelection is prohibited since the probability of winning and the
benefits of holding office for a single term are likely to be lower than the costs of
switching to obtain ballot access. However, in some cases, an ambitious actor may
perceive their probability of winning to be high and the benefits of holding a particular
office to be high, outweighing the potentially high costs of switching parties. Thus, on
the surface, the prohibition on reelection and party control over ballot access has two
potentially contradictory consequences. While in office, we are likely to see high levels
of party loyalty from individual members, as loyalty to one’s party is the best way of
securing a future office. However, during election periods, we are also likely to see high
levels of party disloyalty, or party switching, as conflicts over candidate selection and
securing future office become the most critical issue for ambitious actors. While
politicians join parties for a number of reasons, such as ideological affinity, and may also
switch parties for a number of reasons that have little to do with the institutional rules in
place, under the combination of non-consecutive reelection and party control over ballot
access, one is likely to observe that most ambitious politicians who do switch parties will
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do so over candidate selection conflicts, since the prohibition on reelection forces many
actors to focus primarily on political survival and obtaining the next position.
2.5. Conclusion
In a game of snakes and ladders, the object of the game for each player is to reach
100 at the top of the board. To play the game, each player rolls a die to move up the game
board from the starting position of 0 to the final position of a 100. Along the way, a
player may land on a ladder, which puts them ahead a variable number of spaces, or they
may land on a snake, sending them in reverse, potentially all the way back to the
beginning of the game.
Ambitious actors who pursue a political career without reelection play in an
environment much like a game of snakes and ladders. They all desire to reach the highest
office, or 100, but along the way they may advance rapidly for a period of time, and then
suddenly appear to “regress” and pursue a lower position than what they currently hold.
The important point for ambitious actors in this environment is that they must keep
playing the game, constantly seeking the highest office even if they occasionally must
return to a lower office. By staying in the game, actors still have the potential to “win” or
reach their most desired office. In the American context, ambitious actors tend to quit
playing the game when they land on a snake. While nothing prevents a politician in the
U.S. from competing for lower office after possessing a higher office, almost no actors
do, suggesting that a step down the career ladder for an American politician is not a
viable strategy for reaching high office. To further the analogy, American politicians will
tend to play the game as long as they move up, and if they are comfortable in their
current position, refuse to roll the die. In other contexts where reelection is not possible
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or highly uncertain, it is always preferable to roll the die and stay in the game, regardless
of the outcome.27
In this chapter I have attempted to develop a theory of political ambition to
explain why it is rational for political actors in a context of no reelection to always roll
the die, or potentially compete for an office of lower prestige after serving in a higher
office and why political careers in this environment are likely to resemble a game of
snakes and ladders. Pursuing a political career in this institutional environment has
consequences for the types of observable behavior one will see from strategic legislators,
and will likely influence the type of representation citizens receive from their individual
representatives as well as their political parties. While the theory is closely tied to details
of the Mexican case, the hope is that the discussion is sufficiently general that the theory
could be applied to other contexts where the pursuit of static ambition is an extremely
risky endeavor.
In the following chapters, I put several implications of this theory to the test. Not
all of the possible implications of this theory are empirically tested, and will have to
await future research. In the next chapter, I examine how changes in electoral
competition coincided with changes in the career paths of legislators and changes in their
behavior. The following chapters (4-7) then develop specific testable hypotheses based
on the theory presented here, and examine career paths, pork-barreling, bill sponsorship,
and party switching separately.

27

I would like to thank Michael Rocca for helping me flesh out this analogy.
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Chapter 3: The consequences of increasing electoral competition
In this chapter, I argue that general increases in electoral competition during the
transition towards democracy had profound effects on the political careers of Mexican
legislators, which in turn, influenced the behavior of legislators while in office. Increased
competition altered the political opportunity structure of Mexican politics by increasing
the value of elected office and also by making municipal and state-level positions
valuable positions for pursuing successful political careers. Prior to democratization,
administrative office, rather than elected office, was more valuable for climbing the
political career ladder (Smith 1979; Nacif 1996). I make the case that electoral
competition altered the political opportunity structure by introducing meaningful
competition for elected offices and also by increasing the importance of the Mexican
Congress in the national-policymaking process, altering the way strategic political actors
used a congressional seat to pursue their goals.
Increases in electoral competition also had a profound influence on the party
system, by encouraging opposition parties to professionalize and reduce their previous
reliance on political amateurs. As the party system changed and became much more
competitive, the increased professionalization of the political parties as vehicles to
channel the ambitions of their members led to dramatic changes in behavior as the
increasing relevance of Congress in the policy-making process vis-a-vis the Executive
Branch was both a cause and consequence of strategic legislators using the tools at their
disposal to pursue their career goals.
This chapter draws on secondary literature that examines career paths and
legislative behavior prior to 1997 as well as aggregate data from the 1997-2009 period to
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demonstrate how changes in electoral competition and the party system led to changes in
the career paths of legislators and their individual behavior. Understanding these
structural changes in the Mexican political system are crucial for setting up the
subsequent chapters and for interpreting results based on individual-level data.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. I first describe changes in the
competitive environment, from one of one-party dominance, to a competitive three-party
system. As a result of changes in the competitive environment, the political parties and
individual politicians adopted new strategies in an attempt to cope with increasing levels
of competition. The second part of this chapter examines changes in the career paths of
legislators across the three major parties, demonstrating that as competition increased, the
political parties increasingly drew upon more experienced, professional and locallyconnected candidates to compete for political office.
The third part of this chapter examines the consequences of changes in the party
system and the electoral environment for legislative behavior. As the party system
became more competitive, the parties and individual politicians had greater incentives to
engage in behavior to increase credit claiming for particular policies in the hope of
attracting greater vote shares. I find that increases in electoral competition led to a rapid
increase in congressional activity and productivity as legislators increasingly sponsored
more bills. Similarly, the loss of majority control in the legislature by the President’s
party reduced the legislative success of the executive, while increasing the importance of
Congress in the policy-making process. Legislators also increasingly engaged in
behaviors that are consistent with a shift towards more candidate-centered politics. Over
time, federal deputies increasingly sponsored more single-authored bills as one way to
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engage in credit-claiming and position-taking, and were less likely to co-author bills with
other deputies. Deputies also increasingly began attempting to secure federal resources
for their municipalities and states during the annual budget process and away from
federal programs with diffuse targets.
In sum, this chapter demonstrates that increased electoral competition and an
increasingly competitive party system led to more experienced and locally connected
legislative candidates, who then became increasingly productive while in office and
increasingly represented local, rather than strictly partisan, interests.
3.1 The decline of one-party dominance
The former ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) had a solid hold on
power from its formation in 1929 until the late 1980s, although it did not lose the
presidency until 2000 when it was defeated by the National Action Party (PAN). The
roots of the PRI can be traced back to the Mexican Revolution (1910-20) as leaders of the
revolutionary state attempted to consolidate their power. The original incarnation of the
PRI was formed by former president Plutarco Elías Calles in 1929 under the name,
National Revolutionary Party (PNR). The party switched names again in 1938 under
president Lázaro Cárdenas to the Party of the Mexican Revolution (PRM) and then
became the PRI in 1946 (Greene 2007).
One important mechanism used by the PRI-state to maintain control over the
political system was the constant reform of electoral rules (Díaz Cayeros and Magaloni
2001). The most important and long lasting reform was the ban on consecutive reelection
instituted in 1933. In 1933, the Mexican Congress approved a constitutional amendment
that prohibited consecutive reelection for federal deputies and senators, as well as for
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state legislators and municipal presidents (i.e. mayors) (Constitución Política de los
Estados Unidos Mexicanos, Art. 59 and Art. 116). Governors, as well as the President,
are barred from reelection for life.
There were several reasons why the PRI (actually the PNR in 1933) implemented
term limits in the mid-1930s. Prior to 1933, the justification for presidential term limits
was to reduce the instability over presidential succession that had plagued Mexico since
the end of the Revolution. The ban on presidential reelection has stabilized alternation in
power since 1934. In addition, the reform was seen as implementing a key tenet of the
Revolution, “Sufragio Efectivo, No Reelección,” or “Effective Suffrage, No Reelection,”
which had been raised by Francisco Madero against the dictatorship of Porfirio Díaz in
1910 (Weldon 2003, 33).28 However, the ban on reelection for all public offices was not
part of the revolutionary platform, and Jeffrey Weldon (2003) argues it was put in place
for other motives. A ban on consecutive reelection contributed to the centralization of
power in the hands of the PRI’s national party leaders and the President, and also
centralized power nationally by weakening local political parties and local power
structures (Weldon 2003, 34). In 1964-65 there was an attempt in the Mexican Chamber
of Deputies to allow reelection for federal legislators. However, after the reform passed
in the lower house, the Senate unanimously rejected it. Careaga (2003, 54-55) argues that
the reform was struck down because the PRI saw the ban on consecutive reelection as a
key mechanism for their permanence in power, and contributed to the stability of the
political system.
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Porfirio Díaz also used the same slogan in the 1870s to obtain power (Drake 2009).
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In addition to implementing term limits for all offices, the PRI continually
reformed electoral rules for legislative office as a way to maintain the legitimacy of the
one-party dominant system, while giving some political space to opposition parties (Díaz
Cayeros and Magaloni 2001). Prior to 1963, legislators were elected by plurality in
single-member districts, which were nearly all dominated by the PRI (Nacif 1996). In
1963, a restricted form of proportional representation was instituted that would provide
some minor representation to opposition parties. The reason for the implementation of
this system under the PRI was to increase the political system’s legitimacy. Although the
PRI rhetorically claimed Mexico was a democracy, the composition of the legislature and
the electoral fortunes of opposition parties suggested otherwise. The PRI dominated the
electoral playing field, but depended on minor parties continuing to compete in elections,
in order to justify the PRI’s continuance in power and differentiate the regime from other
authoritarian states in the region. However, in no way was the competition fair as the PRI
was able to use state coffers and patronage to maintain itself in power. Kenneth Greene
(2007) argues the PRI’s use of state resources and the politicization of the federal
bureaucracy, combined with the selective use of fraud and repression, made it nearly
impossible for opposition parties to compete on a level playing field. Not until the
economic crisis of the 1980s, which seriously depleted the PRI-state’s ability to plunder
the treasury and resources of state-run businesses for electoral gain, did the political
system open up the possibility for opposition parties to win elected office.
The National Action Party (PAN), founded in 1929 by conservatives and Catholic
activists in response to the semi-socialist state-led reforms of the revolutionary regime,
has been Mexico’s most consistent opposition party, although it failed to gain any
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significant office until the late 1980s (Mizrahi 2003). The PAN had for many years
advocated for the introduction of proportional representation in order to increase the
presence of other parties in the political system, and it seems that the PRI adopted their
idea in order to add some legitimacy to its democratic claims, while also silencing
internal and external critics of the PRI’s authoritarian practices (Bejar Algazi 2004;
Mabry 1973).
The electoral system was substantially reformed again in 1977, leading to the
creation of a mixed-member system with 300 SMD seats and 100 PR seats. Mexico in the
1970s witnessed substantial increases in political violence, while the democratic facade
of the PRI regime was seriously challenged. In the 1976 presidential election, the PRI
candidate ran uncontested as the PAN failed to agree on a candidate. In an attempt to
bring new political parties into the fold, as well as regain some legitimacy for electoral
politics, the 1977 electoral reform promoted the creation and participation of a number of
new opposition parties while giving them an increased chance to win seats in the
Chamber of Deputies (Greene 2007; Rodríguez Araujo 1989). From 1988 on, the
Chamber of Deputies has been made up of 300 plurality seats, and 200 closed-list PR
seats. Since 1994, the electoral rules also stipulate that no party can win more than 300
seats in the Chamber of Deputies, which prevents a single party from being able to
reform the constitution without participation from at least one other political party
(Molinar Horcasitas and Weldon 2001:225-229).
Not until 1988, when the PRI faced its first serious challenge in the presidential
campaign due to an internal split in the PRI over the presidential nomination, did the
opposition parties begin to present themselves as serious contenders to the PRI. The
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National Democratic Front coalition of disgruntled members of the PRI and numerous
small left parties, led by Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, that competed in 1988 went on to form
the other major opposition party in Mexico, the Party of the Democratic Revolution
(PRD) (Bruhn 1997). In 1989, the PAN won the governor’s seat in Baja California, the
first governorship to be held by a party other than the PRI since its founding in 1929.
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, opposition parties were also increasingly
winning elections at the municipal and state levels. While there was a certain level of
sub-national democratization prior to alternation in power at the national level, it is not
quite accurate to characterize the slow-moving process of democratization in Mexico as a
largely bottom up process. Parallel to opposition victories by the PAN in such states as
Baja California, Guanajuato, and Chihuahua, and local level victories by the PRD in
Michoacán, a number of states governed by the PRI, such as Puebla, Oaxaca and
Tabasco, ignored pressures from the PRI national leadership to accept opposition
victories and instead entrenched a type of authoritarian politics that was no longer subject
to oversight by the federal government (Cornelius 1999; Eisenstadt 1999; 2004; Greene
2007; Snyder 1999; Ward and Rodriguez 1999). Many of these sub-national authoritarian
regimes persisted long after 2000, despite democratic multi-party competition at the
national level and a general weakening of the PRI’s hold on national political power.
Table 3.1 presents the breakdown of seats in the Chamber of Deputies from 1982
through the 2006 elections. As can be seen in the table, the PRI held the large majority of
seats in 1982 and 1985, suffered a slight blow to its congressional dominance in 1988,
but then recuperated until it finally lost majority control of the Chamber in 1997. Figure
3.1 demonstrates the PRI’s decline graphically. As is very apparent in figure 3.1, the PRI
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had a stranglehold on nearly all the single-member district seats to the Chamber until the
1997 elections, while most opposition party representation came from the proportional
representation seats. A similar story exists for the Senate, as shown in Figure 3.2. The
PRI held nearly all seats in the Senate until the 1990s, and did not lose majority control of
the upper-chamber until the 2000 elections.
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Sources: Nacif 1997 for 1982-88 data. Pdba.georgetown.edu for 1991-1997 data; ife.org.mx. * Results for 1988 reflect
individuals elected as part of the Frente Democratico Nacional, which became the PRD in 1989.

Table 3.1: 1982-2006 Elections to the Chamber of Deputies
1982
1985
1988
1991
1994
1997
2000
2003
2006
Party
SMD PR SMD PR SMD PR SMD PR SMD PR SMD PR SMD PR SMD PR SMD PR
PRI 299 0 289 0 233 27 290 30 273 27 165 74 132 79 161 63 62 41
PAN 1
50
9
32 38 62 10 79 20 99 64 57 136 71 80 71 137 69
PRD* 29 108 0
41
7
64 70 55 24 27 56 41 91 36
Other parties 0
50
2
68
0
3
0
50
0
10
1
14
8
23
3
25 10 54
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3.2 Increasing electoral competition and political career paths
Recent research in Mexico has suggested that electoral competition, even without
reelection, has increased democratic responsiveness and government performance
(Coppedge 1993; Beer 2003; Langston 2003; Solt 2004; Hecock 2006). This body of
work argues that increasingly competitive elections alter political recruitment patterns,
legislative roles, and the formulation of public policy, leading to more locally connected
candidates, stronger and more professional legislatures, and the development of
representative institutions. This result is due to the pressures political parties face in a
competitive environment, leading them to select candidates more popular with voters and
promote policies that voters support. For example, Caroline Beer (2003) argues that
competition has led to increasingly professional legislatures in a sub-national comparison
of state legislatures, Douglas Hecock (2006) finds that competition leads to increases in
educational spending, and Matt Ingram (2009) finds greater competition leads to
increases in judicial spending. Despite the wealth of findings, others suggest that electoral
competition has no effect on responsiveness when looking at municipal government
performance (Cleary 2007).
Primarily, this work is based on aggregate spending data, at either the municipal
or state level, and therefore fails to identify and directly test the relationship between
electoral competition and individual responsiveness and performance. Here, I further
pursue the hypothesized relationship between increased electoral competition, the career
paths of legislators, and the behavior of legislators while in office by using individuallevel data from Mexican legislators.
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One potential consequence of an increasingly competitive environment is that
political parties that seek to win elections should be more likely to choose qualified,
experienced candidates that are popular with voters. Especially in a context where parties
run candidates in single-member districts, candidate quality should be a major concern of
office-seeking political parties. In Mexico, the outcomes of the SMD races are also
crucial for the allocation of proportional representation seats, since it is solely through the
votes obtained in the SMD races that PR seats are distributed (see Kerevel 2010 for more
on the mechanics of the electoral system). The opposite should also be true. Where there
is little electoral competition, political parties should be more likely to satisfy other goals,
such as rewarding important interest groups in choosing candidates, rather than
individuals who can win votes.
Defining a quality candidate is not necessarily an easy task, although one
potential measure of quality would be a candidate who has already held previous elected
office (e.g. Jacobson 1989; Carson and Engstrom 2005). By adopting this definition, I
can compare the previous elected office experience of federal deputies during a period
when elections for the Chamber of Deputies were not very competitive (1982-1991), to
the more recent period of competitive legislative elections (1997-2009).
Benito Nacif (1996) presented information on the elected office experience of
federal deputies for the 1982-91 period as well as the type of elected office experience
deputies had during this period. In order to make comparisons between the noncompetitive period to the competitive period, I replicated Nacif’s analysis for the 19972009 period, and used his results for the 1982-91 time frame. Table 3.2 displays the
comparison. For the uncompetitive period, just over half of PRI deputies had no prior
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experience in elected office, while nearly three-quarters of opposition deputies had no
prior elected office experience. While the PRI exerted strong control over access to
elected office, most politicians who reached the Chamber of Deputies had not previously
been elected to any other office. While Nacif’s data is limited, other work on the career
paths of legislators under one-party dominance suggests similar findings. Peter Smith
(1979, 149), in a study of political careers in Mexico throughout the 20th century finds for
the 1946-71 period:
“The “electoral” track continued to be rather self-contained and isolated from the
other offices. As before, people moved with relative ease from posts in the party
hierarchy or sindicatos[unions] or municipal governments (via state-level
bureaucracies) to the Chamber of Deputies, there to repeat or retire.... One also
gets the impression that seats in the Chamber of Deputies came to furnish rewards
for loyal service in the party and in local government, and they may also have
served to cut off rising union leaders from their grass-roots constituencies, thus
making them dependent on the centralized hierarchy for further political
advancement. Except for a weak link to the Senate, the Chamber has not provided
much of a springboard to higher office.”
Other studies also suggest that the PRI used legislative office as a reward to members of
the individual sectoral organizations that made up the party, the worker’s sector, the
peasant sector, and the popular sector (De la Garza 1972; Nacif 1996). Many deputies
during this time period came from union organizations closely tied to the party, and after
serving a three-year term in the Chamber, would return to their organization. In a number
of cases, members of these sectoral organizations would serve multiple terms in the
Chamber over their political careers (De la Garza 1972).

71

Table 3.2: Elective Office Experience in the Chamber of Deputies,
1982-2009
1982-91 Average
Other
minor
PRI PAN parties Total

#of
offices
held
0 50.5% 70.0%
1 27.5% 20.0%
2 14.2% 10.0%
3 5.0% 0.0%
4 or more 4.8% 0.0%

1997-2009 Average

PRI

PAN

PRD

Total

70.0%

56.6%

29.6%

44.1%

53.6%

40.1%

21.7%

25.5%

33.6%

35.7%

30.0%

33.6%

6.7%

12.3%

27.0%

16.5%

12.7%

20.0%

0.0%

3.5%

8.2%

3.7%

3.5%

5.5%

1.7%

2.2%

1.7%

0.2%

0.3%

0.8%

Source: 1982-91 data from Nacif 1996. 1997-2009 author's compilation

Examining the results in Table 3.2 for the competitive period, 1997-2009, we see
a large increase in the percentage of deputies with previous elected office experience.
Among the PRI, a large majority of federal deputies have served in at least one prior
elected office, and about 37% have served in two or more prior elected positions. For the
PAN, which has been around much longer than the PRD, a small majority of legislators
have prior experience in elected office, but this is a drastic change from the 1982-91
period where 70 percent of PAN deputies had no prior elected office experience. Among
PRD deputies, a slight majority of legislators have no prior elected office experience,
although this is changing rapidly. Table 3.3 examines in more detail the elected office
experience for the three major parties across 4 legislative terms from 1997-2009. Among
the PRI and the PAN, the percentages of deputies with prior elected office experience
remains fairly constant across time, while members of the PRD are becoming
increasingly experienced in elected office. During the LVII Legislature (1997-2000),
67% of PRD deputies had not held prior elected office, but this percentage dropped to
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44% in the LX Legislature (2006-09). Since the PRD is a much newer party than the
PAN or the PRI, and was the victim of much greater repression by the PRI during the
1990s (Bruhn 1997; Eisenstadt 2004), it is unsurprising that it was not until very recently
that members of the PRD were able to gather elected office experience.
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Table 3.3: Elective Office Experience in Chamber of Deputies by Term among Major Parties Only,
1997-2009
PRI
PAN
PRD
#of offices
held LVII LVIII LIX
LX
LVII LVIII LIX
LX
LVII LVIII LIX
LX
0 30.3% 32.2% 29.0% 23.8% 44.0% 48.6% 38.7% 43.5% 67.2% 56.6% 46.9% 44.1%
1 33.8% 29.3% 38.5% 31.4% 37.1% 35.6% 38.0% 33.3% 25.6% 32.1% 29.6% 33.9%
2 27.4% 26.9% 24.9% 30.5% 17.2% 13.5% 18.0% 17.9% 6.4% 9.4% 16.3% 17.3%
3 8.1% 9.1% 5.4% 12.4% 1.7% 2.4% 4.7% 5.3% 0.8% 1.9% 7.1% 3.9%
4 or more 0.4% 2.4% 2.3% 1.9% 0.0% 0.0% 0.7% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.8%
Source: Author's compilation

In addition to a general increase in the elected office experience of federal
deputies across all three major parties, there is also a change in the types of previous
experience federal deputies are bringing to the Chamber, as seen in Table 3.4. During the
uncompetitive period, we see that most deputies with elected office experience have
either been federal deputies during a previous legislature, highlighting the repetition
alluded to by Smith (1979) above, or have served as state legislators. Except for a few
members of the PRI, almost no deputies had previously been senators or governors. It is
also apparent from Table 3.4 the serious lack of opportunities the PAN and other
opposition parties had at the municipal level, with very few members of these parties
having experience as a city councilor or mayor. However, with the increase in electoral
competition, there is a major change in the types of elected office experiences deputies
are bringing to the Chamber. While there are some differences across the three major
parties, there is clearly a trend across all parties to elect deputies that have previous
elected office experience at the local level. During the uncompetitive period, the most
common experience deputies had was prior service in the same office. Under increased
electoral competition, it is much more common for deputies to have previously served as
state legislators, mayors or city councilors. In addition, there is a small but important
increase in the presence of former senators and governors in the Chamber, suggesting the
Chamber is no longer a dead end for ambitious politicians as it was prior to the onset of
electoral competition.
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Table 3.4: Type of Elective Office Experience Among Federal
Deputies, 1982-2009 (Percentage of Deputies who held office at least
once)

Type of
office
city
councilor
mayor
state
legislator
federal
deputy
senator
governor

1982-91 Average
Other
minor
PRI PAN parties Total

1997-2009 Average

PRI

PAN

PRD

Total

14.7%

7.5%

8.3%

12.5%

15.1%

24.8%

11.9%

18.0%

13.2%

0.0%

5.0%

10.0%

30.1%

11.2%

13.4%

19.5%

21.0%

10.0%

10.0%

15.5%

41.0%

32.8%

26.3%

34.8%

20.1%

17.5%

11.6%

18.2%

24.0%

8.7%

11.4%

15.6%

0.4%

0.0%

0.0%

0.3%

7.0%

2.4%

3.2%

4.5%

0.4%

0.0%

0.0%

0.3%

1.8%

0.4%

0.5%

1.0%

Source: 1982-91 data from Nacif 1996. 1997-2009 author's compilation

Table 3.5 further breaks down the type of previous experience in elected office for
the 1997-2009 period. Again, we see a gradual increase in the types of experience held by
PRD deputies. Especially for local offices, such as city councilor, mayor, and state
legislator, relatively few PRD deputies had experience in these offices during the LVII
Legislature, compared to PRD deputies in the LX Legislature. For the PRI and the PAN,
there is no evident increase in the type of experience brought to the Chamber over this
time period. If career path data were available for the 1991-97 period, it is likely that this
time period is when we would see changes in the types of experience among deputies of
these two parties.
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Table 3.5: Type of Elective Office Experience Among Federal Deputies by Term, 1997-2009
(Percentage of Deputies who held office at least once)
PRI
PAN
PRD
Type of office
LVII LVIII LIX
LX
LVII LVIII LIX
LX
LVII LVIII LIX
city councilor 15.8% 13.0% 17.2% 13.3% 24.1% 25.5% 24.7% 24.6%
7.2% 11.3% 11.2%
mayor 29.9% 27.4% 29.4% 37.1% 5.2% 10.1% 14.0% 13.5%
5.6% 11.3% 19.4%
state legislator 38.5% 42.3% 43.0% 40.0% 31.9% 27.9% 41.3% 31.9% 19.2% 17.0% 30.6%
federal deputy 23.9% 27.4% 17.7% 30.5% 14.7% 4.8% 9.3% 8.7%
6.4%
9.4% 19.4%
senator 6.0% 8.2% 4.1% 13.3% 0.0% 1.4% 0.7% 5.8%
1.6%
7.6%
3.1%
governor 0.4% 2.4% 2.3% 2.9% 0.9% 0.0% 0.7% 0.5%
0.8%
0.0%
0.0%
Source: author's compilation

17.3%
17.3%
33.9%
11.0%
3.2%
0.8%

LX

Another important consequence of increased electoral competition is that elected
office has become increasingly attractive for ambitious politicians. As alluded to earlier,
elected office under one-party dominance was not a very attractive position, and
especially for members of the Chamber of Deputies during this period, serving in the
legislature provided few opportunities for advancement. For the most successful
politicians during one-party rule, such as those in the federal cabinet or the presidency, it
was rare to find many of these individuals with any elected office experience (Smith
1979; Nacif 1996). Instead, ambitious politicians seeking to move up the career ladder
sought positions within state and federal bureaucracies. For example, of the five
Presidents of Mexico from 1970-2000, not a single President had prior experience in any
elected office before becoming President, and it was virtually required to be a cabinet
member to be considered as a PRI presidential candidate (Castañeda 2001; Musacchio
2002).29
However, this situation has changed drastically with the increase in electoral
competition. President Vicente Fox (PAN, 2000-06) had previously been governor of
Guanajuato, and competed against two other former governors, Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas
29

PRI Presidents – Echeverría (1970-76), was Secretario de Gobernación prior to
becoming President, no prior elected office experience. López Portillo (1976-82), was
Secretario de Hacienda prior to becoming president, no prior elected office experience.
De la Madrid (1982-88), was Secretario de Programación y Presupuesto prior to
becoming President, no prior elected office experience. Salinas de Gortari (1988-94), was
Secretario de Programación y Presupuesto prior to becoming President, no prior elected
office experience. Zedillo (1994-2000), was Secretario de Educación Pública prior to
becoming President, no prior elected office experience. For the period from 1946-70, the
backgrounds of the Presidents is a little more varied, although all had federal cabinet
positions prior to becoming President. Alemán Valdés (1946-52) had previously served
as governor of Veracruz. Ruiz Cortines (1952-58) had prior experience as a federal
deputy and as governor of Veracruz. López Mateos (1958-64) did not have prior
experience in elected office. Díaz Ordaz (1964-70) had served as federal deputy and
senator.
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(PRD, former governor of Michoacán and former mayor of Mexico City), and Francisco
Labastida (PRI, former governor of Sinaloa). Current President Felipe Calderón (PAN,
2006-12) was a former federal deputy, and competed against Andrés Manuel López
Obrador (PRD), a former mayor of Mexico City, and Roberto Madrazo of the PRI,
former federal deputy, senator, and governor of Tabasco. For the upcoming 2012
Presidential elections, almost all the potential candidates have prior experience in elected
office. For the PRI, the main pre-candidates were Enrique Peña Nieto, former governor of
the State of México, and Manlio Fabio Beltrones, former governor of Sonora, federal
deputy and current senator. For the PRD, the main pre-candidates were López Obrador
again, and Marcelo Ebrard, current mayor of Mexico City and former federal deputy. For
the PAN, the main pre-candidates are Josefina Vázquez Mota, former federal deputy and
PAN caucus leader during the LXI Legislature, Santiago Creel, former federal deputy and
current senator, and Ernesto Cordero, current Secretary of the Treasury and the only
major potential candidate without previous experience in elected office. Now, most
candidates for higher office are likely to have elected office experience, either as
legislators, mayors of large cities, or governors (Beer 2003; Langston 2006).
3.3 Increasing electoral competition and bill sponsorship
Due to the increased role of elected office experience for advancing within the
Mexican political system, it is likely we will see individuals in these offices behave in
ways to advance their careers. For example, in a competitive environment, ambitious
legislators may sponsor more bills, give more speeches, or increase constituency service,
all in an attempt to claim credit and advance the policy interests of key constituents in
order to obtain a future office. In an uncompetitive environment, legislators have little
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incentive to engage in these activities, since their political future is not tied to electoral
performance.
While data is not available to demonstrate that legislators changed their behavior
in all of these different ways, data is available to look at changes in bill sponsorship over
time. It is likely that since electoral competition spread slowly throughout Mexico (e.g.
Cornelius, Eisenstadt and Hindley 1999; Eisenstadt 2004), that changes in legislative
behavior will be gradual, not only because some legislators are coming from
uncompetitive environments or sub-national authoritarian regimes while others come
from competitive environments, but also because politicians require a learning period to
adapt to changes in their environment. Figure 3.3 looks at the change in bill sponsorship
by federal deputies, state legislatures, and the President, from 1991 to 2009.30 What
figure 3.3 demonstrates is that in the period from 1991-97, prior to the PRI losing
majority-control of the Chamber of Deputies, federal deputies did not sponsor very many
bills, and sponsored a similar amount of bills compared to the President. Even though
deputies sponsored a somewhat similar amount of bills as the President, most bills
originating in the Chamber did not pass. For the LV Legislature, only about 22% of bills
sponsored by deputies passed, and in the LVI, this figure dropped to near 15%. In
contrast, for the period 1991-97, about 99% of bills sponsored by the President passed.
While the specific data is not present in figure 3.3, studies that have examined bill
sponsorship throughout the period of one-party rule have found a similar trend (Molinar
Horcasitas and Weldon 2009; Bejar Algazi 2004). When elections were not competitive,
and the PRI held large majorities in the legislature, most legislative activity originated in
30

Data for 1991-97 taken from Nacif 2006. Data for 1997-2009 compiled by author from
Sistema de Información Legislativa, Secretaría de Gobernación.
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the Executive branch, and legislators had little influence in the policy-making process
(See Appendix I for data on bill passage rates).
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The importance of the Chamber of Deputies in formulating policy changed
drastically following the PRI’s loss of majority control following the 1997 mid-term
elections. First, as can be seen in figure 3.3, federal deputies increasingly sponsored more
legislation. In the LV Legislature, federal deputies only sponsored 117 bills throughout
the 3-year term. During the LX Legislature, federal deputies sponsored 2691 bills. While
the passage rate of bills sponsored by federal deputies stayed fairly constant across time,
around 15-20 percent of total bills presented, deputies were certainly more active and
have had a greater influence on policy (Nacif 2006). The President’s legislative success
also declined somewhat over the same time period. In the LV Legislature, the President
sponsored 124 bills, of which 122 passed. During the LX Legislature, the President
sponsored only 42 bills, of which 38 passed. While the passage rate of Presidential bills is
still rather high, the decrease in bills emanating from the Executive reflects the strategic
calculations of the President. Executives should be more likely to sponsor bills they know
will get through the legislative process, rather than court failure by sponsoring legislation
that has little chance of passage. Nevertheless, Presidents are likely to make some
strategic miscalculations, or draft bills designed for political impact without much hope
of passage, and send bills to the legislature that fail to pass. President Vicente Fox (PAN,
2000-06) was particularly unsuccessful, even though he presented fewer bills than most
of his PRI predecessors. During the LVIII Legislature, 87% of Fox’s bills passed, and in
the LIX Legislature, only 63% of Fox’s bills passed.
The drastic increase in bill sponsorship can also be explained by legislators
seeking to claim credit for individual activity, a behavior consistent with politicians
seeking to win elected office (Mayhew 1974). Ambitious legislators are likely to engage
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in particular activities within the Chamber for which they can claim credit, such as
drafting a particular bill. Table 3.6 displays the percentage of deputies who did not
sponsor any bills across four legislative terms. In the LVII Legislature, a majority of
deputies (55.3%) did not sponsor any legislation. By the LX Legislature, the percentage
of deputies who did not sponsor any legislation drastically decreased, to 14.4%. At the
same time, the average number of bills sponsored increased over time, from 1.1 bills
during the 1997-2000 term, to 5.6 bills in the 2006-09 period.
Table 3.6: Bill sponsorship and cosponsorship in the Mexican
Chamber of Deputies, 1997-2009

Congress
LVII
LVIII
LIX
LX

Years
19972000
20002003
20032006
20062009

% of
% of
deputies
deputies
Mean
Mean
with no
with no
bills
cosponsors sponsored cosponsored
sponsored
per bill
bills
bills
1.1

7.1

55.3%

2.7%

2.0

8.0

40.0%

1.4%

5.5

3.2

22.1%

3.4%

5.6

2.8

14.4%

3.0%

Source: Author's compilation from the Gaceta Parlamentaria and the
Diario de los Debates. Propietarios only. "Sponsorship" refers to bills
presented in the Chamber of Deputies. "Cosponsorship" refers to bills
signed (but not presented) by individual deputies.

In addition, due to the lack of clear rules within the Chamber of Deputies on the
authorship of individual bills (see Chapter 6 for a larger discussion), individual deputies
may be more likely in a competitive environment to draft single-authored bills for which
they can easily claim credit, rather than work collectively with other deputies on bills
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where it may be more difficult to claim credit for individual effort. Figure 3.4 displays
trends in co-sponsorship across time. During the first two legislative terms for which I
have data on co-sponsorship, roughly half of bills were single-authored, but in the last
two legislative terms, more than three-quarters of all bills sponsored in the Chamber of
Deputies were single-authored bills. There is also a decline in the number of bills
sponsored that have more than ten co-sponsors over time.
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3.4 Increasing competition and pork-barrel politics
Above, I described how electoral competition led to increasing numbers of
locally-connected legislators with more experience in local elected office. Is there
evidence that legislators with greater levels of experience in local office are representing
more local interests in office? Recent research suggests that there is a state-level
dimension in roll-call voting in Mexico (Langston 2010; Rosas and Langston 2011), but
beyond this, little empirical evidence exists to suggest what kinds of interests legislators
are representing in the Chamber. One way to examine the types of interests legislators are
representing is by examining individual amendments to the federal budget submitted by
federal deputies.
Previous research on Mexico suggests that changes in electoral competition
altered the way in which the federal budget was debated and approved. In the 1980s and
1990s, the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) used federal spending in an
attempt to shore up existing support bases as a strategy to stunt the growth of opposition
parties (Costa-I-Font et al. 2003; Magaloni 2006). However, research shows that
individual legislators rarely engaged in any pork-barreling behavior until the PRI lost
majority control of the lower house in 1997, or did little else other than approve the
budget as submitted to the Chamber by the President (Weldon 2002). The increased
uncertainty in election outcomes post-1997 likely created incentives for locally connected
candidates to pursue strategies to shore up their party’s support in the district as well as a
strategy to increase the chance of obtaining a future political position.
Federal deputies make requests to amend the budget to fund a myriad number of
projects. Some of the requests are particularistic, such as to build a road, hospital, or
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water treatment plant in a particular community, while others are fairly general, such as
to increase the general education or health care budgets, or to increase funding for certain
disadvantaged groups like women, indigenous people, the disabled or the elderly. In
addition, some deputies request money to benefit particular interest groups, like bean
farmers, tequila producers, former railroad workers, or a specific group of unionized
workers. Some requests are very specific, for example, 100,000 pesos to pave a particular
road in community X and where the money should come from. Other requests are very
general and vague, such as the Budget Committee should consider allocating more
money to primary education than what was proposed by the executive branch.
To begin to make some sense of the types of funding that deputies request, I
created 19 different categories of budget amendments that summarize the variety of
amendments while still preserving some of the diversity. In Appendix II I describe in
more detail how I categorized the various budget amendments.
Table 3.7 provides a first look at the types of funding requests made by federal
deputies. The first thing to notice is that deputies are making more requests over time.
During the LVII Legislature, deputies only made 55 requests to amend the budget. Three
terms later, deputies made 484 amendment requests during the LX Legislature. We also
see a change in the priorities of legislators over the four terms examined here. Since so
few requests were made during the LVII Legislature, it is hard to make strong
conclusions, but most of the requests related to social services and welfare, such as
requests to increasing funding towards various anti-poverty programs and to increase
social security pensions, education spending, and miscellaneous government spending.
During the LVII Legislature, most of the miscellaneous requests related to government
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programs dealing with the banking and financial crisis of the 1990s. Almost all funding
requests made during the 1997-99 budget debates related to federal programs, providing
little in the way of specific individual credit claiming opportunities that might be useful
for pursuing a future elected office.
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Table 3.7: Funding requests during annual budget process
from federal deputies, 1997-2009
agricultural producers
aid to workers
arts and culture
agricultural and
rural development
economic development
education
environment
govt spending priorities
health care
human rights and minorities
migrants and ex-braceros
misc govt spending
mixed requests
public works
science and technology
funding
security and defense
social services/welfare
transportation
utilities
Percentage Total
Total

LVII
3.6%
3.6%
0.0%

LVIII
9.2%
9.2%
2.8%

LIX
2.0%
2.0%
4.7%

LX
2.5%
2.7%
4.8%

10.9%
5.5%
12.7%
0.0%
5.5%
0.0%
9.1%
0.0%
18.2%
5.5%
0.0%

1.8% 2.3% 5.6%
0.9% 2.3% 5.0%
11.9% 11.3% 11.6%
2.8% 2.3% 3.3%
4.6% 12.5% 2.5%
7.3% 7.8% 4.6%
11.9% 9.0% 7.0%
2.8% 3.5% 3.7%
1.8% 2.3% 1.7%
1.8% 3.9% 4.1%
2.8% 5.5% 12.2%

1.8%
0.0%
20.0%
1.8%
1.8%
100%
55

1.8% 3.1% 0.6%
0.0% 3.1% 1.0%
10.1% 4.3% 5.8%
9.2% 11.7% 13.8%
7.3% 6.6% 7.6%
100% 100% 100%
109
257
484

Source: Individual Puntos de Acuerdo relating to funding requests
during the annual budget process submitted by federal deputies.
Author's compilation from Diario de los Debates and Gaceta
Parlamentaria, Chamber of Deputies
In the LVIII Legislature, nearly 20% of funding requests related to funding for
specific agricultural producers and aid to organized workers. Both of these categories
represent attempts to transfer federal funding to specific interest groups. We also see over
40% of requests being targeted to largely federal programs that transfer money to
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education, health care, human rights and disadvantaged groups, and poverty reduction
programs.31 Thus, during the 2000-03 term, roughly 60% of funding requests were
directed towards specific interest groups or to policy areas of a largely federal nature
where it would be somewhat difficult for legislators to claim credit with specific
constituency groups to pursue a future career in sub-national office.
By the LX Legislature, we see a transformation in the priorities of legislators. Not
only do we see a dramatic increase in the number of budget amendments, suggesting that
legislators are strategically trying to use the budget process as a way to claim credit with
particular constituencies in order to pursue their goals, but we also see a greater
percentage of amendments being directed towards specific infrastructure projects in
particular municipalities and states. For example, compared to the LVIII Legislature, only
about 30% of funding requests during the 2006-09 term relate to mostly federal programs
dealing with education, health care, human rights and poverty reduction and only about
5% of requests target specific interest groups. There is also an increase in funding
requests dealing with specific infrastructure requests related to public works,
transportation and utilities that overwhelmingly target particular geographic areas. In the
LVII Legislature, these types of requests amounted to less than 4% of the total number of
requests, and increased to about 20% of amendments in the LVIII Legislature. By the LX
Legislature these types of amendments increased to almost 35% of funding requests. In
sum, these results from Table 3.7 suggest federal legislators are increasingly attempting
to use the budget process to direct funds towards specific constituencies rather than

31

Adding the categories of education (11.9%), health care (7.3%), human rights and
minorities (11.9%), and social services/welfare (10.1%).
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towards particular interest groups that may be linked to their political party or towards
federal programs that target dispersed constituencies.
However, just by looking at the policy areas in which budget amendments are
targeted does not convincingly demonstrate the increasingly decentralized nature of
funding requests. Figure 3.5 more clearly shows the increasing focus of federal deputies
towards states and municipalities. In Figure 3.5, I classify the target of each budget
amendment as benefiting a municipality (or group of specific municipalities), a state, a
regional group of states (such as the northern border region), a federal constituency, or a
particular interest group that is not geographically specific.
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The results in Figure 3.5 demonstrate the changes in the way in which deputies
attempt to influence the budget over time. In the LVII Legislature, only about 11% of
requests targeted specific municipalities or states, increasing slightly to 15% in the next
term. As suggested in Figure 3.5, the overwhelming majority of requests during the 200003 term were targeted towards federal programs (56%) or towards interest groups
(18.4%). The contrast with the LX Legislature is stark. By the 2006-09 term, over 60% of
funding requests targeted municipalities and states, a 49% increase since the LVII
Legislature. Furthermore, federally targeted requests are cut almost by two-thirds,
dropping from 78% of requests during the LVII Legislature to about 31% of requests in
the LX Legislature. We also see a drastic reduction in the percentage of requests that
have a regional focus and that target interest groups, as it is likely hard for legislators to
claim credit for funding that is dispersed across multiple states.
In sum, the results from an analysis of all budget amendments submitted by
federal deputies across four legislative terms suggest that the increasingly competitive
nature of elections has altered the incentives and goals of legislators, leading them to
focus more of their energy on representing state and municipal interests, and less time on
funding federal programs and organized interests. We can clearly see from the individual
amendments the increasing sub-national focus of federal legislators during the annual
budget process.
3.5 Conclusion
Changes in electoral competition and the decline in the electoral fortunes of the
PRI led to dramatic changes in the types of candidates running for legislative office, the
productivity of the legislative branch, and the behavior of individual legislators. As
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electoral competition increased, candidates winning office in the Chamber of Deputies
were more experienced, and had greater connections to their local communities. These
more professional and experienced legislators, combined with the loss of majority control
in the Chamber by the PRI in 1997, dramatically altered the role of the Chamber of
Deputies within the Mexican political system. The Chamber became increasingly
productive and influential within the policy-making process, while the Executive was
weakened. Federal deputies also began to recognize the credit-claiming abilities available
to them while in office in order to advance their career goals, and began to sponsor
increasing levels of legislation for which they could claim sole credit, and also
increasingly tried to secure resources for their local communities and states.
Generally, this chapter also demonstrates that electoral competition matters.
Increasing electoral competition for public office pressures officeholders and political
parties to professionalize and to cater to the interests of constituents. Parties and
individual representatives in an increasingly competitive environment also face pressure
to represent the interests of voters, or risk losing office. Furthermore, the increase in
electoral competition also opens up the number of potential offices for which ambitious
politicians can compete, which not only allows for greater participation in the political
process, but diffuses power away from the Executive branch towards representatives with
closer ties to local constituencies. These dramatic changes brought on by electoral
competition have serious consequences for the type of public policies produced, the
behavior of politicians, and the way in which citizens are represented in a political
system.
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The findings in this chapter also challenge the notion that term limits reduce the
professionalization of legislative bodies (Kousser 2005). Clearly for the Mexican case,
term limits have been a constant for many years, but the increased level of electoral
competition led to pressures to professionalize the Chamber of Deputies and its members
as demonstrated here. Changes in levels of competition also led to similar trends at the
state-level (Beer 2003).
This chapter painted a broad picture of major changes in the electoral
environment in Mexico, and how democratization influenced the political careers and
behavior of federal legislators. It also highlighted how competition influences the
strategic decisions made by ambitious actors to pursue a political career, with different
types of experience and behavior considered more valuable in competitive versus
uncompetitive environments. The following chapters examine in more detail the career
paths and behavior of Mexican federal deputies during the 1997-2009 period, by putting
the theory developed in Chapter 2 to the test. The information presented here provides
important background information regarding dramatic changes in the Mexican political
system that helps contextualize the empirical results in the following chapters.
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CHAPTER 4: Are Mexican legislators progressively ambitious?
In Chapter 2 I outlined a theory of political ambition in a context where reelection is
prohibited. In this chapter, I begin to test several implications of this theory using data on
the career paths of over 2000 Mexican federal deputies across four legislative terms from
1997-2009. I argue that Mexican legislators are progressively ambitious political actors.
Since Mexican deputies cannot pursue static ambition, it is also possible they pursue
discrete ambition. However, I argue this is not the case, that the overwhelming majority
of Mexican legislators are professional politicians with a wealth of experience and that
many go on to other political offices after leaving the Chamber of Deputies. Most
legislators have previous experience at the sub-national level, either as local deputies or
mayors, and many legislators seek elected office at the state-level after serving their term.
Even though it may appear some Mexican legislators seek offices of lower prestige after
leaving the Chamber, this is short-term strategic behavior that is a consequence of not
being able to pursue reelection to the same office, and long term trends in the careers of
federal deputies suggest that over time they do seek higher office.
This chapter is organized as follows. I first review the theory of political ambition
presented in Chapter 3 and the hypotheses that will be tested here. I then discuss the data
on career paths and how it was collected. Finally, I present empirical evidence on the
previous experience of Mexican legislators and the future offices they sought or obtained
after entering the Chamber of Deputies.
4.1 Pursuing political ambition without reelection
For a rational political actor, the expected utility of holding a particular public office is
simply determined by the probability of winning office, the benefits of holding office,
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and the costs incurred in obtaining the office (Black 1972). Once in office, political actors
face three possible decisions: stay in the same office for another term, move on to an
alternative office, or leave office at the end of the term. When reelection is prohibited, the
possible career decisions open to a rational actor are to leave public office (discrete
ambition) or move on to an alternative office (progressive ambition).
However, it is extremely unlikely, even in situations where reelection is
prohibited, that political actors possess discrete ambition. Assuming reelection is
prohibited, potential candidates will seek public office (U(O)) when the probability of
winning office (P) times the benefits of holding office (B) are greater than the costs of
obtaining office (C), or U(O) = PB – C, and when U(O) > U(Ai), where U(Ai) represents
all other career alternatives besides public office (Black 1972; Maestas et al. 2006). If
U(Ai) > U(O), then an individual will not attempt to run for public office. However, if
U(O) > U(Ai), and the actor makes this decision knowing the existing political
opportunity structure of their environment, they are likely to value holding a public office
over some other alternative in many situations. If that is not the case, then that individual
is not likely to have attempted to seek public office in the first place.
Imagine a scenario in which a potential candidate for public office, such as a
lawyer, professor, or businessman, is weighing the decision to run for public office. If
they know that a single term in public office lasts three years without the possibility of
consecutive reelection, the costs of leaving their current position and the possible
uncertainty of regaining it after three years are likely to outweigh the benefits of holding
a public office for a short period. Unless the benefits of holding public office for a single
term are extremely high, such that the individual could retire to private life and leave
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their profession after a three-year term, then it does not seem particularly likely that the
large majority of potential candidates for public office enter with the goal of only serving
one term and hope to be able to return to their profession afterwards.
If this reasoning is correct, then in the context where reelection is prohibited, we
should observe that the large majority of public officeholders have previous experience in
public office, and current public officeholders then attempt to continue in a different
public office after their term ends. In short, prohibiting reelection is unlikely to encourage
the emergence of so-called “citizen legislators” who enter public life for a short period
and then return to their private pursuits. Using data on the career paths of Mexican
federal deputies, two testable hypotheses emerge:
H1: More legislators should enter office with previous experience in public office
compared to legislators who enter office from a non-political position
H2: More legislators should pursue a public office after their term is over than
legislators who return to a non-political office
Thus, the decision to pursue progressive ambition likely takes place before an individual
decides to pursue a career in politics. In an environment where reelection is prohibited or
unlikely, most political actors are likely to possess progressive ambition.
Once an individual has decided to enter public office where reelection is
prohibited, the next strategic decision they have to make is how and where to pursue their
career goals. Once an individual term is over, a political actor must decide on where to
seek future office. I assume there is a hierarchy of possible positions of which an
ambitious political actor may choose from, and that in the ideal scenario, they are able
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climb this career ladder from the bottom to the top over the course of their political
career.32
Therefore, ambitious individuals have a clear preference ordering for which office
they would like to possess after leaving their current position. Despite the theoretical
existence of a career ladder and preference ordering, it is unlikely that in a situation
without reelection, that we would observe similarly situated politicians pursuing similar
offices after their term is over. To illustrate why, let us assume a political environment
where there are three potential offices an ambitious actor can hold, federal legislator (F),
state legislator (S), and mayor (M) and this actor holds a preference ordering where M >
F > S. A federal legislator at the end of their term faces the decision to run for state
legislative office (S) or mayor (M). According to this actor’s preferences, they would
most like to run for mayor at the end of their term. The expected utility of holding the
mayor’s office is based on the probability of winning the office(Pm), the benefits of
holding that office(Bm), and the costs incurred in running for that office (Cm). The same
can be said for the expected utility of holding a state legislative seat, except we can also
assume that Bm > Bs due to the actor’s preference ordering and the increased power an
executive has over a legislator. Thus,
E(Um) = Pm*Bm – Cm
E(Us) = Ps*Bs – Cs
Even if the actor prefers to be mayor over state legislator, they will run for state
legislator at time t if E(Us) > E(Um) depending on the values of P and C. We can assume

32

This assumption is similar to Rohde’s (1979) assumption that if pursuing higher office
entailed no risk, then all members of the U.S. House would prefer to be governors or
Senators.
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Cm>Cs in most cases, but Pm and Ps may change drastically from election to election. If
Pm is much lower than Ps, such as in a case where there is a strong alternative candidate
for mayor, or the individual’s political party does not allow them to run for mayor in a
particular election,33 then it is perfectly rational for this actor to run for state legislator at
time t. They will only run for mayor when E(Um) > E(Us). Therefore, even though we
may know the actor’s preferences, his decision on when and where to run are largely
based on the probability of winning office and the costs of running for office. One
observable implication of this method of pursuing a political career when reelection is not
allowed is that similarly situated individuals on the career ladder will pursue widely
different positions after leaving office. Another observable implication is that for
individuals who are stepping down the ladder by entering the Chamber of Deputies, they
will be more likely to seek a higher position on the career ladder than someone who is
moving up the ladder by becoming a federal deputy. Finally, if it is indeed the case that
federal deputies weigh the probabilities of winning and the costs and benefits of
obtaining a particular office, we should observe federal deputies who step down the
ladder (i.e. take a less prestigious position) have a greater rate of success in obtaining the
position, compared to federal deputies who attempt to climb up the ladder to higher
office.
H3: Federal legislators who came to office from lower-level positions (e.g. city
councilor) will more likely seek a future office of lower prestige than federal
legislators who reached office after serving in higher-level positions (e.g.
senator).

33

These particular scenarios are extremely common in Mexican elections.
101

H4: Federal legislators leaving office at time t will pursue a myriad number of
future offices rather than similar types of office
H5: Federal deputies who seek lower positions after their term (i.e. city councilor,
state legislator) should be more successful at winning than federal deputies who
seek higher positions (i.e. senator, governor, mayor).
Partisanship is also likely to have a large influence on the potential opportunities
available to deputies when considering their future career choices. Executives have
control over a number of political appointments, which might suggest that deputies who
share the partisanship of an executive may be more likely to receive bureaucratic
appointments at the state or federal levels, including cabinet-level positions. Not all
appointed positions come with high visibility, but even if the potential benefits of holding
an appointed office are low, the probability of winning the office are high and the costs
are low, suggesting that for some deputies who share the partisanship of either their
state’s governor or the president, the expected utility of holding a bureaucratic position
will be potentially higher than attempting to win an elected office. Thus, deputies who
share the partisanship of their state’s governor or share the partisanship of the president
(PRI from 1929-2000, PAN from 2000-present) should be more likely to seek or obtain a
bureaucratic appointment than deputies from other political parties.
H6: PAN deputies leaving office in 2000, 2003, 2006 or 2009 should be more
likely to seek a federal bureaucratic appointment than deputies from other
political parties
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H7: Federal deputies should be more likely to seek a state-level bureaucratic
appointment if they share the same party label with their state’s governor at the
end of the legislative term.
In addition to examining general trends in the career paths of ambitious politicians
where reelection is prohibited, it is also necessary to take into account the institutional
environment in which these actors pursue their goals. Political goals are shaped by the
available opportunities, and the “political opportunity structure” is shaped by existing
institutions (Schlesinger 1966; Black 1972). The U.S. literature on progressive ambition
makes two assumptions about the nature of electoral institutions that must be addressed
when moving to a comparative context, as these institutions are likely to influence the
probability of winning (P) and the costs of running (C). In the American context, it is
assumed that all politically ambitious actors run in winner-take-all, plurality elections. It
is also assumed that ambitious actors control their own fate in terms of deciding to run for
an office and that there are no barriers to ballot access other than the support from voters
(e.g. primaries) and the resources they possess to campaign. In many other contexts,
proportional representation is used to decide elections, and party elites control access to
the ballot. To understand progressive ambition in Mexico, it is critical to take into
account the mixed-member electoral system as well as the centralized control over ballot
access by party elites. These two factors have a significant impact on the probability of
winning an election and the costs of obtaining office that are likely to influence the career
paths of federal deputies.
District officeholders should be much more likely to build on the political capital
accumulated through winning an election by seeking office in a similar or overlapping
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constituency in which they were originally elected. In contrast, PR officeholders have no
clearly defined constituency other than their own party, and thus we should expect these
individuals to pursue offices where they do not need to gain the support of a clearly
defined territorial constituency, such as a bureaucratic appointment, future proportional
representation seats, or to work within the party organizations. One testable hypothesis is
that legislators elected through single-member districts should be more likely to pursue
future elected office than legislators elected through proportional representation.
H8: SMD legislators should be more likely to pursue future local elected office
than PR legislators
The way in which candidates are selected to run for elected office is also likely to
influence the probability of an ambitious individual winning office and the costs of
running for office. Candidate selection methods in Mexico have varied widely across
time, across parties, and even across districts in the same election within parties (Corona
Armenta 2004; Freidenberg 2010; Reveles Vázquez 2003a; 2003b; Wuhs 2006).
Nevertheless, candidate selection for district races is often much more decentralized
compared to selection methods for populating the proportional representation lists, and in
a competitive environment, candidate selection for district races is likely to privilege
electability over other factors. Access to the top spots on the PR lists is controlled by
national party leaders to ensure that their future congressional leaders will reach office,
and as rewards to other key members and intellectuals that have little chance of winning a
district race (Wuhs 2006; Freidenberg 2010; Kerevel 2010). Thus, candidates for the PR
lists are drawn from a somewhat different pool of potential candidates, and are selected
for reasons fundamentally different than for those used to fill the district race slots. One
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implication of this difference in selection methods for the two modes of election, is that
officeholders should display different backgrounds prior to entering office and pursue
different careers after leaving office. If parties are in fact choosing candidates who they
feel are electable to fill the district candidacies, then we should observe a greater number
of federal deputies elected in single-member districts to come from previous elected
office, since these individuals likely already have an electoral base and some visibility
that will be useful for winning the federal deputy seat. Moreover, since PR candidates for
federal legislative office are likely to have greater ties to national party leaders
responsible for their selection, we should see a greater number of legislators elected
through PR to come from national party positions and the federal bureaucracy than
legislators elected through district races. PR legislators are also somewhat less likely to
have the state-level connections to pursue future office at the sub-national level and
therefore we should see that PR legislator are less likely to pursue a sub-national office.
H9: SMD legislators should be more likely to come from a previous elected office
compared to PR legislators
H10: PR legislators should be less likely to come from a sub-national office
compared to SMD legislators
H11: PR legislators should be less likely to pursue future sub-national office
compared to SMD legislators
4.2 Data and Methodology
To explore political ambition in the Mexican case it was necessary to collect
individual-level data on the career paths of Mexican deputies. I collected information on
the previous positions held by federal deputies prior to obtaining office, as well as any
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position they sought or obtained after being elected to the Chamber of Deputies. The
sample of cases includes nearly every individual legislator who was elected to the
Chamber as a principal (propietario) legislator, and any alternate (suplente) legislator
who took the oath of office.34 The possible universe of cases I could examine for the four
legislative terms between 1997-2009 include 4008 individuals who were elected as either
a propietario (2004) or suplente (2004).35 My sample includes 2,345 individuals, 2,003 of
whom are propietarios and 342 of whom are suplentes. Therefore, I attempted to collect
career path data on almost every single legislator that was elected or took the oath of
office as suplente across four legislative terms. Of the propietarios in my sample, I was
able to collect information on future careers for 95% of the individuals in my dataset. For
the suplentes, I found future career information for 73% of those who served some time
in office. The difference is almost certainly due to the fact that suplentes are much
weaker candidates in terms of experience and in the types of positions they can
reasonably compete for in the future. Thus, suplentes are more likely to seek lower
34

One legislator, Carlos Cornejo Torres (PRI, Edomex-15) from the 58th Legislature does
not enter my data set since he was arrested for murder after the July 2000 elections but
before taking the oath of office. Hidalgo, Claudia. 2000. “Formal prision a Cornejo
Torres.” El Universal, 29 October.
http://www2.eluniversal.com.mx/pls/impreso/noticia.html?id_nota=20447&tabla=estados
35
There are four extra propietario-suplente pairs in the universe of cases due to the
original pairs vacating office. Replacement deputies only come in to cover vacated PR
seats, and the new deputy-suplente pair are the next on the list who are able to take office.
Vacated SMD seats are left vacant until the next election. In the 58th Legislature, Luis
Ariel Canto García (PAN-3rd Cir.) replaced Roger Antonio González Herrera
(propietario) and Lizbeth Evelia Medina Rodríguez (suplente), after they both took leaves
of absence. Arturo Díaz Ornelas (PAN-2nd Cir.) replaced Ricardo Francisco García
Cervantes (propietario), whose suplente could not take office after García Cervantes took
a leave of absence. In the 59th Legislature, Beatriz Mojica Morga (PRD-5th Cir.) replaced
Carlos Zeferino Torreblanca Galindo (propietario) and Carlos Alvarez Reyes (suplente),
after they both took leaves of absence. In the 60th Legislature, José Francisco Melo
Velásquez (CONV-3rd Cir.) replaced Alberto Esteva Salinas (propietario) whose suplente
could not take office after Esteva Salinas took a leave of absence.
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positions in municipal or state government in which it is difficult for a researcher to
uncover where they went after leaving office. It is also likely the case for those
propietarios in my dataset with missing information that they either took a position so
small it was impossible to uncover, failed in their attempt to continue their political
career, or decided to return to private life. In some cases, it is possible an individual
deputy cannot afford to continue their political career. As one deputy told me in an
interview, he was too poor to wage another campaign and had used most of his legislative
salary to engage in constituency service.36 Nevertheless, since I found some information
for the overwhelming majority of my observations, any conclusions I draw from the data
will be generally representative of legislators and will paint a fairly accurate picture of
career paths in the Mexican political system. Due to the differences in data collected
between propietarios and suplentes, and the fundamental differences between the two
types of legislators in terms of experience, I restrict my discussion to propietarios in
subsequent analysis.
These data come from a variety of sources, such as official candidate lists from
the federal and state level electoral institutes, information requests for CVs of former
deputies made to government agencies (if they currently held a position at the time of
data collection), official biographies maintained by Congress and the Secretaría de
Gobernación, published secondary sources on the biographies of Mexican politicians,
national and local newspapers, government websites at the municipal, state, and federal
levels, and websites maintained by the political parties and individual politicians. In order
36

Interview with Gerardo Ramírez Vidal, PRD deputy (Morelos-3), LVII Legislature,
October 28, 2011 at the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Mexico City. Even
though parties receive public financing, legislators who run in district races often have to
use their own finances to campaign.
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to be thorough, I collected as much information as possible on any office sought or held
prior to and after leaving legislative office, not just positions held immediately prior to
and immediately after leaving office. In Appendix III, I describe in more detail the
sources used to construct the career path database.
Despite the time-consuming nature of this data collection process, there are gaps
in the information. The goal was to collect complete career path information for every
legislator in my dataset. However, because of constant rotation of positions in the
Mexican political system due to the prohibition on reelection, it is not always possible for
ambitious politicians to hold some political office at all times. The large majority of
legislators are also teachers, academics, doctors, agriculturalists, lawyers, or run their
own business. When legislators fail to obtain office immediately after leaving the
Chamber, they often return to their profession for short periods of time until they can
seek another office. There are numerous reasons for an ambitious politician in Mexico to
engage in this type of behavior. Primarily this is due to the electoral calendar for statelevel elections. In the time period I am studying here, federal elections were held in 1997,
2000, 2003, 2006, and 2009. State-level elections can occur in the same year as federal
elections, or any year in-between. For example, a legislator from the state of Hidalgo
elected in 2000 had the possibility of leaving office early to compete in the 2002 state
elections, or finish their term and wait until the 2005 state elections. Furthermore, a
legislator leaving office in 2003 may have wanted to run for Senate, but had to wait until
2006 to do so. Depending on political opportunities in their state, their party affiliation,
and their financial situation, they may seek an office in the interim three years, or just
wait three years to compete for the senate seat. Data collected on the previous career
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paths of legislators prior to taking office in the Chamber of Deputies confirms that
legislators sometimes experience gaps in their political careers.
Because of the high degree of uncertainty involved in seeking and maintaining a
political office within the Mexican political system, it was not always possible to
determine what a legislator did immediately after leaving office. The strategy taken here
was to code a legislator’s ambition based on the most proximate position they sought or
obtained either while in office or after leaving office. For over 90% of individuals on
which I have future career path data, I was able to find an office they held within three
years of leaving office, and the overwhelming majority of these cases involve future
career decisions taken the year they left office or one year later. I am not particularly
concerned with some of these gaps in the data, since I assume that legislators are strategic
actors that work towards certain career goals. If they are acting strategically it is not
difficult to assume that their behavior within the legislature should be related to an office
they desire in the near future, whether that happens to be an office they obtain
immediately after leaving the Chamber or in two or three years. Because I was much
more likely to find information on legislators seeking an elected office or other major
appointed position any gaps in the future career paths of legislators in my data are likely
due to the legislator either taking a lower position while waiting to pursue their major
career goals, or briefly returned to private life in order to wait for a better opportunity.
4.3 Career Paths of Mexican Legislators
In this section, I trace the career paths of Mexican legislators that have served between
1997-2009 and test the hypotheses developed above. The first step in demonstrating that
Mexican legislators are progressively ambitious requires examining their previous
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experience. Hypothesis 1 suggests that the large majority of legislators will have prior
experience in public office, and this is exactly what I find. When individuals enter the
Chamber of Deputies, they are not in-experienced “citizen legislators” but political actors
with a wide variety and depth of political experience at multiple levels of government.
Table 4.1 demonstrates the variety of experiences legislators have had prior to
entering the Chamber. This table just reflects the different types of experiences legislators
have had at any point in their career prior to entering Congress, not the extent of that
experience nor the position they held immediately prior to being elected federal deputy.
For example, across the four legislative terms, around 35 percent of legislators have had
at least some previous experience in a state legislature.37 16 percent have served prior
terms as federal deputies, and a much smaller percentage have previously served as
senators. A large number of legislators have also served in previously elected office at the
municipal level. Around 17 percent of federal deputies have previously served as a city
councilor38, and about 19 percent of legislators have previously been mayors. What the
table also demonstrates is that it is relatively more common for federal deputies to have
previously experience in elected office at the state level, rather than rotate back and forth
between the Chamber of Deputies and Senate.

37

This table only codes individuals with previous legislative experience as a propietario
(principal) legislator. Many legislators have also previously been elected as suplentes, but
since it is nearly impossible in any systematic way to determine if they actually served as
a legislator for any significant period of time, I do not code a legislator’s previous
experience as a suplente. Suplentes do not receive salaries and have no duties. In many
cases, suplentes hold some other office while they are a suplente, such as serving as
congressional staff in some capacity.
38
regidor or síndico.
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Table 4.1: Previous Experience of Federal Deputies, 1997-2009

State Party
Municipal Party
National Party
State bureaucracy
State Legislator
Federal bureaucracy
Municipal
bureaucracy
Mayor
City Councilor
State Party Leader
Federal Legislator
State Cabinet
Senator
National Party Leader
Governor
Federal Cabinet
N

LVII
(19972000)
65.6%
45.6%
44.8%
38.8%
31.4%
30.4%

LVIII
(200003)
64.7%
51.7%
41.7%
39.3%
31.7%
31.1%

LIX
(200306)
69.3%
57.1%
48.9%
45.3%
39.9%
34.9%

LX
(200609)
62.5%
46.9%
50.1%
39.3%
34.5%
30.7%

23.0%
17.2%
15.4%
19.2%
16.4%
8.8%
3.6%
1.0%
0.8%
0.4%

28.7%
16.8%
17.8%
15.4%
15.4%
8.8%
5.2%
4.0%
1.0%
0.4%

35.7%
22.0%
17.4%
16.2%
15.8%
9.4%
2.6%
1.6%
1.2%
0.4%

36.3%
18.6%
18.8%
16.4%
16.4%
7.4%
7.2%
2.4%
1.2%
0.4%

31.0%
18.6%
17.3%
16.8%
16.0%
8.6%
4.6%
2.3%
1.1%
0.4%

500

501

501

501

2003

Overall
Ranking
65.5%
50.3%
46.4%
40.7%
34.4%
31.8%

Percentages reflect the percentage of federal legislators who have experience in a
given position prior to taking office in the Chamber of Deputies. Analysis restricted
to propietarios only.

In addition to elected office, federal deputies possess a wealth of experience from
serving in bureaucratic and party posts and all levels of government. These findings
suggest that gaining political and administrative experience prior to entering the Chamber
of Deputies is highly valued and an important step on the way to becoming a federal
deputy. These findings also reinforce those by Camp (2010, 46-73), who has argued that
party militancy has become increasingly important in the democratic era for the pursuit of
a political career. Furthermore, we generally see that more legislators have experience at
the municipal and state levels, either in bureaucratic or party positions, than compared to
having experience working at the national level. The figures for working experience in
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the federal bureaucracy and in the national parties also obscure the fact that most of the
positions are held by legislators in their states of origin. They may have been employed
by one of the numerous federal bureaucracies, but were responsible for administering
federal programs in their state. National party organizations also commonly appoint
delegates of the organization to each state for a number of reasons that are separate from
state or municipal party organizations.
The final piece of evidence we can draw from Table 4.1 is that legislators more
often have experience at lower-level positions, and are much less likely to return to the
Chamber after serving in more powerful positions such as senator or governor. This trend
suggests that Mexican politicians do possess a hierarchy of goals and typically seek to
move up to more powerful positions over time. We do see evidence that federal
legislators have experience in every single office except the Presidency, but this does not
mean Mexican politicians just move from office to office without some goals in mind to
seek a higher office than the one they currently possess. Part of the reason we see
individuals who have previously been governors, have served in the presidential cabinet,
or have been national-level party leaders is that the enforced rotation in office sometimes
requires politically ambitious actors to use a federal deputy seat as a waiting period
before pursuing a higher office. These individuals may also be much more likely to hold
important leadership positions within the legislature, which come with many more added
benefits than being a regular backbencher within the Chamber.
In sum, federal legislators possess a variety of previous political experience, but
they are much more likely to have served as state legislators than federal legislators, and
very few senators return to a seat in the Chamber. We also see that more legislators come
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with municipal and state-level experience than experience at the national level. Finally,
we can see that federal deputies possess some idea of a hierarchy of positions, and see a
seat in the Chamber as a mid-level position between lower level positions at the
municipal and state level39, and much more coveted positions, such as serving in a
gubernatorial or presidential cabinet, serving as a senator or governor, or as a national
party leader.
While Table 4.1 demonstrates the wide variety of experiences that federal
deputies possess, it does not tell us where they came from immediately prior to serving in
the Chamber. Table 4.2 displays the position a legislator possessed just before entering
the Chamber, and provides a stronger confirmation of hypothesis 1. To the extent
possible, the prior position reflects the last known office a federal deputy held before
running for election. For example, a legislator in the LVIII Legislature won in July 2000,
so the table reflects the position they held either in 1999 or early 2000. In the few cases
where it was not possible to determine what the legislator was doing right before running
for office, I coded their last known position. This issue is most apparent in Table 4.2 by
looking at the figures for federal legislator. Since consecutive reelection is prohibited, it
is impossible for a federal deputy to have held the same position prior to entering the
Chamber. However, of the 1.5 percent of federal deputies who seem to have been
‘reelected’, the large majority of these individuals were previously serving as suplentes
39

It is not always clear where the position of mayor fits within the political opportunity
structure, since the importance of the position is related to the population of the
municipality. Being mayor of a small, rural municipality is not likely to be a particularly
coveted position, except for individuals who do not want to leave their communities,
since rarely do individuals from these municipalities move on to higher office. However,
being mayor of medium and large cities is likely to be more coveted than being a state or
federal legislator and serve as a jumping off point to higher office, such as governor, state
cabinet, or senator.
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and thus, never took office.40 There are only a handful of individuals for which their last
known position was a federal deputy seat held three years prior to winning office.41

Table 4.2: Previous Position of Federal Legislators Prior to Entering
Chamber of Deputies

State Legislator
State Party
National Party
State Bureaucracy
Mayor
Federal Bureaucracy
Municipal Bureaucracy
Union
Non-political office
City Councilor
Municipal Party
Senator
State Cabinet
Congressional Staff
Federal Legislator
Interest Group/Social Movement
Governor
N

LVII
(19972000)
14.0%
19.0%
10.6%
5.8%
4.4%
6.0%
4.4%
8.8%
7.2%
3.4%
3.8%
2.4%
2.8%
3.2%
1.4%
2.6%
0.2%

LVIII
(200003)
18.2%
13.2%
8.2%
5.8%
6.4%
6.4%
6.2%
4.4%
4.0%
5.2%
6.6%
5.2%
2.8%
5.2%
1.8%
0.6%
0.0%

LIX
(200306)
21.8%
10.4%
10.8%
7.2%
8.6%
5.6%
6.2%
6.0%
5.8%
4.0%
3.8%
1.0%
4.2%
3.0%
1.2%
0.2%
0.2%

LX
(200609)
18.0%
8.6%
11.6%
8.8%
7.6%
7.0%
7.6%
4.8%
6.6%
3.8%
2.2%
6.2%
3.6%
1.4%
1.6%
0.6%
0.2%

500

501

500

501

Overall
Ranking
18.0%
12.8%
10.3%
6.9%
6.7%
6.2%
6.1%
6.0%
5.9%
4.1%
4.1%
3.7%
3.4%
3.2%
1.5%
1.0%
0.2%
2002

Propietarios only. Figures for city councilor, mayor, and legislative positions include previous
suplente positions. State and national party positions contain leadership positions.
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Suplentes who never took the oath of office and served as a federal deputy are not
barred from running in the following election for either a propietario or suplente seat.
However, once a propietario or suplente takes the oath of office for any length of time,
they are then barred from running for either position in the next election, thus preventing
a rotation over time between propietario and suplente pairs.
41
Of the 31 individuals coded as previously serving as a federal deputy prior to entering
the Chamber of Deputies (again), 24 of these individuals were suplentes. For the
remaining 7 individuals, I have no information on what these individuals did for the three
years between terms. Since the information on previous experience almost entirely comes
from official congressional records, these 7 individuals also did not consider it
noteworthy enough to specify what they did for those three years.
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The most common position from which federal legislators come is a state
legislative seat, with around 18 percent of federal legislators coming immediately from a
state legislature to the federal Chamber of Deputies. These figures understate the extent
to which state legislators attempt to move from the state to the federal level for two
reasons. First, I only have data on state legislators who were successful at reaching the
Chamber. Certainly many more tried and lost the election, and as I will demonstrate in
more detail below, federal deputies are not always successful at winning state legislative
seats after leaving the Chamber. Second, not all state legislative terms are coterminous
with the Chamber of Deputies. For example, a politician entering the LX Legislature in
2006 may have exited their state legislature in 2004 or 2005, and then obtained a
bureaucratic or party position in the interim one or two years before running for a
congressional seat.
To a certain extent this table demonstrates that legislative experience is a valuable
commodity to possess prior to entry into the Chamber of Deputies. While coming from a
state legislative seat is common, and probably more common than what is displayed in
Table 4.2, we also see a small number of senators who come to the Chamber after their
senate term. Five to six percent of deputies in 2000 and 2006 came from the Senate.42 We
also see a small number of individuals who worked as congressional staff, either at the

42

In 1997, 32 proportional representation senators were elected for the first time. The
1980s and 1990s saw several reforms to the election of senators. Previously, 2 senators
were elected from every state and the Federal District and the body was renewed entirely
every six years. In 1988, the staggered election of senators was introduced, with 32
senators elected for six years, and 32 senators elected for 3 years. In 1991, 32 senators
were elected, and for the 1994 elections, an additional 32 senators were elected, raising
the total membership to 96. PR senators were introduced in 1997 to serve a three-year
term, raising the total membership of the Senate to 128. 2000 saw the return of the entire
128-member Senate being renewed every six years.
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state or federal level immediately prior to entering the Chamber. Future chapters will
explore in more detail the value of this legislative experience for understanding behavior
in the Chamber of Deputies.
After serving as state legislator, the next most common set of positions are state
and national party positions, and state and federal bureaucratic positions. Overall, about
27 percent of legislators come from some type of party position, either at the municipal,
state, or federal level. The importance of holding a party position likely reflects the
partisan control over candidate selection and how the electoral system interacts with
candidate selection mechanisms. Since the national party organizations are largely in
charge of populating the proportional representation lists (Wuhs 2006; Freidenberg
2010), it makes sense to see the importance of holding a national-level position to be
considered for a spot on the PR list. Likewise, candidate selection for district races is
decentralized at either the state or municipal level, and thus the importance of serving in
prior positions at the level of candidate selection. Another 19 percent of legislators come
from appointed administrative or bureaucratic positions at the municipal, state and federal
levels. The large majority of these bureaucratic positions are appointments made by
mayors, governors, the president or cabinet members at the state and federal levels, and
thus individuals with these positions possess close relations with important political elites
that are likely to have an influence over candidate selection.
With the widespread use of term limits for all offices, one might expect to see
more inexperienced individuals attempting to run for office. However, this is not the case.
Only around 6 percent of federal legislators entered the Chamber from a non-political
office, such as a teacher or university professor, doctor, lawyer or as a member of the
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business sector. Moreover, the figures in table 4.2 for individuals coming from a nonpolitical office overstate the percentage of legislators who have no prior political or
government experience. A number of these individuals have at least some political or
administrative experience, but for a variety of reasons, were working in the private sector
immediately prior to running for office. In addition to individuals coming from the
private sector, we see a fairly small number of individuals coming from a political
activist background, either as part of a union, an interest group or politically-oriented
NGO, or from a social movement. These types of individuals may be more likely to lack
the necessary skills to work as an effective legislator, and with the possible exception of
unions, are also probably less likely to have the connections to party elites involved in
candidate selection. The higher percentage of individuals coming from unions is due to
the corporatist structure of the PRI and the many unions that are tied to that party’s
organization. Many of these “group delegates” (Siavelis and Morgenstern 2008) rotate
between party, union, and elected offices through their career. In sum, the evidence in
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 provides strong confirmation of hypothesis 1, suggesting that Mexican
federal deputies are ambitious politicians that bring a variety of political experiences to
the Chamber.
Hypothesis 2 suggests that most federal deputies will pursue a future public office
after their term is over in the Chamber, while Hypothesis 4 suggests that deputies will
pursue a wide variety of future positions, rather than seek similar positions. The results in
Table 4.3 find support for both of these hypotheses. Table 4.3 demonstrates that most
deputies seek to pursue their careers at the state level, typically in some sort of elected
office, and that only a very small minority do not seek or obtain a political office. For
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legislators leaving office in 2003 and 2009, the most common position to seek was
mayoral office, followed by a federal appointment in 2003 and a state legislative position
in 2009.43 For those leaving office in 2000 and 2006, it was most likely that a federal
deputy would seek a senate position, then followed by mayoral office. In general, a large
number of federal deputies pursue some sort of elected office at the state level44 after
leaving the Chamber, with a notable increase over time. For deputies leaving during midterm election years, nearly 40 percent sought an elected office at the state-level if their
term ended in 2003, increasing to 53 percent of deputies whose term ended in 2009. For
deputies leaving office in general-election years, about 50 percent of deputies sought
either a state-level elected office or a seat in the Senate if their term ended in 2000, which
increased to 60 percent of deputies leaving office in 2006. The data in Table 4.3 also
likely understates the extent to which deputies pursue future elected office. For example,
if a deputy leaves office in 2003, but is from a state that has elections in 2004 or 2005,
they are likely to obtain some sort of party or administrative position in the interim.

43

Deputies leaving in 2003 pursued a state legislative seat or federal appointment at
almost identical rates.
44
Mayor, state legislator, governor or city councilor
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Table 4.3: Immediate Position Sought or Obtained by Federal Legislators
after Leaving Office, Chamber of Deputies 1997-2009

Mayor
State Legislator
Senator
Federal Bureaucracy
Governor
State Bureaucracy
National Party
State Party
Union
State Cabinet
Non-political office
Municipal Bureaucracy
City Councilor
Interest Group/Social Movement
Federal Legislator
Retired/died/banned from office
Federal Executive
Municipal Party
Total Percentage
N

LVII
(19972000)
10.6%
8.7%
20.3%
9.1%
7.8%
7.2%
6.4%
4.2%
5.1%
2.3%
3.8%
4.2%
3.2%
2.5%
2.1%
0.9%
0.4%
1.1%
100%
472

LVIII
(200003)
16.9%
15.2%
3.0%
15.9%
5.5%
7.8%
8.9%
6.8%
4.0%
4.7%
1.9%
1.9%
1.7%
1.3%
1.7%
2.1%
0.6%
0.2%
100%
473

LIX
(200306)
17.3%
11.9%
23.7%
9.5%
5.6%
4.9%
4.1%
3.3%
1.9%
3.7%
3.7%
2.7%
1.4%
1.7%
2.9%
0.4%
1.0%
0.4%
100%
486

LX
(200609)
22.6%
19.0%
0.2%
11.3%
8.8%
7.3%
6.3%
6.3%
2.5%
2.7%
3.4%
3.1%
2.5%
2.5%
0.2%
0.8%
0.2%
0.2%
100%
478

Overall
Ranking
16.9%
13.7%
11.8%
11.4%
6.9%
6.8%
6.4%
5.1%
3.4%
3.4%
3.2%
3.0%
2.2%
2.0%
1.7%
1.1%
0.6%
0.5%
100%
1909

Propietarios only

Besides seeking elected office, most of the remaining deputies sought or obtained
a bureaucratic post or a position within their political parties. 21 percent of deputies
leaving the LVII Legislature sought a bureaucratic post45, which increased to 26 percent
following the LVIII Legislature. The percentage of deputies seeking a bureaucratic
appointment dropped to 17 percent after the LIX Legislature and raised again slightly to
22 percent following the LX Legislature. Fewer deputies seek positions in their political
parties after leaving office. Nearly 12 percent of deputies leaving the LVII Legislature
sought or obtained a party position, which increased to about 16 percent of those deputies
leaving the LVIII Legislature. Only about 8 percent of deputies leaving the LIX
45

At the municipal, state, or federal level.
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Legislature sought or obtained a party position, and about 13 percent sought a post in
their party following the LX Legislature. With the exception of leadership positions
within the parties, most other party positions do not provide substantial visibility or
power46, and thus, are likely not the first preference of deputies who obtain these
positions after leaving the Chamber.
Thus, large numbers of federal deputies seek elected office after serving in the
Chamber of Deputies, consistent with the argument that Mexican federal deputies are
progressively ambitious. However, because each individual deputy has to calculate the
probability of winning and the costs of obtaining a future office based on their unique
circumstances, we should observe they pursue a wide variety of offices, which we in fact
do find in Table 4.3.
How successful are deputies at obtaining the positions they seek immediately
after leaving office? The theory developed in Chapter 2 suggests that when reelection is
prohibited, the number of potential competitors for any office is likely to be very large. In
this environment, we may see some federal deputies move “down” the career ladder, such
as becoming city councilor or state legislator, while others move “up” the career ladder,
such as becoming mayor, senator, or governor, as each individual weighs the probability
of winning, and the costs of obtaining any particular position. One observable implication
is that federal deputies should be more successful at winning lower positions, and less
successful at winning higher positions. We should also observe a large number of federal
deputies seeking or obtaining appointed positions rather than pursue a much more
uncertain elected office, since P will likely be higher, and C very low.
46

Many party positions do not provide pay either, although party finances in Mexico are
a bit of a black box.
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Table 4.4 tests Hypothesis 5 by examining the success of federal deputies in
pursuing their future careers. One note of caution is in order in interpreting Table 4.4. I
attempted to gather as much information as possible about future career paths of federal
deputies. For those who obtained candidacies for elected office, it was easy to determine
where they sought future office and whether or not they were successful. However, a
number of federal deputies sought elected office but failed to even get the candidacy. To
the extent possible, I tried to obtain information on the aspirations of deputies who sought
candidacies but failed to win a position on the ballot. Newspapers frequently cover intraparty competition and therefore it is not extremely difficult to find evidence of politicians
seeking the candidacy for some particular office. Furthermore, conflict over candidate
selection is exceedingly common in Mexican politics, and a fair number of these conflicts
lead to party-switching (see Chapter 8), which garners media attention, or lead to cases in
the electoral courts, which leave a record. This data is certainly imperfect, although the
extent to which I can more accurately measure a deputy’s ambitions, rather than just the
office they obtained, the more accurate my conclusions will be. Thus, I used any
information that was available to me for each individual deputy to code their success in
obtaining office. For deputies that obtained office, this decision was easy. For those that
did not obtain office, they may have secured a spot on the ballot, but lost the election, or
attempted to secure the candidacy but failed to make it on to the ballot.47 It is also much
more difficult to obtain information about deputies who seek non-elected office but fail,
thus the high perception of success in obtaining non-elected offices in Table 4.4. The
only non-elected offices for which it was possible to obtain evidence of failure with any
47

In the future, I could break this down further into aspired to office/official candidate
but lost/won office.
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degree of certainty are competitions for party leadership positions at the state and
national level. The media frequently covers these competitions and therefore it is easier to
identify losing candidates for these leadership positions.
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LVIII (2000-03)
Not
Obtained Obtained
63%
38%
22%
78%
93%
7%
3%
97%
0%
100%
96%
4%
12%
88%
9%
91%
0%
100%
0%
100%
0%
100%
11%
89%
38%
63%
0%
100%
100%
0%
0%
100%
0%
100%
0%
100%

N
Mayor
50
State Legislator
41
Senator
96
Federal Bureaucracy
43
State Bureaucracy
34
Governor
37
National Party
30
State Party
20
Union
24
State Cabinet
11
Non-political office
18
Municipal Bureaucracy
20
City Councilor
15
Interest Group/Social Movement
12
Federal Legislator
10
Retired/died/banned from office
4
Federal Executive
2
Municipal Party
5
N
472
Propietarios only. Some percentages do not add to 100 because of rounding.

LVII (1997-2000)
Not
Obtained Obtained
68%
32%
59%
41%
60%
40%
2%
98%
0%
100%
84%
16%
10%
90%
15%
85%
0%
100%
0%
100%
0%
100%
0%
100%
13%
87%
0%
100%
90%
10%
0%
100%
100%
0%
40%
60%
N
80
72
14
75
37
26
42
32
19
22
9
9
8
6
8
10
3
1
473

LIX (2003-06)
Not
Obtained Obtained
69%
31%
50%
50%
68%
32%
0%
100%
0%
100%
74%
26%
15%
85%
13%
88%
0%
100%
0%
100%
0%
100%
8%
92%
14%
86%
0%
100%
93%
7%
0%
100%
40%
60%
0%
100%
N
84
58
115
46
24
27
20
16
9
18
18
13
7
8
14
2
5
2
486

LX (2006-09)
Not
Obtained Obtained
80%
20%
59%
41%
100%
0%
4%
96%
3%
97%
95%
5%
10%
90%
20%
80%
8%
92%
15%
85%
0%
100%
7%
93%
25%
75%
0%
100%
0%
100%
100%
0%
0%
100%

Table 4.4: Success of Obtaining Immediate Position Sought by Federal Legislators after Leaving Office,
Chamber of Deputies 1997-2009
N
106
90
1
54
35
42
30
30
12
13
16
15
12
12
0
4
1
1
474

1997-2009
Not
Obtained Obtained
71%
29%
47%
53%
66%
34%
2%
98%
1%
99%
88%
12%
11%
89%
14%
86%
2%
98%
3%
97%
0%
100%
5%
95%
21%
79%
0%
100%
94%
6%
0%
100%
45%
55%
22%
78%

N
320
261
226
218
130
132
122
98
64
64
61
57
42
38
32
20
11
9
1905

Notwithstanding the incomplete nature of the data, we can draw some tentative
conclusions from the available information. First, very few deputies seek to return to a
city council position48 but for those who do, a large majority of them win. Except in very
large municipalities, a city council position is not especially attractive and also a large
step backwards for deputies with progressive ambition. Furthermore, as evident in Table
4.2, few deputies come directly from city council positions, suggesting this is a much
lower position on the career ladder in many municipalities. 49 Second, as we have already
seen, a large number of deputies seek office in their state legislature or as mayor.
Deputies are slightly more successful at obtaining a state legislative position after leaving
office than becoming mayor, but in both cases we see a slight decrease over time in the
success rate of deputies who ran for these positions. While running for state legislative
office immediately after leaving the Chamber of Deputies may seem like a step
backward, it may be that some deputies wish to pursue a legislative career, and due to the
ban on consecutive reelection, the only real option is to alternate between state and
federal arenas.50 It is also possible that the potential for obtaining an important leadership
position within the local legislature (such as caucus leader or chair of an important
committee) is actually a step up the career ladder. Third, a number of deputies attempt to
run for governor after leaving office, but most of them are not successful. Without other

48

Voters in municipal elections elect a mayor (presidente municipal) along with a slate of
city councilors (regidor or síndico). Voters cannot individually vote for city councilors.
49
I would like to thank Francisco Sales, Director of the Centro de Estudios Sociales y
Opinión Pública in the Chamber of Deputies, for pointing this out to me. A city council
position in a large municipality (e.g. Guadalajara, Monterrey) is a desirable office, but in
small towns these positions come with very few perks.
50
Interview with Vidal Llerenas Morales, PRD deputy (DF-8), LXI Legislature, October
11, 2011 in the Chamber of Deputies. He said he wants to be a state legislator after
leaving office since reelection is not an option.
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relevant experience, a seat in the Chamber of Deputies does not seem to be the best
starting point from which to launch a campaign for governor. Finally, of the 115 deputies
who sought a seat in the Senate in 2006, less than a third were successful. Slightly more
deputies were successful in obtaining a Senate seat in the 2000 election (40 percent), but
competition for Senate seats is fierce due to the smaller number of seats available, and
many federal deputies fail at obtaining a seat in the upper chamber. In sum, Table 4.4
demonstrates that a large number of federal deputies do seek a higher office after their
term, such as mayor, governor or senator, but many fail in their attempts. Federal
deputies have an easier time obtaining a lower office, such as city councilor or state
legislator, or seeking an appointed position.
Up to this point I have discussed the experience and previous posts of federal
deputies, and where they have sought office immediately after leaving the Chamber.
However, I have not yet examined how future career paths vary based on previous
experience, and hypothesis 3 suggests that the type of position a federal deputy will seek
in the future is, in part, conditional on their past experience. Table 4.5 examines the three
most common positions a deputy sought based on their prior post. The evidence used to
generate this table is available in Appendix IV. This table most clearly shows the nature
of progressive ambition in the Mexican context and for the most part, we see federal
deputies seek the next most logical career position based on previously held office. For
example, deputies who were previously city councilors are most likely to seek a federal
appointment after leaving the Chamber, followed by state legislator and then mayor,
while previous state legislators most commonly then seek to become mayors. Mayors
who enter the Chamber of Deputies most commonly seek to return to the same office

125

after a three-year term, then followed by seeking to be governor. Deputies who were
previously senators or held a position in the state cabinet are most likely to seek
gubernatorial office. In general, the majority of federal deputies who pursue their political
careers at the state level seem to be using their service in the Chamber of Deputies as a
way to move up the career ladder in state office from the lower positions of city councilor
and state legislator, to mayoral office, the state cabinet, and up to one of the most desired
offices, that of governor.

Table 4.5: Progressive Ambition of Mexican Federal Legislators, 1997-2009
Previous post
City Councilor
Mayor
State Legislator
State Bureaucracy
State Party
State Cabinet
Senator
Federal Bureaucracy
National Party
Interest Group
Non-political office
mid-term elections
presidential elections

Top 3 future positions
1st
2nd
3rd
federal bureaucracy
state legislator
mayor
mayor
governor
state legislator
mayor
senator
state bureaucracy
state bureaucracy
mayor
federal bureaucracy
mayor
state legislator
senator
governor
senator
mayor
governor
federal bureaucracy
state legislator
federal bureaucracy
state legislator
national party
national party
senator
state legislator
interest group
senator
state legislator
mayor
non-political office
senator
Overall Most Sought Positions
mayor
state legislator
federal bureaucracy
senator
mayor
state legislator

Propietarios only.

The evidence to this point suggests that Mexican deputies are progressively
ambitious and do attempt to advance their political careers, but due to the high degree of
uncertainty about obtaining a future position, deputies will often take a step backward
before attempting to compete for a more prestigious political office. However, there are
also a number of constraints that are likely to influence the individual calculus of the
costs and benefits of where to pursue future office. One of those constraints is
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partisanship, as suggested in Hypotheses 6 and 7. In Table 4.6 I test these two
hypotheses, looking at the influence of a deputy’s partisanship on their likelihood of
obtaining a future bureaucratic appointment.

Table 4.6: The importance of partisanship in the pursuit of bureaucratic appointments
among Mexican federal deputies
57th
58th
59th
60th
Legislature
Legislature
Legislature
Legislature
(1997-2000) (2000-2003) (2003-2006) (2006-2009) Overall
Federal-level appointments
PAN deputies
0.17*
0.33*
0.29*
0.24*
0.27*
Other deputies
0.07
0.05
0.01
0.02
0.04
State-level appointments
Share partisanship of
state governor
0.11
0.21*
0.13*
0.17*
0.15*
Do not share
partisanship of state
governor
0.08
0.05
0.03
0.04
0.05
Cell entries are percentages of deputies that sought or obtained a bureaucratic appointment,
including cabinet-level posts, after leaving the Chamber of Deputies. *p<.001 according to a
two-tailed t-test.

Under the period studied here, 1997-2009, PAN deputies should be much more
likely to obtain a federal bureaucratic appointment compared to other deputies, primarily
because the PAN won the presidency in 2000 and 2006, and deputies leaving the
Chamber in this period will be entering a political environment where the PAN controls
the presidency. To test this hypothesis, I compared the percentage of PAN deputies who
sought a federal appointment to other deputies and find that a much greater proportion of
PAN legislators sought federal appointments. Over the four legislative terms studied
here, 27 percent of PAN deputies sought federal appointments compared to only 4
percent of deputies from all other political parties, as seen in Table 4.6. 38 PRI deputies
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across the four legislative terms also sought federal appointments, although 21 of these
deputies were PRI deputies leaving the 57th Legislature, and an additional 10 left the 58th
Legislature. Since Ernesto Zedillo of the PRI, President from 1994-2000 did not leave
office until December 2000, and the legislative term officially ends in August 2000, PRI
deputies who left the 57th Legislature, especially if they left before their term was over,
still had the opportunity to secure at least a short-term federal appointment. Furthermore,
Vicente Fox of the PAN, President from 2000-2006 was much more open to appointing
individuals from other political parties (Camp 2010), which also explains the slightly
higher level of opposition party deputies seeking federal appointments after the 57th and
58th Legislatures.
Hypothesis 7 suggests deputies who share the partisanship of their home-state
governor should be more likely to seek a state-level bureaucratic appointment. To test
this hypothesis, I coded the partisanship of the governor for each deputy’s home state at
the time the legislative term ends in the Chamber of Deputies.51 In Table 4.6 I find that
deputies who do share the partisan of their state’s governor are more likely to seek a state
appointment. Across all four legislative terms, 15 percent of deputies who share their
governor’s party label seek a state appointment, compared to only 5 percent of deputies
who do not.
Finally, I hypothesized that the mixed electoral rules and variation in candidate
selection methods are likely to influence the career paths of federal deputies by acting as
constraints on potential future opportunities. Hypotheses 8 through 11 suggest that SMD

51

It is important to code partisanship at the end of the term, since many gubernatorial
elections are staggered, leading to the possibility that the partisanship of the governor
from any particular state will switch during the legislative term.
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deputies should be more likely to come from sub-national office and elected office, and
also be more likely to pursue their future careers at the state level or in an elected
position, compared to PR deputies. Table 4.7 tests these propositions through a series a ttests. Looking first at the immediate prior positions held by federal deputies before
reaching the Chamber, I find that PR deputies are much less likely to come from a statelevel office or an elected office, but are more likely to come from a federal position. 46
percent of PR deputies came from a state-level office, compared to 75 percent of SMD
deputies. Only 13 percent of SMD deputies came from a federal office compared to 40
percent of PR deputies. While at least a plurality of PR and SMD deputies come from
state-level office, these findings do suggest that elites in charge of candidate selection are
drawing from somewhat different pools of potential candidates. Furthermore, since the
number of state-level positions is much larger than the number of possible federal offices,
it is not particularly surprising that most individuals, regardless of mode of election,
come from a state-level office.
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Table 4.7: Influence of electoral institutions on the
career paths of Mexican federal deputies, 1997-2009
SMD
PR
% immediate prior office
state-level office 0.75
0.46*
federal office 0.13
0.40*
elected office 0.39
0.27*
% seeking future office
state-level office 0.68
0.45*
federal office 0.24
0.44*
elected office 0.58
0.47*
*differences significant at the p<.001 level according to
a two-tailed t-test. Propietarios only. For each mode of
election, state and federal office percentages do not add
to 100 since I did not count non-political office, interest
group and union positions as state or federal office.
State-level office: city councilor, mayor, state legislator,
governor, state and municipal bureaucracy, state and
municipal party, state cabinet. Federal office: federal
deputy, senator, national party, federal bureaucracy,
federal cabinet. Elected office: city councilor, mayor,
state/federal legislator, senator, governor.
Looking at deputies who were elected after previously serving in any elected
office, I find that 39 percent of SMD deputies came from an elected office, compared to
only 27 percent of PR deputies. This difference is statistically significant, although much
smaller than the differences evident between state and federal office. Nevertheless, this
finding suggests that parties are more likely to populate the district candidacies with
individuals leaving another elected position, as these individuals may have greater
chances of winning the district race, rather than place these individuals on the PR lists.
The differences found in the previous careers of federal deputies by mode of
election continue to be evident when examining where they seek future office after
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serving in the Chamber. 68 percent of SMD deputies attempt to obtain a state-level
position after leaving office compared to only 45 percent of PR deputies. In contrast, 44
percent of PR deputies seek a federal position compared to only 24 percent of SMD
deputies. In addition, it seems that SMD deputies are more likely to build on their
political capital after winning their position as federal deputy to pursue a future elected
office compared to PR deputies.
4.4 Conclusion
I have argued in this chapter that Mexican federal deputies are progressively
ambitious political actors that enter the Chamber with a wide variety of political
experience and seek to pursue their future careers in higher office once their term is over.
However, because of the high degree of uncertainty that exists in pursuing a political
career when consecutive reelection is prohibited, federal deputies pursue a wide variety
of future careers based on the probabilities they have of obtaining a particular office. This
uncertainty leads some deputies to seek less prestigious positions after their term in the
Chamber, while others seek higher office, conditional on the type of prior political
experience they had before entering the Chamber.
Moreover, the institutional environment in which deputies pursue their careers has
important effects. It appears that the existence of mixed electoral rules and the
consequent differences in candidate selection for each mode of election, has a significant
influence in the way in which ambitious politicians pursue their careers within the
Mexican political system. While electoral rules do not provide rigid barriers that block
individual legislators from pursuing any particular career, they do seem to provide
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incentives for deputies elected in single-member districts to pursue a different set of
offices than deputies elected by proportional representation.
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Chapter 5: Electoral rules, ambition, and pork-barreling in the Chamber of
Deputies
Research on Mexican legislative behavior has suggested that legislators have few
incentives to engage in constituency service or pork-barreling activities due to the
prohibition on consecutive reelection, party voting in the electorate, and strong party
control over the candidate selection process (Casar 2002; Freidenberg 2010; Nacif 2002;
Ugues, Jr., Medina Vidal and Bowler 2012; Weldon 2002; Wuhs 2006). Reelection plays
a key theoretical role in the behavioral studies of legislators, including decisions to serve
general or particularistic interests (Mayhew 1974; Arnold 1990). Moreover, studies of the
effects of term limits and ‘shirking’ among legislators in their final term find they are less
attentive to their constituency, participate less, and less likely to direct government
resources to their districts (Carey et al. 2006; Herrick, Moore and Hibbing 1994;
Rothenberg and Sanders 2000), providing a strong argument for why legislators who
cannot seek reelection would not provide constituency service or particularistic benefits.
However, most Mexican legislators are career politicians, even if they are not
career legislators. If one assumes that Mexican legislators are progressively ambitious, as
is common in studies of legislatures where reelection is less frequent than in the U.S.
Congress (e.g. Samuels 2003; Micozzi 2009; Taylor 1992), and as I argued in Chapter 4,
then one should expect them to engage in activities while in office to further their careers
after leaving Congress. For example, federal legislators seeking to run for mayor, state
legislator, or governor after serving in the legislature may engage in activities that target
their future constituency. Legislators seeking a future sub-national office should be more
likely to engage in ‘pork-barreling’ behavior in order to claim credit with their
‘selectorate’ (Samuels 2003; Micozzi 2009). However, not all legislators in federal
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systems seek a sub-national office, and thus variation in ambition should lead to variation
in providing particularistic benefits.
Moreover, some recent research has suggested that increased electoral
competition, and the increased importance of federalism has led to greater pressures on
Mexican federal deputies from governors to represent local and state interests due to the
influence governors have over the careers of co-partisans from their state (Langston
2010; Rosas and Langston 2011). Gubernatorial influence over federal deputies may
pressure deputies to represent constituent interests despite the lack of a reelection
incentive, and is another indicator that legislators are engaging in strategic behavior to
further their political careers after leaving a three-year term in the Chamber of Deputies.
In addition to the personal motivations of legislators to further their careers,
electoral rules may also influence whether or not legislators engage in pork-barreling
(Lancaster 1986; Stratmann and Baur 2002; Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita 2006).
Although all legislators come from some geographic region, individuals elected in singlemember districts (SMD) are likely to have greater ties to specific constituencies and also
feel greater pressure from district interests or ‘attentive publics’ (Arnold 1990; Bickers
and Stein 1996) to deliver compared to individuals elected through closed-list
proportional representation (PR). In addition, due to variation in the candidate selection
methods for SMD and PR deputies in Mexico, competing principals may exert different
pressures on SMD and PR deputies (Freidenberg 2010; Langston 2010; Rosas and
Langston 2011; Wuhs 2006). Fortunately, the presence of a mixed-member electoral
system in Mexico where 60 percent of deputies are elected through SMDs and 40 percent
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are elected by closed-list PR allows for the examination of the effect of electoral rules on
pork-barreling behavior.
Despite competing theoretical reasons regarding the propensity of Mexican
legislators to engage in pork-barrel politics, scholars know very little about the individual
behavior of Mexican federal deputies and their provision of particularistic benefits. One
way to examine this issue is a study of their behavior during negotiations over the budget
debated annually in the Chamber of Deputies, where legislators attempt to provide
benefits to their constituents through the submission of amendments to the federal
budget. I argue that despite institutional rules that appear to eliminate incentives for
legislators to be responsive to constituents and seek a personal vote, Mexican legislators
are progressively ambitious and therefore use these interventions into the budget process
as a form of credit claiming to further their political careers after leaving Congress.
Furthermore, I argue the mixed-electoral system creates diverging incentives for
legislators to respond to different constituencies. Deputies elected at the district-level are
likely to feel greater pressure to “bring home the bacon” and attempt to amend the budget
regardless of their career aspirations, while deputies elected through proportional
representation are less likely to request that federal spending be directed towards
particular states or municipalities if it does not serve their career goals.
As I have previously argued in Chapter 3, electoral competition has altered the
way ambitious politicians in Mexico pursue their careers, which has consequently
affected their interests and the way in which they represent their constituents. One way in
which this change is evident is the evolving nature of budget amendments and their
intended targets. Beginning in 1997, federal deputies increasingly began to participate in
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the annual budget negotiations in order to alter the distribution of resources proposed by
the President. Federal deputies also increasingly attempted to direct resources towards
municipalities and states through geographically targeted budget amendments and away
from federal programs and interest groups.
In this chapter, I move on from an analysis of the aggregate changes in budget
amendments over time, to an individual-level analysis that examines the determinants of
submitting geographically targeted amendments and what this behavior can illuminate
about the career goals of individual deputies. In the remainder of the chapter, I review
previous research on the determinants and consequences of pork-barreling, and how
electoral rules alter the incentives of legislators to be attentive towards specific
constituencies. I then develop a number of specific hypotheses that can be tested with
available data. Finally, I discuss the data and methodology of the empirical analysis and
present the results.
5.1 Previous research
Prior research on pork-barreling and constituency service largely comes from the
United States where it is assumed that nearly all legislators seek reelection to the same
office (Mayhew 1974; Arnold 1990). One strategy incumbent legislators can use to
increase their chances of reelection is by distributing federal resources to their districts to
claim credit for serving constituent interests, and several studies have found evidence that
this is the case (Stein and Bickers 1994; Bickers and Stein 1996; Alvarez and Saving
1997).
In a comparative context, many assumptions taken for granted in the U.S. case
must be examined before addressing the reasons and consequences of pork-barreling. In
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many countries, legislators do not seek repeated reelection or possess static ambition,
such as in Brazil and Argentina (e.g. Samuels 2003; Micozzi 2009), and in Mexico,
seeking consecutive reelection is prohibited by the Constitution. In cases where
legislators are more likely to possess progressive ambition, reasons for pork-barreling are
likely to differ and so are the potential targets. In Brazil, pork-barreling is used to further
careers in the municipal and state arenas rather than seek reelection to the same office,
and therefore there is evidence to suggest that individually submitted budget amendments
in that country target potential future constituencies (Ames 1995; Samuels 2003). The
logic is similar to the U.S. case, although the potential target of pork-barrel politics is
different. If we assume static ambition as in the U.S. case (e.g. Mayhew 1974), then
incumbent legislators should seek to target the constituencies that elected them to office.
However, if we assume progressive ambition, then incumbent legislators should target
the constituency where they seek to pursue their future careers. An incumbent who
wishes to pursue a career in their municipality or state should spend more time directing
resources to these geographic areas. Conversely, incumbents seeking careers at the
federal-level, such as in the federal bureaucracy, should spend less time on
geographically targeted budget amendments, as this kind of behavior will likely have
little impact on achieving their career goals.
H1a: Legislators seeking careers at the municipal/state level should attempt to
direct more resources to the municipal/state level
H1b: Legislators seeking federal level careers should spend less time on
geographically targeted distributive politics than other legislators
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It is also important to account for variation in electoral system design when
studying pork-barreling in a comparative context. The plurality, single-member district
(SMD) system of the United States makes it easy for constituents to identify their
representative, and for representatives to target a specific geographic region. This
territorial link between constituents and representatives provides credit-claiming
incentives for individual legislators elected through SMDs to engage in distributive
politics (Mayhew 1974; Lancaster 1986; Carey and Shugart 1995). However, under
proportional representation, where many legislators may represent the same district, the
incentives to distribute pork to particular geographic areas is reduced, since legislators
will have a harder time claiming credit for their efforts and constituents will not have
clear information on who is responsible for any particular transfer of resources (Lancaster
1986).
While there is much theory to support the notion that electoral rules will influence
incentives to engage in pork-barreling (Lancaster 1986; Ashworth and Bueno de
Mesquita 2006), little concrete evidence exists to support the theory. Previous research in
comparative contexts either faces the same problem as the U.S., where all legislators are
elected under the same rules (e.g. Ames 1995; Samuels 2003), or relies on rather indirect
measures of pork-barreling and constituency service such as legislator surveys (Lancaster
and Patterson 1990; Heitschusen, Young, and Wood 2005) or committee membership
(Stratmann and Baur 2002). Furthermore, previous research on this particular topic in
countries with mixed-electoral rules (e.g. Stratmann and Baur 2002; Heitschusen, Young,
and Wood 2005) is somewhat hampered by the widespread use of dual candidacy, since
many legislators elected through proportional representation have campaigned in single-
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member districts and seek to do so in the future.52 Studying pork-barreling in the
Mexican case provides an ideal opportunity to examine the role of electoral rules on
pork-barreling, since dual candidacy is restricted by law in Mexico and rarely used by the
major political parties (Kerevel 2010). Therefore, I hypothesize legislators elected
through single-member districts will engage in more pork-barreling than legislators
elected through proportional representation.
However, electoral system effects on the propensity to provide particularistic
benefits to local constituencies are likely to interact with the future career goals of
individual deputies. Legislators elected in single-member districts will not only face
pressure from district constituencies to provide benefits, but are also more likely to
capitalize on their local connections to pursue a future political career in the district or
state. Moreover, those responsible for getting the SMD legislator on the ballot in the first
place will likely be influential elites at the district or state level who may be in a better
position to help the legislator pursue a future political career back home, rather than seek
a national-level post. In contrast, legislators elected through proportional representation
are typically nominated by national-level party elites (e.g. Wuhs 2006) and are more
likely to be beholden to national elites for their future careers than their SMD
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Dual candidacy refers to the practice whereby individual legislators run in a district
race and are also placed on the PR lists. Candidates who lose in the district race still have
a chance to win a PR seat. Dual candidacy is thought to reduce or eliminate any potential
electoral system effects since candidates elected through PR may have still campaigned
in a district and may still try to cultivate a support base in that district for a future election
(Ferrara et al. 2005; Pekkanen, Nyblade and Krauss 2006). Mexico restricts the extent to
which parties can use dual candidacy, but the political parties rarely use the option nor is
there evidence they are strategic in the placement of candidates who are dually-listed.
Most mixed-systems employ dual candidacy, such as Japan, Germany and New Zealand,
and the practice is fairly widespread (Massicotte 2004). For more on this topic and data
on dual candidacy in the Mexican case, see Kerevel (2010).
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counterparts. However, many PR legislators may still wish to pursue careers at the state
or municipal level after leaving office and for those that do, they may attempt to engage
in behavior similar to the SMD legislators in an attempt to win future office. Thus, I
hypothesize electoral system effects will be most pronounced among deputies seeking a
future national post, and more muted among those seeking sub-national office.
H2: SMD legislators should engage in more pork-barreling than PR legislators,
conditional on where they pursue future office.
Candidate selection methods are also likely to influence the behavior of
legislators, independent of the method by which they are elected to office. Political
parties in Mexico hold exclusive control over ballot access and therefore possess strong
control over the candidate selection process and the future careers of politicians. One way
in which candidate selection methods are likely to influence a deputy’s propensity to
amend the budget is through the influence of co-partisan governors. Mexican governors
have an enormous amount of control over candidate selection for their co-partisans
(Freidenberg 2010; Langston 2010), and if they outlast the term of the federal deputy, can
provide a future administrative post or ballot access in a future election after the legislator
leaves office.53 Moreover, governors are particularly interested in the annual budget
process since over 90 percent of state resources come from federal transfers, and spend
time meeting with their deputies in the Chamber during budget negotiations to ensure
their interests are represented (Langston 2010; Rosas and Langston 2011).54

53

Federal deputies serve 3-year terms and cannot be consecutively reelected. Governors
serve 6-year terms and can never be reelected.
54
Interview on October 11, 2011 in the Chamber of Deputies with Vidal Llerenas
Morales (PRD, DF-8), Secretary of the Budget Committee.
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Due to the strong influence of the governors over their co-partisan deputies and
their keen interest in the outcome of the budget negotiations, one might expect that
deputies with co-partisan governors in the Mexican context will submit more budget
amendments than deputies who do not share a co-partisan governor. However, there are a
number of reasons why one should not expect to see this relationship in the available
data. First, the budget amendments (puntos de acuerdo) are primarily a credit claiming
tool used by deputies rather than a direct reflection of influence in the budget process. 55
Much of what goes on during the negotiation of the federal budget is unobservable by
researchers (Sour 2006; Sour and Munayer 2007). Second, while gubernatorial influence
is present in the budget process, it is informal and not transparent. Not only do governors
hold sway over their co-partisan deputies, but they are also important members of their
respective parties and can therefore negotiate with their caucus leaders to advocate for
more state resources and push to get their deputies on the Budget Committee (Langston
2010).
Thus, gubernatorial influence is likely to manifest itself in seemingly counterintuitive ways in the budget amendment data. For example, governors and their copartisan deputies are likely to privilege informal over formal ways to influence the
budget. Federal deputies who share co-partisan governors are also less likely to need to
engage in more public credit-claiming activities to try to secure a future political post,
since it is more likely the governor will also help the deputy in pursuing their political
ambitions. On the other hand, federal deputies who do not share a co-partisan governor
are likely to have much fewer opportunities to pursue their political career in their home
55

Interview on October 11, 2011 in the Chamber of Deputies with Vidal Llerenas
Morales (PRD, DF-8), Secretary of the Budget Committee.
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state since administrative posts are largely partisan appointments, and many of the
appointments are controlled by governors. Thus, these deputies should be more likely to
engage in credit-claiming activities in an attempt to influence the budget negotiations,
since they are unlikely to benefit from the informal influence of their governor.
H3: Federal deputies who share a co-partisan governor should sponsor fewer
budget amendments than deputies whose partisanship differs from the governor
One of the primary ways in which governors can influence federal deputies is by
the promise of a future political appointment, as discussed above. However, not all
gubernatorial terms outlast the term of federal deputies due to the staggered nature of
elections in Mexico’s federal system. It is likely for many deputies that the governor who
helped them reach office will no longer be there when the legislative term is over, and
may be unable to hold much sway over the deputies behavior while in office, or offer
much in the way of future political benefits. For example, a federal deputy elected in the
LX Legislature serves from 2006-2009, but they may come from a state where a new
governor will be elected in 2007, 2008 or 2009. Thus, deputies who outlast their
gubernatorial “sponsor” may not benefit from informal influence in the budget
negotiations and instead engage in more public credit-claiming activities. This leads to
the final testable hypothesis:
H4: Federal deputies from states where the governors switch during the legislative
term should sponsor more budget amendments than deputies from states where
the governor outlasts the legislative term.
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5.2 Negotiation of the federal budget in the Chamber of Deputies
The annual budget is submitted in the fall of every year by the executive branch to
the Chamber of Deputies. The Chamber has exclusive authority over the portion of the
budget related to spending, and most of the debate takes place within the Budget and
Public Accounts Committee (Comisión de Presupuesto y Cuenta Pública, hereafter
Budget Committee). The Chamber has the authority to amend the budget as it sees fit,
which then has to be passed and signed by the President. For many years, there was
debate over whether or not the President had the authority to veto the budget, but this
issue was cleared up in 2005 when the Supreme Court ruled that the President does have
this right (Weldon 2002; Fernández Villaseñor 2010).
Previous research on budgeting prior to 1997 suggests that deputies largely
abdicated their authority to amend the budget while the PRI was in power, until that party
lost a majority of seats in the lower house in 1997 (Díaz Cayeros and Magaloni 1998;
Weldon 2002). Even though the formal powers of the Chamber of Deputies regarding
their ability to amend the budget are similar to those of the U.S. Congress (Díaz Cayeros
and Magaloni 1998), the Chamber majority effectively gave the President complete
control over the budget until the 1990s. Since 1997, federal deputies have increasingly
used their prerogative to amend the budget.
The link between the formal amendments and the final budget approved by the
Chamber of Deputies is unclear, as there is little transparency in the negotiation process
within the Budget Committee (Sour 2006; Sour and Munayer 2007). What is clear, is that
post-1997 the Chamber of Deputies does modify a significant portion of the budget
submitted by the President. In the LVII Legislature, more than half of budget line items
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(ramos) were modified in any given year, and during the LVIII and LIX Legislatures, at
least 75% of budget line items were substantially modified (Sour 2006). While federal
deputies, senators, state legislatures and committees can submit formal amendments to
amend the budget, it is difficult to determine which, if any, amendments are taken into
consideration by the Budget Committee. In an interview with a secretary of the Budget
Committee with first hand knowledge of the budget negotiations, I was told that many
deputies do get what they want included in the budget, although it is much easier for a
deputy to get money for a road than more complicated projects, such as a water treatment
plant.56 However, the deputy claimed the budget amendments were primarily used as a
credit-claiming tool by individual deputies intended for public consumption. The creditclaiming nature of the amendments is supported by the fact that some amendments fail to
specify specific spending amounts and where the money should be taken from, and
instead are general suggestions to increase or decrease spending in a particular area.57
Despite this ambiguity about the effectiveness of the budget amendments, what is
certain is that federal deputies have increasingly used this legislative tool in recent years
(as shown in Chapter 3) and the Chamber of Deputies does alter the budget submitted by
the President to a substantial degree. Even if federal deputies only use the amendments as
a form of credit-claiming without any hope that their personal preferences are included in
the final budget, a study of these amendments can provide critical insight into the goals
and preferences of individual legislators.
56

Interview on October 11, 2011 in the Chamber of Deputies with Vidal Llerenas
Morales (PRD, DF-8), Secretary of the Budget Committee.
57
It would be possible to identify amendments that do include specific spending criteria
and then compare the amendments to the final approved budget to see if it was included
in the modifications made by the Chamber of Deputies. However, that task is beyond the
scope of this work and will be left up to future research.
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5.3 Data and Methodology
To examine pork-barreling in the Mexican context, I collected the requests
submitted by federal deputies related to the spending portion of the federal budget
(Presupuesto de Egresos de la Federación). Senators and state legislatures also have the
right to submit amendments to the budget, and have increasingly exercised this right, but
here I only focus on those amendments submitted by federal deputies.58 Most requests
relating to the budget are submitted directly to the Budget Committee, although if
deputies are submitting a request related to a specific government program that is under
the jurisdiction of another committee, they may submit the request to that committee
instead. In addition, many committees submit their own requests for spending to the
Budget Committee, and thus in some cases deputies will submit a funding request to
another committee before that committee submits their requests to the Budget
Committee. Therefore, I collected all puntos de acuerdo relating to the annual budget
process, regardless of where they were sent. Puntos de acuerdo from the 1997-2003
period were gathered from the Diario de los Debates, the official congressional debate
record, and from the Gaceta Parlamentaria for the 2003-09 period.59

I used only

amendments related to funding requests for the following year’s budget.60
For the remainder of the analysis, I focus only on the 2006-2009 period. I do this
because the focus is primarily on amendments targeting states and municipalities. This
strategy proves nearly impossible for the LVII Legislature because there are only six
58

The overwhelming majority of amendments come from deputies.
The Gaceta Parlamentaria does not have any records of puntos de acuerdo prior to the
LIX Legislature (2003-06).
60
I did not include funding requests that focused on the current budget, requests for
information from the executive and other government ministries, technical requests to
alter wording, and requests for new taxes and revenue.
59
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budget amendments with sub-national targets. For the LVIII and LIX Legislatures, nearly
70 percent of legislators did not sponsor a budget amendment with a state or municipal
target. By the LX Legislature, 47 percent of deputies had sponsored at least one
amendment, making a statistical analysis more feasible.61
5.3.1 Dependent variable
To develop the dependent variable, I first coded the target of each budget
amendment as federal, state, or municipal. Budget amendments that targeted multiple
states or interest groups were dropped from the analysis. I then summed the total number
of budget amendments for each geographic target submitted by each individual deputy.
At the bivariate level, I look at the number of sponsored amendments for each of these
three targets. For the multivariate analysis, the dependent variable is a sum of the total
number of budget amendments sponsored by an individual legislator that target either a
state or a municipality.62
The way in which budget amendments (and all puntos de acuerdo generally) are
sponsored is very similar to bills in the Mexican context (see Chapter 6), but sponsorship
patterns in Mexico differ fundamentally from the U.S. Congress. These differences
warrant attention as they influence the coding of the dependent variable and how
sponsorship is modeled. Puntos de acuerdo can be anything from requests for
61

Percentages based on propietario legislators only. In previous iterations of the paper, I
did experiment with zero-inflated negative binomial regression to model amendment
behavior across the 2000-2009 period. However, I found the results to be highly subject
to model specification, especially the logit model explaining the large number of zeros in
the dependent variable. Nevertheless, the results generally confirmed those presented
here.
62
The range of this count variable is from 0 to 25, with mean 1.2, standard deviation 3.5,
and median 0. I added together state and municipal budget amendments because of the
overall relatively few amendments submitted by deputies, and because in practice, the
distinction between the two is not always clear.
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information from other government offices, ideological and symbolic pronouncements, to
specific requests for resources. They are presented to the floor of the Chamber of
Deputies, and if they are considered urgent, are voted upon immediately. Otherwise,
puntos de acuerdo are turned over to the relevant committee, and in the case of budget
amendments, usually the Budget Committee. In some cases, committees respond to the
punto de acuerdo, accepting or rejecting whatever action is requested, but in the case of
the Budget Committee, a response regarding a spending request is not directly linked to
any change in the federal budget. For example, in negotiations for the 2007 annual budget
in late 2006, the Budget Committee issued a report stating that all puntos de acuerdo
relating to the 2007 budget had been dealt with, with no specifics regarding the inclusion
or exclusion of any specific request into the approved budget.63
In the U.S., legislative rules state bills must have a single author, or sponsor, and
after 1978, can have an unlimited number of cosponsors (Campbell 1982; Thomas and
Grofman

1993).

Similar rules exist

in

Argentina (Micozzi

2009;

personal

communication). In Mexico, no such rules exist that clearly delineate between the author
of a bill (or punto de acuerdo) and cosponsors. Instead, the relevant distinctions are
between those who “present” or “propose” a bill, and those who “sign” a bill. In the case
of budget amendments, many are presented by a single deputy, with no other signatories
attached to the bill. However, other amendments are presented by more than one deputy
with the possibility of additional signatories. Still other amendments are presented by, for
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“Dictámen de la Comisión de Presupuesto y Cuenta Pública, por el que se consideran
atendidas todas las proposiciones con punto de acuerdo relacionadas con el Presupuesto
de Egresos de la Federación para el Ejercicio Fiscal de 2007, aprobado por la Cámara de
Diputados y publicado en el Diario Oficial de la Federación.” Gaceta Parlamentaria,
Cámara de Diputados, número 2236-III, jueves 19 de abril de 2007.
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example, “The Parliamentary Group of the PAN”64 or a multi-party group of deputies,
without specifying a specific presenter. In these cases, there are only signatories to the
amendment. Because of the varying nature of the way deputies sponsor amendments,
making clear distinctions between “sponsors” and “co-sponsors” as is typical in
legislative studies is very difficult in the Mexican case.
For the purposes of this chapter, I consider any signatory to an amendment as a
sponsor. Nevertheless, since many fewer deputies present puntos de acuerdo than
sponsor one, I control for the number of amendments presented by individual deputies in
the multivariate analysis.65 I also include an analysis with the number of presented budget
amendments as my dependent variable, to demonstrate that similar patterns hold
regardless of how the dependent variable is constructed.
5.3.2 Independent variables
The first key independent variable is mode of election. Legislators elected through
proportional representation are coded 1, and coded 0 if elected in a district. I expect
legislators elected through PR to sponsor significantly fewer budget amendments and
thus expect a negative relationship.
The second major independent variable is future state office. I classified the future
positions of federal deputies into two categories, national office and state office. National
office refers to positions in the federal bureaucracy, in the executive branch, in the

64

In almost no cases do amendments presented by a specific parliamentary caucus
include the entire party. Instead, they typically include a small subset of party members.
65
The inclusion of this control does not alter the significance of the other findings in the
model.
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national party organizations, and future positions in Congress.66 State office refers to any
elected office at the state-level (city councilor, state legislator, mayor, governor),
positions in the governor’s cabinet, in the state and municipal bureaucracy, and in the
state and municipal party organizations.67 I expect deputies who sought or obtained a
future office at the sub-national level to have been engaging in strategic behavior while in
Congress and therefore submit more municipal- and state-targeted budget amendments. 68
I include a control variable in the multivariate analysis for those deputies who pursued
future careers that did not fit into the national/sub-national dichotomy. These other
deputies held positions in unions, social movements, ngo’s, left political office, died, or
retired.
In addition to mode of election and future state office, I include an interaction
term between the two variables. I expect PR and SMD deputies to behave similarly
regarding the submission of budget amendments if they are pursuing state office, but
expect SMD deputies who went onto national office to sponsor more budget amendments
than their PR counterparts.

66

Future positions in the Senate or Chamber of Deputies might be considered a statelevel office, although this possibility is potentially muted by the existence of the PR lists,
suggesting local constituencies are not as important. Data on the backgrounds of
legislators reinforces this point. For example, of all the legislators in my dataset with
previous Senate experience, 88 percent of them were elected to the Chamber through the
PR lists. For those with previous experience in the Chamber of Deputies, 63 percent of
them were subsequently elected through the PR lists.
67
Percentages in Table 5.1 for state and national office do not add to 100% because of
some deputies who sought or obtained positions in unions or social movements, left
political office altogether, retired or died.
68
While this measure of progressive ambition is temporally after the legislator’s term in
office, it is a measure of the office or constituency in which they would like to pursue
their future political careers after leaving the Chamber. Therefore, if this measure is an
accurate representation of their immediate ambitions, legislators should act strategically
while in office in the hope of obtaining this position.
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Gubernatorial influence in the budget process is measured in two ways. I include
a dichotomous variable that captures partisan congruence between the deputy and the
governor at the beginning of the deputy’s term, in this case, 2006.69 Deputies with copartisan governors are coded 1, 0 otherwise, and I expect a negative relationship between
party congruence and the number of sponsored amendments. The other way in which I
capture gubernatorial influence is a dichotomous variable coded 1 if the governor of a
deputy’s state switched during the 2006-2009 legislative term, and 0 otherwise.70 I expect
deputies from states where the governor switched during the term to sponsor more budget
amendments.
I use a number of other independent variables to control for other possible factors
related to amendment activity at the state level. In terms of individual characteristics, I
capture each legislator’s gender and education.71 Previous research has suggested that
women in the Mexican legislature and the U.S. legislature are more active than men
(Anzia and Berry 2011; Kerevel and Atkeson 2011), therefore I expect females to
sponsor more budget amendments than men. However, since the state political arena is
somewhat inhospitable for women in the Mexican context (Kerevel and Atkeson 2011), it
is also possible there is no difference between genders in sponsoring budget amendments.
Previous research suggests that legislators with more education sponsor more bills, and as
a result, I expect it may be positive here as well (Kerevel and Atkeson 2011).
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This measure captures party congruence between governors elected in 2001, 2002,
2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006 and deputies elected in 2006.
70
This measure captures governors who left office in 2007, 2008 and 2009.
71
Gender: Male=0, Female=1. Education: primary=1, secondary=2, high school=3,
technical=4, some college=5, college degree=6, at least some master’s level education=7,
at least some doctoral level education=8.
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I also include controls for institutional position within the Chamber of Deputies.
Each legislator is coded 1 if they were a committee chair, a committee secretary, a party
leader (caucus leader or speaker), or a member of the Budget Committee. I expect
legislators with these positions to have informational advantages over other legislators
that may allow them to more effectively participate in the budget amendment process and
therefore I expect legislators with these positions to sponsor more amendments.
Since all Mexican deputies are elected along with an alternate (suplente) in case
the primary legislator takes a temporary or permanent leave of absence, I control for
alternates in the data. Alternates are generally much weaker legislators in terms of
influence, experience, and time in office. Most alternates come into office near the end of
the legislative session, typically in the spring, and are thus also much less likely to be
active during the budget negotiations in the fall. Therefore, I expect alternates to sponsor
fewer amendments than principal legislators. In addition to alternates, I also include the
natural log of the number of days in office served by each individual deputy.72 Deputies
who serve only a short time, regardless if they are an alternate or primary legislator, are
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All terms in office run from September 1st of the election year, to August 31st of the
third year of their term. The number of days in office was calculated by collecting all the
leaves of absence (solicitudes de licencia) recorded in the Diario de los Debates and the
Sistema de Información Legislativa and subtracting any days in which the deputy was
absent. For the LX Legislature, nearly 32 percent of principal legislators did not serve
their entire term. I use the natural log rather than a count of the number of days since I
expect little differences between deputies who serve the entire term and those who took
off a few weeks, but much larger differences among deputies at the lower end of the
spectrum. There is a high correlation between alternates and number of days in office (.81). However, in results not shown here, the inclusion or exclusion of one or both of
these variables has little effect on the substantive results of the model, nor does it effect
the size of coefficients of any of the other variables. If alternate is excluded, days in
office is positive and significant, while other variables are virtually identical to those
presented in Table 5.2.
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unlikely to participate very much in the legislative process compared to those who have
served most or all of their term.
Partisanship is also likely to influence legislative behavior, which is measured by
a series of dummy variables with the PAN as the left out category.73 Since the executive
during this period was from the PAN, it is more likely President Felipe Calderón
submitted a budget closer to the preferences of PAN deputies. Members of opposition
parties should therefore be more likely than PAN deputies to amend the budget.
5.3.3 Modeling techniques
The dependent variable in the budget amendment model is a count, and therefore
requires techniques that accurately reflect the nature of count data. Typically for count
data a poisson regression is used. However, the dependent variable is overdispersed,
meaning the variance is greater than the mean. When there is overdispersion it is more
appropriate to use negative binomial regression (Gardner, Mulvey and Shaw 1995). I then
use Clarify (King, Tomz and Wittenberg 2000) to generate predicted values of the
dependent variable based on changes in the independent variables.
5.4 Explaining pork-barreling in the Chamber of Deputies
Table 5.1 demonstrates the relationships between amending the budget, electoral
rules, and progressive ambition. I first discuss the relationship between electoral rules and
budget amendments. The table looks at the mean number of budget amendments that
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Dummy variables are included for the PRI, PRD, PVEM and PT. Another dummy
variable, “other minor parties” captures members of PASC, PANAL, and Convergencia.
A total of 10 deputies switched parties during the LX Legislature. In general, I code a
deputy’s party as the one under which they were elected, except for 4 deputies who
switched after being elected but prior to actually taking office on September 1, 2006. 2
deputies declared themselves independent, but not until near the end of their term in
2009. Thus, there are no deputies coded as independents in this legislature.
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target the federal, state, and municipal levels, as well as the overall mean number of
sponsored and presented budget amendments by mode of election. The means are fairly
small due to the small number of legislators who do sponsor amendments, but the trends
evident in the table confirm theoretical suspicions about the effects of electoral rules on
pork-barreling. Overall, legislators elected in single-member districts (SMD) sponsor
significantly more amendments than those elected through proportional representation.
When we disaggregate amendments by their geographical target, we see that the
difference is most evident in amendments that target states and municipalities. SMD
legislators submit roughly two to three times as many budget amendments that target
states and municipalities than their counterparts elected through PR. There is no
significant difference in the average number of budget amendments targeting federal
programs by mode of election.
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Table 5.1: Electoral rules, progressive ambition and pork barreling in
the Mexican Chamber of Deputies, 2006-09
Progressive Ambition2

Federal target
State target
Municipal target
Total
Federal target
State target
Municipal target
Total
% seeking office
National office
State office

SMD1
PR
National Office
Mean # of Sponsored Amendments
1.29
1.26
1.36
0.87
0.51*
0.49
0.99
0.37*
0.36
3.37
2.32*
2.33
Mean # of Presented Amendments
0.31
0.26
0.29
0.39
0.15*
0.09
0.38
0.08*
0.09
1.18
0.54*
0.48
Progressive
Ambition2
0.11
0.34*
0.89
0.66*

State Office
1.23
0.83+
0.79
3.08
0.29
0.37*
0.30+
1.04*

*significant at the p<.05 level according to a two-tailed t-test; +p<.10.
Suplentes excluded from the results in this table. 1: N=501. One PR deputy
from CONV entered office in January 2009 after previous
propietario/suplente "dupla" both left, leading to an extra propietario in the
data. 2: N=434. Deputies who pursued future careers in unions, social
movements, ngos, some other non-political office, died, or retired are
excluded from these results. Their exclusion does not affect the significance
of these results.

Table 5.1 also demonstrates a significant difference in the career paths of deputies
based on mode of election. I find that legislators elected in single-member districts are
much more likely to pursue their careers at the state-level compared to those elected
through PR. 89 percent of SMD legislators sought or obtained a state-level position after
leaving the Chamber compared to 66 percent of PR legislators. The flipside is true for
those seeking national office. Legislators elected through PR are almost three times as
likely to seek a position at the national-level compared to SMD legislators. The likely
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explanation for this difference is due to the differences in candidate selection for
legislators elected through the two methods. While the political party organizations in
Mexico are very strong and fairly centralized, candidate selection for district races is
typically decentralized to the state or district level, whereas the PR lists are populated by
the national party organizations (Freidenberg 2010; Langston 2008; Wuhs 2006). Thus,
differences in candidate selection are likely to be reflected in the behavior of the
legislators while in office, but also where they are going to pursue their careers after
leaving Congress.
Finally, Table 5.1 demonstrates the relationship between progressive ambition
and the types of amendments offered. Federal legislators seeking to pursue their careers
at the state-level not only submit more budget amendments overall, but submit more
budget amendments targeting municipalities and states than legislators seeking office at
the national-level. However, the level of significance varies based on whether one
focuses on all sponsored amendments, or just those presented by an individual legislator.
Nevertheless, the trends in both cases are very similar. The reduced level of budget
amendment activity for legislators pursuing national office suggests the decreased
importance of cultivating specific constituencies through funding to pursue a political
career, while legislators seeking state office are more likely to attempt to claim credit for
particular benefits sent towards the state or municipality in which they want to gain future
employment.
To pursue the relationships evident in Table 5.1 further, I turn to multivariate
analysis. Table 5.2 displays the results of a negative binomial regression predicting the
number of state-targeted budget amendments sponsored by an individual legislator. Table
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5.3 provides a number of estimates generated using Clarify (King, Tomz and Wittenberg
2000) based on Model 1 in Table 5.2. Estimates were generated for each of the three
major parties, with other variables set at their median. Also included in Table 5.2 is a
second model where the dependent variable is the number of presented amendments,
although I argue Model 1 represents a more accurate representation of sponsorship
behavior with regards to budget amendments. I first provide an in-depth discussion of the
results of Model 1 based on the estimates in Table 5.3 then briefly discuss the differences
between the two models.
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Table 5.2: Negative binomial regression predicting number of sponsored budget
amendments targeted towards states and municipalities,
Chamber of Deputies 2006-09
Model 1
Model 2
DV: # of sponsored DV: # of presented
amendments
amendments
coefficient s.e. sig. coefficient s.e. sig.
# of presented budget amendments
0.47
0.07 **
gender (female=1)
0.02
0.18
0.64
0.25 **
education (8-point scale)
0.16
0.07 **
0.12
0.09
mode of election (PR=1)
-1.13
0.32 **
-1.81
0.56 **
state-level progressive ambition
-0.10
0.28
0.30
0.44
mode of election*state-level ambition
other future office
committee chair
committee secretary
party leader
budget committee member
PRI
PRD
PVEM
PT
other minor parties
# of days in office (log)
alternate (suplente=1)
partisan congruence w/governor
governor switch during term
constant
Log likelihood
LR chi2
N
Pseudo R2

0.82
0.36
0.25
0.32
-0.03
0.26
0.05
0.16
-0.22
0.51
-0.37
0.29
0.71
0.22
0.27
0.23
-0.11
0.55
0.56
0.48
0.38
0.34
0.26
0.30
-1.36
0.66
-0.85
0.17
1.24
0.17
-3.07
2.12
-652.06
226.35
523
0.15

**

**

**
**
**

**

**p<.05; *p<.10. Alpha is significantly different than zero in both models.
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0.68
0.59
0.26
0.53
-0.11
0.37
0.51
0.23
0.82
0.63
0.54
0.34
1.32
0.33
1.92
0.31
0.79
0.93
1.51
0.75
1.85
0.51
-0.31
0.47
-2.60
1.27
0.21
0.25
0.53
0.28
-1.11
3.34
-393.94
115.01
523
0.13

**

**
**
**
**
**
*

**

Table 5.3: Predicted number of sponsored budget amendments that target states and
municipalities among each major party, LX Legislature

PRI

PAN

Predicted
value

PRD

Predicted
Predicted
95% CI
value
95% CI
value
Future state office
SMD
1.5
(0.9, 2.3)
0.7
(0.5, 1.0)
1.0
PR
1.1
(0.7, 1.8)
0.5
(0.3, 0.8)
0.7
Future national office
SMD
1.7
(0.8, 3.0)
0.8
(0.5, 1.3)
1.1
PR
0.5
(0.3, 0.9)
0.3
(0.1, 0.4)
0.3
Partisan congruence w/governor
No
1.5
(0.9, 2.3)
0.7
(0.5, 1.0)
1.0
Yes
0.6
(0.4, 0.9)
0.3
(0.2, 0.5)
0.4
Governor switch during term
No
1.5
(0.9, 2.3)
0.7
(0.5, 1.0)
1.0
Yes
5.3
(3.0, 8.4)
2.5
(1.8, 3.6)
3.4
Education
Primary (min)
0.7
(0.3, 1.5)
0.4
(0.2, 0.7)
0.5
College degree (median)
1.5
(0.9, 2.3)
0.7
(0.5, 1.0)
1.0
Doctoral studies (max)
2.1
(1.1, 3.4)
1.0
(0.6, 1.6)
1.3
Ballot Position
Suplente
0.5
(0.1, 1.6)
0.2
(0.0, 0.7)
0.3
Propietario
1.5
(0.9, 2.3)
0.7
(0.5, 1.0)
1.0
Estimates based on Model 1, Table 5.2. All other variables set at their median.

95% CI
(0.6, 1.5)
(0.4, 1.1)
(0.5, 2.0)
(0.2, 0.6)
(0.6, 1.5)
(0.3, 0.6)
(0.6, 1.5)
(1.9, 5.7)
(0.2, 0.9)
(0.6, 1.5)
(0.7, 2.3)
(0.1, 1.0)
(0.6, 1.5)

Hypotheses 1 and 2 specify a number of relationships between mode of election,
progressive ambition, and pork-barreling behavior, and the results in Model 1 lend
support to these hypotheses. For legislators pursuing future careers in sub-national office,
there is little significant difference in the number of sponsored budget amendments
between SMD and PR legislators. Among members of the PRI, SMD deputies are
expected to sponsor on average 1.5 amendments, compared to 1.1 for PR deputies, an
insignificant difference. However, for legislators that seek a future national office, there
is a large difference in sponsorship behavior based on mode of election. Across all three
major parties, PR deputies who seek a future national-level post sponsor roughly three
times fewer budget amendments than those elected though SMDs. Furthermore, while
there is little evidence to suggest that the propensity to sponsor budget amendments
158

differs among SMD deputies based on their future careers, PR deputies sponsor about
twice as many budget amendments if they are seeking a sub-national post.
These results suggest a number of interesting conclusions. First, legislators
elected through single-member districts are likely to face much greater pressures from
various interests in their district and state to secure federal resources, and their behavior
differs little based on where they pursue future office. Second, this finding regarding
SMD legislators is also fairly surprising since most previous research on pork-barreling
suggests the motive to engage in this type of activity is primarily motivated by a desire
for reelection. However, the evidence presented here suggests that even when reelection
is prohibited, legislators still face pressures to represent particular interests in a
competitive environment. Finally, PR deputies exhibit a wider range of behavior which
seems to be largely based on where they want to pursue future office. PR deputies may
lack some of the constituent pressures faced by SMD deputies and therefore choose to
engage in behavior consistent with their career goals.
Hypotheses 3 and 4 address the potential implications of gubernatorial influence
in sponsoring budget amendments and the results of the model perform as expected. The
estimates in Table 5.3 suggest that federal deputies who do not share a co-partisan
governor sponsor about 2.5 times more budget amendments than those deputies who are
from states with co-partisan governors. While the result may seem counter-intuitive, it is
not if one recognizes the budget amendments primarily as a credit-claiming activity.
In addition, I find that a gubernatorial switch has the strongest effect of any of the
variables on sponsoring amendments. For example, among PRI deputies, the median
legislator sponsored 1.5 state-targeted budget amendments, but if the PRI deputy
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experienced a switch in gubernatorial office during their legislative term, they are
expected to sponsor, on average, a little more than 5 budget amendments. The large effect
of a gubernatorial switch not only suggests the importance of governors in the budget
process, but also the potential influence governors have over the future careers of federal
deputies.
In terms of the other variables in Model 1, I find that education has a significant
effect, with the least educated deputies sponsoring fewer budget amendments than the
most educated. However, the magnitude of the effect of education is somewhat muted,
considering that most federal deputies have college degrees. Deputies that have begun or
completed doctoral degrees only sponsor about 0.3 to 0.6 more budget amendments than
those with college degrees.
As expected, suplentes, or alternates, sponsor significantly fewer budget
amendments than primary legislators. While primary, or propietario, legislators sponsor
about three times more budget amendments than alternates, the effect of the variable is
substantively not very interesting. Since most alternates are not in office during the fall
term in which the budget is actually negotiated, and the large majority of them enter
office during the final spring term before new elections, most alternates rarely have a
chance to effectively participate during the budget negotiations.
Partisanship also explains some differences in the submission of budget
amendments targeting states and municipalities, although the biggest difference seems to
be between the PRI and the PAN. The median PRI deputy (1.5) sponsors about twice as
many budget amendments compared to the median PAN deputy (0.7). The PRD falls
somewhere in the middle, with the median PRD deputy sponsoring 1 budget amendment,
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although the estimates are not precise enough to suggest the PRD’s behavior is
significantly different from the PRI or the PAN.
The other variables in the model have little significant effect. I find few
differences by gender in terms of sponsoring budget amendments, nor does institutional
position seem to have any effect. Members of the budget committee do not sponsor any
more or less budget amendments than deputies not on the committee.
Turning to Model 2, the results compared to Model 1 are slightly different
although do generally confirm those presented in Model 1. The interaction effect between
mode of election and progressive ambition is still present, although not as strong. For
example, among PRD deputies pursuing a future national-level post, the average SMD
deputy presents 1.0 budget amendments compared to 0.2 for the average PR deputy, a
significant difference with 95 percent confidence. Among PRD deputies pursuing future
state-level office, the average SMD deputy presents 1.2 budget amendments compared to
0.4 for the average PR deputy. There is no significant difference among SMD deputies
based on where they pursue future careers, while the difference between PR deputies is
only significant with 90 percent confidence. A gubernatorial switch during a deputy’s
term has a much weaker effect on presenting amendments, with the average PRI deputy
presenting 0.7 amendments compared to 1.2 amendments among those who experienced
a gubernatorial switch, a difference significant at the p<.10 level.
There are a few interesting differences between Model 1 and Model 2. Female
deputies do present budget amendments more often than males. The average PRD female
deputy presents 2.3 amendments compared to 1.2 for men. Partisanship also seems more
important in terms of presenting budget amendments. Nearly all the parties except the
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Green Party (PVEM) present more budget amendments than the PAN. Finally, committee
secretaries present more budget amendments than backbenchers, although it is not clear
why this would be the case.
5.5 Conclusion
Pork-barreling is a recent phenomenon in the Mexican Chamber of Deputies.
However, legislators operating in this new competitive environment are increasingly
using budget amendments as a credit-claiming method to pursue their future career goals
at the sub-national level. The lack of a reelection incentive does not mean that Mexican
federal deputies do not attempt to serve their constituents. However, due to the varied
nature of career paths, deputies who seek to return to the municipal or state arena, do not
share partisanship with their state’s governor, or come from state where the gubernatorial
office changed hands in the middle of the legislative term are much more likely to engage
in credit-claiming activity during federal budget negotiations. Furthermore, the electoral
system matters for understanding legislative behavior in Mexico. Legislators elected
through single-member districts are much more likely to represent municipal and state
interests in the federal budget process, suggesting they are much more tied to the
geographic constituencies that elected them compared to their counterparts elected
through proportional representation. These electoral system effects are most likely due to
differences in candidate selection for the two tiers, pressures from governors, as well as
variation in how each group of legislators pursue their future career goals.
In general, the findings suggest that Mexican deputies are strategic actors that
largely engage in behavior in hopes of obtaining future political office. Removing the
reelection incentive does not lead all deputies to ‘shirk’ or to ignore their constituents.
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Yet, these findings also suggest that the search for future political office conditions the
extent to which deputies do attempt to secure federal resources for current and/or future
constituents.
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Chapter 6: Who sponsors and why? Bill sponsorship and legislative participation in
the Chamber of Deputies
Are there incentives to participate in legislative life when reelection is not allowed?
Many studies of legislative behavior assume reelection as the primary goal driving
legislative behavior (e.g. Mayhew 1974), while others recognize that legislators may have
multiple goals besides reelection, such as seeking influence within the legislature or
pursuing policy goals (Fenno 1973; Hall 1996; Wawro 2000). Even if one assumes
legislators have multiple goals outside of reelection, these additional goals are intricately
tied to the possibility of reelection and to one another. Seeking influence within a
legislature is predicated on the assumption that legislators can accumulate seniority over
time, while the ability of an individual legislator to pursue policy goals becomes
increasingly difficult if they cannot establish any influence within the legislative body,
nor have the experience and expertise that comes with multiple terms. As Wawro (2000)
argues, members of the U.S. House primarily engage in “legislative entrepreneurship” to
advance to leadership posts within the body. Yet, this goal rests on the assumption that
legislators serve multiple terms, since advancement from a backbencher to chair of a
powerful committee in a single term is extremely unlikely (even in Mexico). Thus,
without reelection, it is unclear from a theoretical standpoint why legislators would do
anything at all.
Nevertheless, while Mexican legislators cannot seek consecutive reelection, they
do participate in legislative life, and have increasingly done so in recent years (Nacif
2006; Kerevel 2010; Chapter 3). This chapter seeks to understand who participates and
why in the Mexican Chamber of Deputies. I argue that Mexican legislators are
progressively ambitious, or desire to seek alternative office after serving a term in the
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Chamber and thus, use the tools at their disposal to pursue their career goals. One of
those tools, bill sponsorship, is the focus of this chapter. After examining the
determinants of bill sponsorship within the Chamber of Deputies, I then demonstrate that
legislators who sponsor more bills are more likely to attempt to pursue future legislative
office than other careers.
6.1 Why sponsor legislation?
Previous research on legislative participation generally and bill sponsorship specifically
identifies a number of potential reasons for why individual legislators would be more or
less active. Bill sponsorship primarily serves an agenda-setting function (Schiller 1995;
Woon 2008). Legislators can use bills to advance the goals of their constituents (Schiller
1995; Hall 1996) and also promote their own policy goals (Wawro 2000). Bill
sponsorship and cosponsorship can also serve a position-taking function, providing
valuable signals to legislative leaders, voters, interest groups and other party members
(Campbell 1982; Highton and Rocca 2005; Koger 2003; Mayhew 1974; Rocca and
Gordon 2010; Wilson and Young 1997). Sponsoring salient or controversial legislation
may also lead to media coverage for the legislator(s) involved, providing valuable
benefits such as name recognition and publicity (Highton and Rocca 2005).
While most of the existing literature on bill sponsorship is based on the U.S.
Congress (but see Micozzi 2009), and assumes reelection as a primary goal of most
legislators, assuming progressive ambition changes little. In fact, most studies of bill
sponsorship and cosponsorship in the U.S. find little to no relationship between electoral
marginality and legislative participation (Schiller 1995; Hall 1996; Koger 2003). The
ability to influence the legislative agenda serves the goals of progressively ambitious
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legislators, as it signals to party leaders, other legislators and future constituents that the
individual is an effective legislator, a potentially useful skill for advancing to another
office. Progressively ambitious legislators still have an incentive to use sponsorship to
advance the goals of future constituents, and where parties are strong and have strong
influence over the future careers of legislators, as in Mexico, legislators also have an
incentive to use bills to advance the policy priorities of their parties and groups
responsible for electing the legislator to office. 74 Position-taking and the potential for
media coverage also serves the goals of progressively ambitious legislators, as increased
publicity should also help legislators advance their goals of achieving future office. In
Mexico, there is a tendency in the media to measure the quality and effectiveness of
legislators by the number of bills they introduce, providing an incentive to ambitious
legislators to engage in bill sponsorship and avoid the (potentially misguided) criticism of
a “do-nothing” legislator (Merino 2011).75
Previous chapters have demonstrated why a large majority of legislators who
cannot be reelected are progressively ambitious, rather than return to private life. Starting
with the assumption that legislators in this environment are progressively ambitious, the
question then becomes, where do they seek future office and do they behave strategically
while in the legislature to obtain this future office?

74

Political parties within the Chamber of Deputies also screen legislation sponsored by
their members prior to its introduction on the floor to make sure it is consistent with the
policy views of the party. Interview with Vidal Llerenas, federal deputy, LXI Legislature,
October 11, 2011.
75
In an interview with a former legislator, I was told they introduced a bill primarily to
avoid the criticism that he was there three years and didn’t sponsor a single bill, even
though he knew the bill he sponsored had no chance of passing.
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At the individual level, an ambitious actor may use their current office to engage
in any type of behavior they see as likely to increase the probability of winning a future
office. For a legislator, this could involve constituency service, bill sponsorship, porkbarreling, speaking for certain interests, promoting the interests of a particular group, or
seeking leadership roles to increase influence within the legislature and visibility outside
of it. While most work on national legislatures, and nearly all work on the United States
Congress assumes that legislators primarily seek reelection to the same office (e.g.
Mayhew 1974), assuming progressive ambition does not make legislators any less
strategic. When legislators in the U.S. decide to pursue higher office, evidence suggests
that their behavior reflects these different goals (Herrick and Moore 1993; Padró I Miquel
and Snyder 2006; Victor 2011).
In most cases, representatives that are progressively ambitious seek future
constituencies that include the constituency that first elected them to office. Thus,
scholars who have studied this issue find that progressively ambitious legislators are not
only responsive to their current constituency, but to citizens of their potential future
constituency since these constituencies typically overlap (Squire 1988; Maestas 2000;
2003; Samuels 2003; Micozzi 2009). For example, in the U.S., state legislators may seek
a position in the House of Representatives, while House members may seek a Senate seat.
Outside the U.S., Brazilian and Argentine legislators may seek to become governor or
mayor (Samuels 2003; Micozzi 2009). In all these cases, current and future constituencies
are likely to overlap.
Thus, progressively ambitious legislators are likely to use the tools at their
disposal to increase the probability of winning a future political office. However, since
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legislators possess multiple tools (constituency service, pork-barreling, bill sponsorship,
agenda-setter), the first question that must be answered is to explain why some legislators
use certain tools over others, or in this case, why some legislators sponsor more bills than
others. Once we have a better understanding of the determinants of bill sponsorship
activity, we can then turn our attention to the relationship between this tool and a
legislator’s future career goals.
6.2 Determinants of bill sponsorship
Electoral rules are one important factor that are likely to influence the behavior of
legislators, and there are a number of studies suggesting that the way representatives are
elected influences the type of behavior they engage in once in office (Carey and Shugart
1995; Crisp et al. 2004; Lancaster 1986; Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita 2006;
Heitschusen, Young and Wood 2005). For example, the more a legislator has to rely on a
personal vote to get elected, the more likely they will engage in activities, like
constituency service, to increase support in their district. Crisp et al. (2004) find that as
candidate selection is increasingly decentralized, individual legislators are more likely to
initiate bills that address parochial rather than national issues. These findings are in line
with the theoretical expectations regarding electoral system effects on legislative
participation. Legislators elected in single-member districts (SMD) are particularly
concerned about representing the interests of their district as it influences their future
political career. Thus, SMD legislators will be more interested in engaging in types of
legislative activity that will allow them to claim credit with their constituents. In contrast,
PR legislators are relatively more anonymous, face reduced incentives to engage in
credit-claiming activity in the legislature, and should be expected to engage in activity

168

that is more likely to benefit the party at the national level (Bawn and Thies 2003; Crisp
et al. 2004; Crisp 2007).
Since Mexico uses a mixed-electoral system whereby a proportion of
officeholders are elected by direct vote, and others are elected through closed-list
proportional representation, it is important to consider how mode of election might
influence bill sponsorship behavior once in office. For the Mexican Chamber of Deputies,
300 members are elected through single-member district, plurality elections, and 200
members are elected though closed-list proportional representation in five 40-member
districts. Voters for legislative office only receive one ballot to vote for district
candidates, unlike most other mixed-member electoral systems. Furthermore, in Mexico,
dual candidacy is restricted by law and not widely used in practice and thus, there is a
much more clear-cut distinction between district and PR candidates (Kerevel 2010).
Since dual candidacy is hardly an important factor in Mexican elections,
candidates on the PR lists largely do not campaign for votes. They may engage in behind
the scenes work, but do not engage in debates, organize campaign events, go door to
door, give speeches, produce advertisements or finance clientelist practices.76 In contrast,
a candidate running in a district race for votes must typically engage in all of these
activities.

76

Unfortunately, clientelism and vote-buying is a regular feature of Mexican elections for
all parties. Some examples might include free t-shirts and hats with campaign images on
them, organizing events where free services are offered, from haircuts to medical exams,
or even the direct handing out of money. Campaigns in rural areas might include
candidates giving away cement or fertilizer to potential voters. Where the money comes
from to pay for these activities is unknown. I have personally observed some of these
activities, as well as gleaned evidence of it from newspaper reports and interviews.
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While all potential candidates would probably prefer to pay no costs to winning
office, political parties need candidates to run in district races and therefore, the benefits
of holding office after winning a district election are likely to be different than holding
office won through a spot on the PR list. Candidates who can win district races are likely
to be valuable to political parties, and the act of winning a district election is also likely to
bring benefits to the individual officeholder. A winner of a district race is likely to have
greater name recognition and connections to voters in a given district. They also have ties
to a territorially-defined constituency which can be used to provide constituency service
and be used as an area where they can claim credit for their activities while in office.
These activities are likely to bring benefits to the individual officeholder for their future
political careers after their current term is over. Officeholders who obtained their position
through proportional representation are unlikely to accrue these same benefits since they
have no easily identifiable territorial constituency, have not demonstrated they can win
votes in an election, and voters are unlikely to know who they are absent other unrelated
factors.
Legislators elected under PR pay fewer costs to reach office, especially when
there are district candidates doing much of the campaigning. For candidates at the top of
the list, the probability of winning office is extremely high, which suggests that political
parties are strategic in who they place at the top of the list since they are fairly certain
these individuals will reach office regardless of the party’s overall electoral performance.
Especially in a system without reelection, party control over the top of the list provides
one mechanism for parties to place more experienced and loyal candidates in office who
can take charge of the party’s agenda and business inside the legislature. For legislators at
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the top of the list, the probability they will secure an important leadership position once
they reach office is also much higher compared to district candidates or PR candidates
lower on the list (Kerevel 2010). These leadership positions are desirable as they often
come with added financial benefits, additional staff, and increased influence over policy.
These differential benefits suggest that we will see differences in behavior among
officeholders based on their mode of election, as well as differences in the career paths of
officeholders by mode of election. Since the benefits of holding a legislative seat won
through a district race include the increased possibility of providing constituency service,
which can serve to further individual career goals, we should expect to see officeholders
elected in single-member districts to engage in much more vote-seeking activity than
officeholders elected through PR. Legislators are busy and have many demands on their
time, thus for legislators who spend more time engaging in vote-seeking activities, it is
less likely they will have as much time to engage in other legislative business, such as
drafting legislation. However, officeholders elected through PR should not be assumed to
be any less ambitious, but since they may be much less likely to use constituency service
and pork-barreling as a way to further their career goals, they should be more likely to
use the other tools available to them than district officeholders, namely bill sponsorship.
This discussion leads to the first testable hypothesis.
H1: PR legislators should sponsor more legislation than SMD legislators
Candidate selection methods may also be likely to influence the behavior of
legislators, independent of the method by which they are elected to office. Political
parties in Mexico hold exclusive control over ballot access and therefore possess strong
control over the candidate selection process and the future careers of politicians. One way
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in which candidate selection methods are likely to influence a deputy’s bill sponsorship
behavior is through the influence of co-partisan governors. Mexican governors have an
enormous amount of control over candidate selection for their co-partisans (Freidenberg
2010; Langston 2010), and if they outlast the term of the federal deputy, can provide a
future administrative post or ballot access in a future election after the legislator leaves
office.
Previous research has suggested that co-partisan deputies function as the agents of
governors, which can lead to gubernatorial influence over voting behavior in the
Chamber (Langston 2010; Rosas and Langston 2011), and as I suggested in Chapter 5,
governors can also influence the budget amendment behavior of individual deputies.
While speculative, it is also possible that governors have a role in the bill sponsorship
behavior of individual deputies, pressuring their co-partisans in the Chamber to sponsor
legislation beneficial to state interests. While state legislatures also have the
constitutional right to sponsor legislation in the Chamber of Deputies, these sub-national
bodies rarely take advantage of this opportunity as shown in Chapter 377, and in many
cases it may make more sense for governors to get their deputies to sponsor legislation
rather than the state legislature, as the deputy will actually be in the Chamber working to
get the bill passed. If governors are pressuring their deputies to sponsor bills, then I
would expect to see deputies with co-partisan governors to sponsor more bills, while
deputies from states where the governor switches during the legislative term to sponsor
fewer bills, since a gubernatorial switch is likely to break the principal-agent relationship
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For more on the role of state legislatures in the policy-making process, see Medina
Vidal, Ugues, Jr., and Bowler (2012).
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between governors and deputies. This discussion leads to two exploratory hypotheses that
can be tested with available data:
H2: Deputies with co-partisan governors from their states should sponsor more
bills than deputies without co-partisan governors
H3: Deputies from states where the governor leaves office prior to the end of the
legislative term should sponsor fewer bills than deputies from states where the
governor outlasts the legislative term
In addition to electoral rules, institutional position with the Chamber of Deputies
is also likely to have an influence on bill sponsorship activity (Padró I Miquel and Snyder
2006; Woon 2008). The possession of leadership positions confers agenda-setting powers
upon the legislators lucky enough to hold them, and these positions come with greater
resources and staff (Schiller 1995; Hall 1996; Wawro 2000; Rivera Sanchez 2004;
Kerevel 2010). Therefore, legislative leaders should have greater incentives and greater
opportunities to engage in bill sponsorship compared to backbenchers.
H4: Legislative leaders should sponsor more bills than backbenchers
In addition, serving on committees provides an informational advantage to the
committee’s members (Krehbiel 1991). Legislators should be much more likely to
sponsor bills related to the committees they serve on (Schiller 1995), and if they serve on
a larger number of committees, they should have increased opportunities to sponsor more
bills.
H5: The more committees a legislator sits on, the more bills they will sponsor
Party membership is also likely to matter a great deal in the propensity to sponsor
bills. The U.S. literature suggests that members of the minority party cosponsor more
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bills than members of the majority party since they are likely to be more dissatisfied with
the status quo (Campbell 1982; Koger 2003). In a multi-party presidential system such as
Mexico, a similar logic should apply. Members of opposition parties (parties not in
control of the presidency) should engage in greater levels of bill sponsorship as a form of
position-taking (Mayhew 1974) and as a way to express dissatisfaction with the status
quo.
H6: Members of opposition parties should sponsor more bills than members of the
President’s party
Finally, there are a number of individual characteristics of legislators that should
influence bill sponsorship activity. The educational level of legislators should have an
influence on the ability of individuals to perform legislative work. Legislators with higher
levels of education should be more comfortable understanding and participating within
the legislative process, and will likely pay fewer transaction costs in drafting a bill than
legislators with lower levels of education. Especially in Mexico where most legislators
have little previous legislative experience to develop the necessary skills to sponsor bills,
educational levels are likely to be extremely important in understanding legislative
behavior. While a legislator can always hire an advisor, and the political parties in the
Chamber of Deputies do provide a group of advisors to help their legislators, I was told in
an interview that the educational background of legislators

does influence the bill

drafting process. Deputies with the relevant educational or professional background are
able to draft their own bills, especially shorter, credit-claiming or position-taking bills,
without the help of advisors, while those without the relevant educational background are
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less able to do this task on their own, which is likely to reduce the amount of legislation a
less educated deputy can produce.78
H7: More educated legislators should sponsor more bills than less educated
legislators
While reelection is not possible, a number of legislators do enter the Chamber of
Deputies with some previous legislative experience that they acquired at the state or
federal level at some point in their political careers. Much like with the case of reelection,
where legislative effectiveness increases with tenure (Padró I Miquel and Snyder 2006),
legislators with previous legislative experience should be more comfortable with the
legislative process than those with no experience, and face less of a learning curve.
However, previous legislative experience in the Mexican case may be less important than
realized, since for most individuals with previous experience, they spent several years
doing some other type of activity in between legislative terms, reducing the likelihood
they will be able to capitalize on any skills developed in their previous term. Moreover,
for many members of the Chamber of Deputies, previous experience was gathered in
rubber-stamp legislatures either at the state level, or under PRI dominance, suggesting
there may have been few opportunities to develop useful skills applicable to the current
situation in the Chamber. Nevertheless, I hypothesize:
H8: Legislators with previous legislative experience should sponsor more bills
than legislators with no previous experience
Finally, it is important to consider the gender of the legislator. Previous research
on Mexican legislators suggests that women sponsor an equal or greater number of bills
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Interview with Vidal Llerenas, federal deputy, LXI Legislature, October 11, 2011.
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than men (Kerevel and Atkeson 2011). One potential explanation for why women might
sponsor more bills is that women face greater discriminatory hurdles in entering public
office, and must work much harder than men to reach the legislature (Anzia and Berry
2011). Thus, women legislators may be likely to possess greater skills and be more highly
qualified than their male colleagues, which may translate over into bill sponsorship
activity.
H9: Female legislators should sponsor more bills than male legislators
6.3 The use of bill sponsorship for pursuing future career goals
Differences in behavior while in office are also likely to translate into differences
in career paths for officeholders elected through different methods. Legislators who
dedicate a significant amount of time to legislative work, such as bill sponsorship, not
only signal their desire and capability to engage in this type of work, but also prepare
themselves to move on to a future legislative office or other position where their recent
experience and skills will be useful. Especially in Mexico where candidate selection is
centralized (Wuhs 2006; Freidenberg 2010), party leaders concerned with the party’s
performance in office and electoral prospects should have strong incentives to select high
performing legislators for future legislative positions, rather than support legislators who
have not performed well. Obviously legislators have many duties and can demonstrate
their legislative effectiveness in many ways, as negotiators, orators, leaders, and agendasetters. Bill sponsorship is only one indicator of performance and effectiveness, but is at
least one implication of the above theory that can be tested.
H10: Legislators who invest more time in legislative work (i.e. sponsor more bills)
should be more likely to pursue legislative careers than those who invest less time
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There may also be electoral system effects on where legislators pursue their future
careers. District officeholders should be much more likely to build on the political capital
accumulated through winning an election by seeking office in the same or overlapping
constituency in which they were originally elected. In contrast, PR officeholders have no
clearly defined constituency other than their own party, and thus we should expect these
individuals to pursue offices where they do not need to gain the support of a clearly
defined territorial constituency, such as a bureaucratic appointment, future proportional
representation seats, or to work within the party organizations. Since PR officeholders are
also more likely to engage in legislative work such as drafting bills and chairing
committees (Kerevel 2010), they should also be somewhat more likely to seek a future
legislative office since their skills will be transferable, and parties in a system without
reelection may need to rely on a subset of skilled legislators to conduct legislative
business when building seniority in a specific legislative chamber is not possible.
H11: PR legislators should be more likely to pursue future legislative office than
SMD legislators
The influence of governors over the candidate selection process and the future
careers of co-partisan legislators is also likely to have an effect on how current deputies
pursue future political office. However, it is not clear specifically how gubernatorial
influence will affect the decision to pursue a future legislative seat. Deputies who share
co-partisan governors may be able to use this connection to obtain a spot on the ballot in
a future election, but as I demonstrated in Chapter 4, these same deputies are much more
likely to pursue a bureaucratic appointment due to the low costs of obtaining the position
and a high probability of securing an appointment from a co-partisan governor. If they
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are more likely to seek an appointed position, then deputies with co-partisan governors
may be less likely to immediately pursue legislative office after leaving the Chamber.
While the direction of gubernatorial influence is unclear, I speculate deputies with copartisan governors will be less likely to pursue legislative office, primarily based on
previous findings in Chapter 4.
H12: Legislators who share co-partisan governors should be less likely to pursue
future legislative office than deputies who do not share a co-partisan governor.
Finally, the structure of available opportunities and the number of legislative seats
for which deputies can reasonably compete is likely to have a large influence over the
pursuit of a future legislative career. If there are fewer legislative seats for which to
compete, it is much less likely deputies will pursue this type of future position. In midterm election years, deputies leaving the Chamber are not able to compete for the Senate,
thus they will have fewer legislative opportunities and will be less likely to pursue future
legislative office.
H13: Deputies that leave the Chamber of Deputies in mid-term election years (i.e.
2003, 2009) should be less likely to pursue future legislative office than deputies
leaving in general election years (i.e. 2000, 2006).
6.4 Data and Methodology
Studying bill sponsorship in the Mexican Chamber of Deputies is a more complicated
affair than in the United States. In the U.S., legislative rules state bills must have a single
author, or sponsor, and after 1978, can have an unlimited number of cosponsors
(Campbell 1982; Thomas and Grofman 1993). Similar rules exist in Argentina (Micozzi
2009). In Mexico, no such rules exist that clearly delineate between the author of a bill
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and cosponsors. Instead, the relevant distinctions are between those who “present” or
“propose” a bill, those who “sign” a bill and those who “adhere” to a bill. In most cases,
legislators who present a bill are the authors of the bill, and since the majority of bills
only have a single legislator attached to the bill (see Chapter 3), considering the
presenters of a bill as its sponsor(s) is a reasonable decision. Previous research I have
conducted on bill sponsorship has relied only on the “presenters” of a bill (Kerevel 2010;
Kerevel and Atkeson 2011). Adherents to a bill are legislators who ask for their name to
be attached to a bill when it is presented on the floor before it is turned over to
committee. The names of bill adherents are not attached to the versions of bills available
to researchers, and thus are notoriously difficult to recover.79
When bills are introduced into the Chamber, they include the name(s) of the
presenter, and anyone who signed the bill. However, those who signed the bill prior to its
introduction may or may not be cosponsors in the U.S. sense of the term. Individuals who
sign the bill may have been asked to sign the bill after it was written, may have been the
primary author of the bill, or may have participated in the drafting of the bill with several
other legislators and staff members. Moreover, bills may be presented by more than a
single legislator, and the presenters of a bill may not actually be the primary authors of
the bill. For example, there are many bills in the Chamber of Deputies that were
“presented” by two, three, or more legislators, and which may or may not also contain
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For currently sitting legislators (in the LXI Legislature, 2009-12), the Chamber of
Deputies website breaks down these three distinctions for each individual legislator,
identifying which bills they proposed, which ones they signed, and to which ones they
adhered. But, these distinctions are not available for previous legislatures. It is also
possible to read through the debate records to find evidence of legislator’s asking for their
names to be attached to a bill. The time necessary to recover this data will have to await
future research.
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additional signatures. Bills can also be presented by entire committees, entire political
parties, or by the internal organ called the Junta de Coordinación Política (JCP), which is
the leadership group of all the caucus leaders in the Chamber. When bills are presented
by a committee, or in the name of a committee, they are likely to be presented by the
committee chair or one of the committee’s secretaries. Whether or not the member
presenting the legislation is actually the author of the bill is extremely difficult to
determine.
An example of the problem may help. In the LVII Legislature, PRD deputy
Gerardo Ramírez Vidal helped draft a bill that included a variety of constitutional
reforms to strengthen the legislative branch, such as lengthening the duration of
congressional sessions, increasing the length of the congressional term from three to four
years, among many other proposed changes.80 The bill was presented by PRD deputy
Isael Petronio Cantú Najera, and signed by deputy Gerardo Ramírez along with five other
deputies. However, in an interview with Gerardo Ramírez, he claimed to be the primary
author of the bill, but since the bill was presented while the Chamber was out of session,
deputy Cantú Najera presented it in place of deputy Ramírez Vidal, even though deputy
Cantú Najera had little to do with the actual drafting of the bill.81
Obviously, interviewing every deputy involved with every bill that has more than
a single signature to determine their role in the drafting of the bill is an impossible task. 82
Furthermore, since there is no rule restricting the number of “presenters” or sponsors to a
80

The bill can be found in the Gaceta Parlamentaria: De reformas y adiciones a los
artículos 51, 65, 66, 71, 89 y 93 de la Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos
Mexicanos, Gaceta Parlamentaria, número 425, miércoles 12 de enero de 2000. (578).
81
Interview with Gerardo Ramírez Vidal, Mexico City, October 28, 2011.
82
And, assuming deputies are truthful about the extent of their involvement in a
particular bill may be highly dubious.
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bill, it is unclear how to code the participation of each legislator who was part of the bill.
The strategy I decided to employ here is to code every signature attached to each bill as
equal, and in the multivariate analysis, I control for the number of bills a legislator
presented. Since legislators who sign a bill prior to its introduction can reasonably claim
credit for its existence, and the drafting of bills often involves the help of staff members,
so that even single-authored bills may not truly be authored by the legislator presenting
them, coding each signature on a bill is a reasonable strategy to get at the bill sponsorship
activity of Mexican legislators.
Mexican legislators also seem to have realized the ambiguity of the situation and
their ability to claim credit for legislation that has multiple signatures. For example,
during the LVII Legislature (1997-2000), about 52% of all bills introduced were singleauthored bills, and almost 15% of bills had more than 10 signatures. By the LX
Legislature (2006-09), 76% of all bills introduced were single-authored bills, 14.6% of
bills had 2-4 signatures, and only about 5% of bills had more than 10 signatures. In
addition, the percentage of deputies who did not present a bill on the floor has dropped
drastically over time, while the percentage of deputies who did not sign any bill has
remained relatively constant. During the LVII Legislature, over 55% of legislators did not
present a bill, while this figure dropped to under 15% in the LX Legislature. However,
during the LVII Legislature, only 2.7% of legislators did not sign any bill, compared to
3% in the LX Legislature. These figures suggest an increasing tendency among Mexican
legislators to adapt their behavior to the existing ambiguous rules on bill sponsorship to
claim credit for their work in the Chamber.
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Thus, for the purposes of this analysis, I coded the number of times a legislator
signed (i.e. sponsored) a bill. This count variable serves as the measure of bill
sponsorship used here, and is the first dependent variable.83
The second dependent variable used here is a dichotomous variable on whether or
not a legislator who served in the Chamber of Deputies from 1997-2009 sought future
legislative office, either as a senator or state legislator, immediately after their term in the
Chamber. The data on future career paths was collected from candidate lists at the state
and federal level, newspapers, published biographies of Mexican politicians, and any
available CVs of each legislator, if they are still in public office.84 Due to the centralized
nature of candidate selection in Mexico, not all legislators were successful at winning a
spot on the ballot. Therefore, I had to rely on additional information besides official
candidate lists to determine if federal deputies publicly attempted to pursue future
legislative office. Therefore, the dependent variable reflects any available evidence on
whether or not a legislator in my database tried to gain a future legislative seat, regardless
if they made it onto the ballot or won the seat. More details on the future career path data
are available in Chapter 4.
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Bill sponsorship data is available through the official organs of the Chamber of
Deputies, the Gaceta Parlamentaria and the Diario de los Debates. Information on bill
sponsorship can also be found through the Sistema de Información Legislativa run by the
Secretaría de Gobernación. I primarily relied on the Gaceta Parlamentaria for its ease of
use, the systematic formatting of the necessary information which allowed me to code the
data into a useable format, and because the Gaceta also includes information on the bill’s
trajectory through the legislative process. On very few occasions, there were noticeable
errors in the Gaceta, and so I turned to the Diario de los Debates to check the
information.
84
Candidate lists for state level office were obtained through the state-level electoral
institutes, either on their websites or through freedom of information requests. For
information on candidates aspiring to a candidacy, I relied primarily on newspaper
archives of El Universal, La Jornada (including regional editions), Reforma, Proceso,
Excelsior, Milenio, as well as numerous other local papers.
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6.4.1 Independent variables
Background information on the legislators who served in the Chamber of
Deputies from 1997-2009 was available through the Sistema de Información Legislativa
run by the Secretaría de Gobernación.85 I coded the gender of each legislator, 1 if they
were female, 0 if they were male. I expect female legislators to sponsor more bills than
males. I also expect female legislators to be more likely than males to pursue future
legislative office. Due to widespread gender discrimination in Mexico, female politicians
have a reduced set of opportunities. Very few women win mayoral or gubernatorial
office, and in general, do much better when elected through proportional representation
or seek an appointed office. Since all state legislatures and the Senate include
proportional representation seats, I expect more women to try and pursue legislative
careers.
Education is coded on an 8-point scale, from primary education to at least some
doctoral studies. I expect higher levels of education to be positively related to the number
of bills sponsored. I have no expectations for education regarding its effect on future
legislative office, but include it as a control. I also include age (in years) in the ambition
model as a control. I expect older legislators to be more likely to retire than seek another
legislative office, and therefore expect a negative relationship between age and future
legislative office.
I code the previous legislative experience of federal deputies as a series of dummy
variables. Each legislator is coded 1 if they have previous experience as a state legislator,
senator, or federal deputy, and 0 if they do not. Very few legislators have served more
85

Additional background information was collected from a variety of sources when the
SIL was incomplete. See Chapter 3.
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than one prior term in any of these offices, and therefore I do not code years of service. I
expect legislators with prior legislative experience to sponsor more bills, although as I
mentioned above, there may be no relationship due to the lack of continuity in legislative
life for many federal deputies. I also include previous legislative experience in the
ambition model, although the expectations are ambiguous. On the one hand, current
legislators who have previous legislative experience may represent a subset of politicians
who desire a legislative career and as a result, be more likely to pursue future legislative
office. However, current legislators with previous legislative experience may also be
more seasoned and well-known politicians who desire a more prestigious office after
leaving the chamber, such as mayor, governor, cabinet member or national party leader.
If that is the case, then, previous experience may have a negative influence on pursuing
future legislative office. Both potential explanations may also be partially true for
different groups of legislators, thus leading to no statistically significant relationship
between previous legislative experience and the pursuit of future legislative office.
Besides a legislator’s background, I also include a number of independent
variables to capture their institutional position within the Chamber. Separate variables are
included for deputies that are committee secretaries, committee chairs, and party leaders
(caucus leader or Speaker).86 Legislators are coded 1 if they hold one of these positions, 0
otherwise. I expect legislative leaders to sponsor more bills than backbenchers. I include
these measures in the future legislative office model as controls, but have no directional
expectations. Leaders have the skills and may desire future legislative office, but may
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A party leader is considered any legislator who served as caucus leader (coordinador
parlamentario) or Speaker (presidente de la Mesa Directiva).
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also seek more prominent leadership or sub-national executive positions after leaving
office.
Deputies elected through proportional representation are coded 1, and 0 if they
were elected in a single-member district. I expect PR legislators to sponsor more bills and
be more likely to pursue future legislative office.
To capture gubernatorial influence, I measure the partisan congruence between a
deputy and their home state governor at the beginning of the legislative term for the bill
sponsorship model, and at the end of the term for the ambition model. I expect partisan
congruence between deputies and governors to lead to higher rates of bill sponsorship,
but a lower probability of pursuing future legislative office. In the bill sponsorship model,
I also include a measure that captures whether or not a governor from a deputy’s home
state left office prior to the end of the legislative term. I expect gubernatorial switches to
lead to lower rates of bill sponsorship.
Additionally, in the bill sponsorship model I include a count of the number of
committees a legislator served on throughout their term. According to internal rules, a
legislator can only sit on three standing committees at any one time. However, there are a
large number of special committees and sub-committees that exist for only a single term,
or for a partial term, and these committees do not fall under the three committee
limitation. Rotation on committees is also high within the Chamber of Deputies, and
therefore, even with the limit on serving on three standing committees, many legislators
end up serving on four or five different ordinary committees plus a variable number of
special committees. The count of the number of committees includes the total number of
any type of committee a legislator served on throughout their three-year term, regardless
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of how long they served on any one committee. I expect legislators who serve on more
committees to sponsor more bills, given the greater opportunities they have to participate
in a wider variety of legislative business.
I include a number of dummy variables to capture partisanship, with the PRI as
the left out category. I expect opposition parties to sponsor more bills than presidential
parties. The PRI held the presidency during the 1997-2000 period, while the PAN held
the presidency from 2000-2009. I have no expectations for the party variables in the
ambition model, but include them as controls.
I also include fixed effects for legislative term in the bill sponsorship model to
account for the increasing levels of bill sponsorship activity over time, as shown in
Chapter 3. In the ambition model I include a dummy variable for legislators leaving
office during a mid-term election (left office in 2003 or 2009), since these individuals can
only seek state legislative office, rather than those leaving during a general election who
can seek a seat in the Senate or state legislative office. Due to the reduced number of
opportunities, I expect deputies leaving during a mid-term election to be less likely to
seek future legislative office.
The dependent variable in the bill sponsorship model, the number of bills
sponsored, is included as an independent variable in the ambition model. I expect
legislators who sponsor more bills to be more likely to pursue a future legislative
position.
Finally, in the bill sponsorship model I include the natural log of the number of
days in office served by each individual deputy. Deputies who serve only a short time are
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unlikely to participate very much in the legislative process compared to those who have
served most or all of their term.87
I also make a few methodological decisions that are important to mention before
proceeding. First, in all the subsequent results, I limit my analysis to principal
(propietario) legislators, excluding any alternates (suplentes) that are in my dataset.
Many alternates enter legislative office for a very short time, and are much less
experienced candidates than the primary legislators originally elected to office. Alternates
sponsor many fewer bills than principals, and also are much less likely to seek future
legislative office (or any elected office for that matter). I am primarily interested in the
behavior of those individuals actually elected to office and who served most of their term,
and exclude alternates from the analysis to avoid any bias in the results. Second, in the
bill sponsorship models, I exclude the Mexican Ecological Green Party (PVEM) from the
analysis for a few reasons. First, they are an extreme outlier in terms of number of bills
sponsored during the first three legislative terms studied here compared to the other
parties.88 Second, for nearly all of the LVII and LVIII Legislatures, and part of the LIX
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All terms in office run from September 1st of the election year, to August 31st of the
third year of their term. The number of days in office was calculated by collecting all the
leaves of absence (solicitudes de licencia) recorded in the Diario de los Debates and the
Sistema de Información Legislativa and subtracting any days in which the deputy was
absent. For the LX Legislature, nearly 32 percent of principal (propietario) legislators did
not serve their entire term. I use the natural log rather than a count of the number of days
since I expect little difference between deputies who serve the entire term and those who
took off a few weeks, but much larger differences among deputies at the lower end of the
spectrum.
88
Mean number of bills sponsored by PVEM members: LVII – 49 bills for PVEM versus
7 bills for other deputies; LVIII - 71 bills for PVEM members versus 13 bills for other
deputies; LIX – 145 bills for PVEM members versus 12 bills for other deputies; LX – 17
bills for PVEM members versus 14 bills for other deputies. The decision to exclude the
PVEM was also suggested to me by several scholars in Mexico familiar with behavior in
the Chamber of Deputies.
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Legislature, all bills presented by the PVEM were presented by the entire party and thus,
there is little variation among individual PVEM members for the first three legislatures.
Some of the other minor parties engage in similar behavior, but since they are not such
extreme outliers, I decide to control for them in the model, rather than exclude them like
the PVEM.
6.5 Results
I start by examining levels of bill sponsorship in the Chamber of Deputies and some
simple bivariate relationships between independent variables of interest and sponsorship
in Table 6.1. The average number of bills sponsored by individual legislators has
increased over time, although the greatest increase was between the LVII Legislature and
the LVIII Legislature, from about 7 to 13 bills. There is also some initial support for
several of the hypotheses regarding bill sponsorship. On average, female legislators
sponsor 3.5 more bills than men, and PR legislators sponsor about 3 more bills than SMD
legislators. Legislative experience seems to have little relationship to the number of bills
sponsored, although legislators with previous experience in the Chamber of Deputies
sponsor about 1 more bill than legislators without this experience.89
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Comparing 12.7 to the overall mean of 11.6.
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Table 6.1: Bill sponsorship in the Mexican
Chamber of Deputies, 1997-2009
Mean # of bills sponsored
Legislative Term
LVII
7.2
LVIII
13.4
LIX
11.9
LX
13.9
Overall
11.6
Gender
Male
10.9
Female
14.4*
Electoral System
SMD
10.5
PR
13.3*
1
Experience
Previous state legislator
12.0
Previous federal legislator
12.7*
Previous senator
10.4
*Significantly different at the p<.05 level according to a twotailed t-test. 1: Means are compared against legislators without
this experience. PVEM and alternates excluded.

Table 6.2 presents two negative binomial regressions predicting the number of
bills sponsored by individual deputies. Model 2 includes the number of bills presented as
a control to determine the robustness of the results found in Model 1. While there is some
difference in the results, namely a reduction in the size of the coefficients for education,
the leadership variables and previous experience, the relationships are largely similar and
therefore, I rely on the results of Model 1 to discuss the magnitude of the effects of the
various independent variables.
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Table 6.2: Negative binomial regression explaining sponsorship in the Mexican Chamber of
Deputies, 1997-2009
Model 1
Model 2
coefficient
s.e.
sig. coefficient
s.e. sig.
Proportional representation
0.07
0.03
**
0.06
0.03 **
Female
0.23
0.04
**
0.21
0.03 **
Education (8-point)
0.06
0.01
**
0.03
0.01 **
Committee chair
0.09
0.05
**
0.05
0.04
Committee secretary
0.11
0.03
**
0.08
0.02 **
Party leader
0.50
0.09
**
0.28
0.07 **
# of committees
0.09
0.01
**
0.04
0.01 **
Previous state legislator
0.03
0.03
-0.01
0.02
Previous federal legislator
0.05
0.04
0.06
0.03
*
Previous senator
-0.22
0.07
**
-0.13
0.06 **
PAN
-0.14
0.04
**
-0.11
0.03 **
PRD
0.31
0.04
**
0.23
0.03 **
PT
0.81
0.10
**
0.90
0.08 **
Other minor parties
0.48
0.09
**
0.11
0.07
LVIII Legislature
0.60
0.04
**
0.54
0.04 **
LIX Legislature
0.42
0.04
**
0.16
0.04 **
LX Legislature
0.39
0.04
**
0.16
0.04 **
# of days in office (log)
0.93
0.07
**
0.81
0.06 **
Partisan congruence w/governor
-0.02
0.03
-0.01
0.03
Gubernatorial switch
-0.28
0.03
**
-0.20
0.03 **
Total # of bills presented
0.06
0.00 **
Constant
-5.19
0.51
**
-4.09
0.45 **
alpha
0.26
0.01
0.14
0.01
1031.71**
1723.44**
LR chi-square
-5994.13
-5658.27
Log likelihood
2
0.08
0.13
Pseudo R
N
1905
1905
DV: Total number of bills sponsored. Alternates and PVEM excluded from the model. **p<.05
level; *p<.10 level.

In general, I find support for nearly all of my hypotheses regarding bill
sponsorship. PR and female legislators sponsor significantly more bills than SMD and
male legislators. Legislators with higher levels of education also sponsor significantly
more bills. Possessing a leadership position, such as committee chair, committee
secretary, or party leader, also has a significant and positive effect on the number of bills
sponsored. And, the more committees a legislator serves on, the more bills they sponsor.
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Previous legislative experience for the most part has no influence in bill sponsorship, but
I do find an odd and negative relationship between previous senate experience and
number of bills sponsored. It is possible federal deputies who have previously been
senators are trying to use their seat as a jumping off point to higher office, such as
governor or mayor of a large city, and therefore spend more of their time campaigning or
providing constituency service instead of in the Chamber. However, this is currently
speculation and more research needs to be done to understand this particular
relationship.90 I find that opposition parties, namely the PRD, PT, and other minor
parties91 sponsor significantly more bills than the PRI, while the PAN sponsors fewer
bills than the PRI. The left parties, PRD and PT, also sponsor significantly more bills
than the PAN.92 Finally, there is some evidence of gubernatorial influence on sponsorship
behavior. Partisan congruence seems to have little effect, while a gubernatorial switch in
a deputy’s home state leads to lower rates of bill sponsorship among deputies.
In order to determine the magnitude of the effects found in Model 1 of Table 6.2,
I use CLARIFY (King, Tomz and Wittenberg 2000) to generate some expected values of
the number of bills sponsored while holding other variables at their median or mode.
Since it is unclear what the median party of legislature is, I present results for each of the
three major parties in Mexico, the PAN, PRI, and PRD for three different legislative
sessions. The results are displayed in Table 6.3. First, the effect of electoral rules is fairly
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It is also possible most deputies with previous Senate experience are from the PRI, and
previously served in the authoritarian period, which would not provide much relevant
experience in drafting bills or instilled a different legislative culture among these
particular individuals.
91
PASC, PAS, PSN, PANAL, Convergencia, and independents
92
Testing for the equality of coefficients, I found PT sponsors significantly more than
PRD, and both sponsor significantly more than PAN or PRI.
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modest, with the median PR legislator sponsoring anywhere from 0.8 to 1 more bills than
the median SMD legislator, depending on party and term. While the effect is small, it is
not particularly surprising given that many of the other independent variables are related
to mode of election. For example, female legislators, legislative leaders, legislators with
previous legislative experience, and legislators from minor parties are all much more
likely to be elected through proportional representation (Kerevel 2010; Kerevel and
Atkeson 2011). While the substantive impact of electoral rules is fairly small, it is
surprising they have any influence at all after including these other independent variables.
Table 6.3: Predicted effect of selected variables on the number of bills sponsored from
Model 1 of Table 6.2
Expected # of bills sponsored
Median PAN
Median PRI
Median PRD
Legislator, LVIII Legislator, LIX
Legislator, LX
Min
Max
Min
Max
Min
Max
Mode of election (SMD=0, PR=1) 12.1
12.9
11.2
12.0
15.3
16.3
Gender (Male=0, Female=1) 12.1
15.2
11.2
14.1
15.3
19.2
Education (8-point) 9.1
13.6
8.4
12.6
11.4
17.2
Committee chair=1 12.1
13.3
11.2
12.3
15.3
16.8
Committee secretary=1 12.1
13.6
11.2
12.6
15.3
17.2
Party leader=1 12.1
20.1
11.2
18.6
15.3
25.4
# of committees 8.4
32.9
7.8
30.4
10.7
41.5
Previous senator (no=0, yes=1) 12.1
9.8
11.2
9.1
15.3
12.4
Gubernatorial Switch (no=0, yes=1) 12.1
9.2
11.2
8.5
15.3
11.6
The median legislator is male, elected in a single-member district, has a college degree, has no
previous legislative experience, served on 4 different committees, and has no leadership
position. Values were generated using CLARIFY, holding variables at their median or mode,
selecting the party and term, and varying the relevant variables from their minimum to
maximum values (or from 0 to 1 for dichotomous variables)

Gender has a much stronger effect than mode of election, with the median female
legislator sponsoring about 3-4 more bills than the median male legislator. These results
confirm what was found in Table 6.1. Education also has a fairly strong influence on bill
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sponsorship behavior, with legislators with some doctoral studies sponsoring about 4-6
more bills than deputies with only a primary education.
Institutional position has varying effects. Individuals who are committee chairs or
secretaries only sponsor about 1-2 more bills than the median backbencher, while being a
party leader has a much stronger effect. Party leaders sponsor about 7-10 more bills than
the median backbencher. Maybe somewhat unsurprisingly, the number of committees a
legislator sits on has the strongest effect on the number of bills sponsored, with an
increase of anywhere from 23-31 more bills sponsored as one moves from the minimum
number of committees (0) to the maximum (15).93
Finally, the median legislator with senate experience sponsors about 2-3 fewer
bills than the median legislator without this experience, and deputies from states where
the governor leaves office before the end of the legislative term sponsor around 3-4 fewer
bills than legislators from states where the governor outlasts the legislative term.
Do legislators use bill sponsorship as a tool to pursue future legislative careers?
Table 6.4 examines this question in more depth through a logistic regression predicting
whether or not a legislator attempted to pursue future legislative office.

Table 6.5

examines the substantive effects of the model.

93

Legislators who serve on 0 committees either left office very quickly after being
elected, or spent much of their time on the Mesa Directiva (Board of Directors of the
Chamber of Deputies). While legislators serve on the Mesa Directiva, they cannot
simultaneously serve on a committee.
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Table 6.4: Influence of bill sponsorship on future ambition
for legislative office, Mexican Chamber of Deputies 19972009

Total # of bills sponsored
Proportional representation
Female
Age (in years)
Education (8-point)
Committee chair
Committee secretary
Party leader
Previous state legislator
Previous federal legislator
Previous senator
PAN
PRD
PVEM
PT
Other minor parties
Mid-term election
Partisan congruence w/governor
Constant
LR chi-square
Log likelihood
Pseudo R2
N

Model 1
coefficient s.e. sig.
0.01
0.00 **
0.04
0.12
0.32
0.14 **
-0.02
0.01 **
0.05
0.05
0.22
0.18
-0.12
0.12
0.13
0.35
0.06
0.12
0.17
0.16
-0.78
0.34 **
-0.13
0.14
-0.63
0.17 **
0.33
0.42
0.06
0.40
-0.45
0.39
-0.79
0.11 **
-0.33
0.12 **
-0.21
0.46
120.91**
-1026.38
0.06
1953

Logistic regression. DV: Immediately sought or obtained a
state legislative or senate seat after leaving office. Alternates
excluded from the model. **p<.05 level; *p<.10 level
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Table 6.5: The influence of selected variables on the
probability of seeking future legislative office for the median
legislator based on Table 6.4
Predicted
Probability
of Seeking
Future
Legislative
Office
Min Max
# of bills sponsored (min=0, max=31) 0.15 0.18
Gender (Male=0, Female=1) 0.16 0.20
Age (min=21, max=95) 0.22 0.08
PRD (not member=0, member=1) 0.16 0.09
Previous Senator (no=0, yes=1) 0.16 0.08
Partisan congruence with governor (no=0, yes=1) 0.21 0.16
Mid-term election (no=0, yes=1) 0.29 0.16
Predicted probabilities generated using CLARIFY. All variables
were set to their median or mode, and selected variables then
varied from their minimum to maximum values (or from 0 to 1 for
dichotomous variables). For the bill sponsorship variable, I used
the 95th percentile value (i.e. 31) for the maximum, rather than
the actual maximum of 295, which is an extreme outlier.
I find that the number of bills sponsored has a positive effect on the probability of
seeking future legislative office, although the effect is somewhat modest. As the median
deputy moves from sponsoring no bills to sponsoring 31 bills, they are 3 percent more
likely to seek a future legislative post. Contrary to my hypothesis, I find no significant
relationship between mode of election and the pursuit of future legislative office,
although the coefficient is positive and in the expected direction.
Several of the other variables in the model do have a somewhat stronger effect on
the probability of pursuing legislative office. Female legislators have 4 percent greater
probability of pursuing a legislative career compared to their male colleagues. Age has a
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strong effect, with younger legislators much more likely to pursue another legislative
office compared to older deputies. In general, party has little impact on the pursuit of
legislative careers, although PRD members are much less likely to pursue a future
legislative office.94 Previous senators are also much less likely to pursue a future
legislative office, again suggesting that individuals with senate experience may be
seeking a more prestigious sub-national executive position or other high office at the
national level. Partisan congruence with one’s home state governor reduces the
probability of pursuing future legislative office by 5 percent, suggesting that these
deputies may be more interested in securing a state-level appointment as found in
Chapter 4. Finally, the strongest effect on pursuing a legislative career is temporal.
Legislators who leave office during a mid-term election only have a 16 percent
probability of pursuing a future legislative office, compared to a 29 percent probability
for legislators leaving during a general election. The magnitude of this effect is not
surprising, given that in a mid-term election, legislators do not have the opportunity to
compete for a Senate seat and thus, their available opportunities are substantially reduced.
6.6 Conclusion
The results of this chapter suggest that Mexican federal deputies are strategic
actors that take into account the opportunities available to them to pursue their future
career goals. In terms of explaining bill sponsorship activity in the Mexican Chamber of
Deputies, institutional position seems to matter most. Sitting on more committees and
serving as a party leader have strong effects on the opportunities legislators have to
sponsor bills. In addition, gender and education also have fairly strong and independent
94

This finding may be related to internal party rules, but I need to examine these rules
more to explain this finding.
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effects. While I hypothesized that mode of election would have an effect on levels of bill
sponsorship, and the bivariate results provide some support for this idea, the multivariate
results suggest only a more modest relationship.
I also found that legislators who sponsor more bills are more likely to pursue a
future legislative position. However, there are also a number of individual factors that
matter, such as age and gender, as well as the structure of opportunities available to a
legislator upon leaving office.
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Chapter 7. Party Loyalty and Disloyalty in the Mexican Party System
Why do ambitious politicians join political parties? A large literature has developed to
answer this question, suggesting that political parties are instrumental in the pursuit of
goals among ambitious political actors (Aldrich and Bianco 1992; Aldrich 1995).
Whether politicians are primarily seeking office, votes, policy, influence, or government
resources, parties aid politicians in obtaining their goals.
However, in many cases it is difficult to determine empirically why politicians
join parties, why they join the parties that they do, and which goals predominate in their
affiliation decisions. One reason the answer to this question is difficult is that observing
the decision to affiliate to a particular political party is extremely rare. A number of
scholars have tried to address this issue through studies of party switching, as observing a
politician switch parties provides a number of insights into the ‘why parties?’ question
(Aldrich 1995; Desposato 2006; Heller and Mershon 2009a), the defining characteristics
of a given party system, and the goals of political actors.
Party switching studies in the United States suggest that party switching will be
most common in periods of partisan realignment, and that during other periods where the
party system is stable, incumbency is a large deterrent against switching to another
political party due to the potential electoral costs of switching (Aldrich and Bianco 1992;
Canon and Sousa 1992; Grose and Yoshikawa 2003). Since partisan realignments have
been rare in the United States, party switching has also consequently been quite rare
(McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal 2001; Nokken 2000; Nokken and Poole 2004).
Outside of studies of the United States, nearly all comparative studies of party
switching focus on cases where party switching is extremely high, personalistic politics
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predominate, mass partisanship is low, and/or the party system is undergoing major
realignment (Desposato and Scheiner 2008; Mershon and Shvetsova 2008; Shabad and
Slomczynski 2004; Thames 2007; Zielinski, Slomczynski and Shabad 2005).95 What is
missing from the debate is an examination of party switching in cases where parties are
programmatic, mass partisanship is relatively high, and the party system is relatively
stable.
Theoretical studies of party switching have suggested that in institutionalized
party systems, the frequency of party switching should be very low (Desposato 2006;
Kreuzer and Pettai 2009). Only in rare instances in institutionalized party systems should
one observe politicians “hopping” from one major party to another, or from a major party
to a minor party (Kreuzer and Pettai 2009, 279-81). However, the Mexican case presents
somewhat of a puzzle among institutionalized party systems, primarily because these
types of switches are relatively common, as I demonstrate below, and are not limited to
the transitional period before 2000.
Furthermore, most studies of party switching focus on just a few legislative terms
and ignore the extra-parliamentary political careers of politicians, even though most
studies of party switching recognize the primary theoretical importance of political
careers and ambition to decisions to switch (Canon and Sousa 1992; Desposato 2006;
Heller and Mershon 2008).96 Ignoring extra-parliamentary careers is likely to bias
conclusions about the motivations and consequences of party switching especially across
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See Heller and Mershon (2008; 2009b, 11-13) for some comparative data on party
switching.
96
See Shabad and Slomczynski (2004) for the sole example of which I am aware that
examines party switching outside of switches within a legislative term.
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Latin American countries where parliamentary careers are often very short (Martínez
Rosón 2008).
In this chapter, I argue that the ban on consecutive reelection across the Mexican
political system provides a unique opportunity to study party switching in an
institutionalized and stable party system, primarily because after every term of office,
Mexican political actors must decide with which party to affiliate to continue their
careers. The lack of incumbency creates a situation whereby all competitors for political
office are challengers, and also dramatically increases the number of potential
competitors. I further elaborate the theory of political ambition developed in Chapter 2,
identifying party switching as a rational strategy for career advancement. I then identify a
number of empirical implications from the theory, examining the frequency and
motivations for party switching among Mexican federal deputies. This chapter also fills a
gap within the party switching literature by examining a country with a stable party
system and strong, highly disciplined and programmatic political parties (Carey 2003;
Klesner 2005; Rosas 2005; Samuels 2006), and by examining switching throughout the
political careers of Mexican federal deputies, rather than focusing solely on switching
within a legislature.
In the rest of the chapter, I review and expand upon the theory of political
ambition without reelection developed in Chapter 2, identifying testable implications
from the theory. I then provide some discussion of the Mexican party system, situating
the party switching in context. Next, I discuss the data and methodology, and then present
empirical results.
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7.1 Party affiliation and party switching in the pursuit of political ambition
When a potential candidate decides to seek office, they must decide with which
party to affiliate to run for said office. The Aldrich and Bianco (1992) calculus of party
affiliation is largely the same as the Black-Rohde “calculus of candidacy” model (Black
1972; Rohde 1979), in which a potential candidate would seek office if the probability of
winning the office times the benefits of holding office was greater than the costs of
obtaining office. In the Aldrich and Bianco model, the expected utility of running under
party i is equal to the probability of winning under party i times the utility of holding
office under party i, minus the costs of running for office.
EU(Ai) = Pi*U(Oi) – C
A political actor will run under party i over some other party k, if and only if the expected
utility of running under party i is greater than zero, and is greater than the expected utility
of running under party k.
EU (Ai) > 0
EU(Ai) > EU(Ak)

Contextually, an ambitious actor needs to take into account the competitive
environment in which they seek to pursue future office (Rohde 1979), as the electoral
environment is going to influence the probability of winning under each possible party
label, and the utility of holding office under each potential party. In political systems
where reelection is the norm, incumbency is a major factor that will influence the
probability of winning and the costs of running for potential challengers. Potential
candidates are much less likely to try and compete against an incumbent when the

201

probability of winning is typically low, especially against incumbents who share the same
party label (Jacobson 1989; Cox and Katz 1996; Abramowitz, Alexander and Gunning
2006). Where elections are more competitive, we are likely to see greater numbers of
potential challengers competing against incumbents. However, the popularity, strength,
and resources of the incumbent (or incumbent party) are likely to be a factor in the
decision to enter a race. Thus, for potential candidates in a system with reelection,
incumbency is a potentially strong deterrent to running for a particular office, as it
reduces the probability of winning, and likely also increases the costs of running.
Incumbents seeking reelection are also much less likely to switch political parties,
as they are likely to face substantial costs trying to win ballot access in the new party, and
also face electoral costs in terms of lost votes in the general election since their reputation
and past electoral support is tied to a specific political party (Grose and Yoshinaka 2003;
Heller and Mershon 2009c). Once a politician reaches office under a party label in a
stable party system, if they decide to pursue reelection, the costs of switching to a new
party are likely to outweigh the benefits absent some exogenous shock (Canon and Sousa
1992).
However, in a system without consecutive reelection, incumbency does not exist.
Does this mean that in a system without reelection it will be easier for current
officeholders to run for another elected office since there are never any incumbents? Not
necessarily. The challenge in a system without reelection is that there are no candidates
who remain in their current office, increasing the number of potential competitors for
future office. For any given election year, the number of potential competitors for a single
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office is likely to be extremely large, since no officeholders have the luxury of keeping
the same office and waiting for a more favorable electoral environment to try their luck.
Therefore, without reelection, the potential and actual number of competitors for
any given position is likely to be extremely large due to the systematic need for ambitious
political actors to move on from their current position every three to six years. The highly
competitive battle for ballot access in a context without incumbency opens up the
possibility to ambitious political actors to constantly reevaluate their party affiliation.
Potential candidates must take into account who their potential competitors are within
their current party as well as alternative parties for any given position, as this
environment will influence their probability of obtaining ballot access and winning future
office. If this is the case, then one should observe more politicians switching parties at
specific points throughout their career, rather than others, related to specific points in
time when politicians transition from one position to another (Mershon and Shvetsova
2008).
For currently sitting legislators, most switches should occur near the end of their
three-year term, specifically in the last legislative session prior to new federal elections,
compared to other times during the term. The reason is that throughout the legislative
term, an individual deputy will likely engage in strategic behavior that will be beneficial
to their future careers, and in a strong party system, that would likely involve serving
party interests throughout the term. However, when the end of the term nears and future
elections are on the horizon, an ambitious actor may realize their current party is not
going to serve their immediate career interests, and then decide to reevaluate their party
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affiliation. For similar reasons, one should also observe more legislators switching parties
before and after their term in office, rather than during their legislative service.
H1: More legislators will switch during the final legislative session of their 3rd
year in office compared to other points in the legislative cycle.
H2: Legislators will be more likely to have switched prior to entering office or
more likely to switch after leaving office, rather than switch during their term.
The nature of candidate selection in Mexico, combined with a prohibition on
consecutive reelection is likely to lead to conflicts between the individual goals of
ambitious politicians and the collective goals of parties who want to win elections (Carey
1996; Friedenberg 2010). On the one hand, individual actors should demonstrate a high
degree of loyalty to their political parties, since it is the party who largely determines
future ballot access, or access to other appointed positions in public office. Political party
organizations should be fairly strong, and individual members should display a high
degree of loyalty to their parties. However, an ambitious actor may have individual goals
that occasionally conflict with party goals. For example, a federal legislator from party A
may wish to run for the mayor’s seat of an important city after their term is over. Party
leaders in party A at the city, state, and national level may have one or several candidates
in mind they think can win the mayoral election, and this ambitious federal legislator may
not be on the list of potential candidates. However, the federal legislator may have been
working throughout their term and their larger political career to build up a constituency
and name recognition in this city, and may feel they have a good chance to win the
mayoral election, regardless of the party label they run under. Leaders in Party A now
face a potentially difficult choice. They feel they have a better candidate that is more
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likely to win the mayor’s seat, but if they ignore the legislator also competing for the seat,
some weaker party B may court the legislator to run under their party label. If the
legislator leaves Party A for Party B, Party A risks a potential split in their own ranks,
which may negatively influence them in the election. However, if the other candidate for
party A is ignored in favor of the legislator, this other candidate also faces the option of
switching to Party B or some other political party. In a multi-party system, even holding
open primaries is unlikely to address this conundrum faced by party A, since the losers of
a primary election can still leave Party A for Party B after the primary is over.97 If
conflicts over ballot access are what is driving decisions to switch, then one should
observe politicians switching more often to obtain ballot access under a different party,
rather than over policy, ideological or factional conflicts within parties, or to obtain
greater influence within the legislature.
H3: Politicians will be more likely to switch to obtain ballot access, rather than
over differences in policy, ideological conflicts, or intra-party factional conflicts,
or to obtain greater parliamentary influence.
Ambitious politicians in this situation are likely to desire most a spot on the
ballot. Without a spot on the ballot, the probability of winning the election is zero.
However, switching from Party A to Party B also entails a number of high costs. First,
the party label is likely to influence the probability of winning. Even if a potential
candidate is popular, they may face a much greater chance of winning the election if they
ran with Party A than if they ran with Party B. Second, since the political parties
themselves prize loyalty among their members, a potential candidate who has been
97

This is true assuming that primaries are run by the parties and not run by the state or all
held on the same day, which is the case in Mexico.
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developing a political career with party A is likely to lose much of their political capital if
they switch parties. Other members of Party B are unlikely to trust the party switcher, and
members of Party A will likely hold a grudge against this individual if they ever attempt
to return to Party A after switching parties. Even if the party switcher wins the election,
they still face a choice at the end of their next term on where to seek a different future
office. Since leaders of Party B now have control over the future of this individual’s
career, they may not trust the individual to work in the party’s interest due to the short
time they have been a party member, and also face resistance from other members of
Party B who have been loyal for much longer. Depending on the particular confluence of
factors in any given situation, the party switcher may be successful in developing a new
political career with Party B, or may face a shortened political career as leaders in Party
B pass this individual over for others. Of course, the individual could continue to switch
parties every election. Yet, because party loyalty is valued by all political parties, and
excessive switching may turn off voters, it is unlikely that ambitious actors in this
particular type of system would pursue a continuous strategy of party switching over
multiple elections.
H4: Among politicians who have switched parties at least once during their
careers, the proportion who have switched only once will be greater than the
proportion of those who have switched more than once.
As a result, the costs of switching parties could be extremely high and signal the
end of one’s political career if the ambitious actor does not make a wise decision.
Because of the potentially high costs of switching parties, we should see a high degree of
party loyalty where reelection is prohibited since the probability of winning and the
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benefits of holding office for a single term are likely to be lower than the long-term costs
of switching to obtain ballot access. However, in some cases, an ambitious actor may
perceive their probability of winning to be high and the benefits of holding a particular
office to be high, outweighing the potentially high costs of switching parties. If party
switching is not generally a function over the office-seeking goals of politicians, but
rather related to ideological or policy conflicts with a member’s current party, then one is
likely to observe indiscipline among these legislators prior to a party switch. But if
switching is primarily related to office-seeking, there should be no relationship between
switching and party discipline.
H5a: Legislators who switch parties during office will be as disciplined as other
members of the party under which they were elected.
H5b: Legislators who switched parties prior to entering office or who switch
parties after leaving office will be as disciplined as other members of the party
under which they were elected.
Thus, on the surface, the prohibition on reelection and party control over ballot
access has two potentially contradictory consequences. While in office, we are likely to
see high levels of party loyalty from individual members, as loyalty to one’s party is the
best way of securing a future office. However, during election periods, we are also likely
to see high levels of party disloyalty, or party switching, as conflicts over candidate
selection and securing future office become the most critical issue for ambitious actors.
7.2 The evolution of the Mexican party system
For most of the 20th century, Mexico can easily be characterized as a hegemonic
party system, with the founding of the PRI in 1929 (Greene 2007). Until the 1977
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electoral reform which opened up the party system and added 100 proportional
representation seats in the Chamber of Deputies, opposition to the PRI was limited to an
extremely weak PAN, and two small parties closely tied the PRI, the Authentic Party of
the Mexican Revolution (PARM), and the Popular Socialist Party (PPS). The PARM was
formed in 1954 with the support of then president, Adolfo Ruiz Cortines, to incorporate
disgruntled sectors of the military into the political system. The PPS was formed by
influential labor leader Vicente Lombardo Toledano as a left alternative to the PRI.
However, both PARM and PPS supported PRI candidates for President until 1988, and
had little outside support base. Except for a handful of seats in the Chamber of Deputies,
PARM and PPS had little presence in the Mexican political landscape and largely served
the PRI regime’s goals of maintaining a facade of democratic competition (Mabry 1974;
Smith 1979).
The political opening in 1977 saw a surge in the number of small left parties that
began to compete for political office. The Mexican Communist Party (PCM), banned in
1929, and again in 1940 after a brief opening under the presidency of Lázaro Cárdenas
(1934-40), obtained legal registration to participate in the 1979 elections. The opening
also saw the founding of a number of other small left parties, including the Socialist
Worker’s Party (PST), the Revolutionary Worker’s Party (PRT), and the Mexican
Worker’s Party (PMT), among others. During the 1980s, the PCM joined with the PMT
to first found the United Socialist Party of Mexico (PSUM) and then the Mexican
Socialist Party (PMS) (Flores Andrade 2005; Greene 2007; Rodríguez Araujo 1989).
The run-up to the 1988 elections was a watershed moment in the history of the
Mexican party system, as a faction within the PRI, the Democratic Current led by
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Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas and Porfirio Muñoz Ledo, upset over the increasingly rightward
turn of the PRI, decided to split from the PRI and run Cárdenas as their presidential
candidate for the 1988 elections. Officially, the PARM gave Cárdenas their registration,
but a large coalition of minor parties formed in 1988, called the National Democratic
Front (FDN), made up of the PARM, the PPS, the PMS, the PST, the Green Party (PV,
later PVEM), the Liberal Party (PL), the Cardenista Front for National Reconstruction
(PFCRN), and the Social Democratic Party (PSD), along with other activists and social
movements (Bruhn 1997). The PRT never joined the FDN and instead ran their own
candidate, Rosario Ibarra, in the 1988 elections.
As a result of the allegedly fraudulent 1988 elections where the PRI narrowly
won, Cárdenas and certain members of the FDN decided to found the Party of the
Democratic Revolution (PRD). The PRD was largely made up of the former PMS,
former members of the PRI, members of the various other minor left parties, and allied
unions, activists and social movements. The consolidation of the left into the PRD also
saw the disappearance of most of the other minor opposition parties by 2000, as
individual members joined one of the now three major parties, and parties like the PPS,
the PARM, the PRT, and PFCRN lost their party registration status due to poor electoral
performance.
From 1991 onward, the major national competition in the Mexican party system
has been between three major parties, PRI, PAN, and PRD, although at the state level,
competition is usually restricted to two parties, either between PRI and PAN in the north,
or PRI and PRD in the south (Klesner 2005). In addition, a number of other minor parties
have managed to maintain a strong enough presence to keep their party registration over
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the years, including the Worker’s Party (PT), the Convergence Party (PC, or
Convergencia)98, the Ecologist Green Party of Mexico (PVEM), and since 2006, the New
Alliance Party (PANAL) (Cedillo Delgado 2007). In addition to these small parties,
there have been a number of attempts to form other parties that have not been able to last
much more than one election cycle, including the Nationalist Society Party (PSN), the
Social Alliance Party (PAS), the Mexican Liberal Party (PLM), and the Alternative
Social Democratic and Peasant Party (PASC, later just Social Democratic Party, or PSD),
among others (Flores Andrade 2005).
The fairly consistent competition between three major parties in Mexico has led to
a fairly stable and institutionalized party system, with PAN commonly characterized as
being on the center-right, PRD on the center-left, and PRI as a centrist party, although
ideologically, the major parties are somewhat fluid and function like catch-all parties
(Klesner 2005). The other minor parties are somewhat ambiguous in terms of their
ideological stances, although at the national level PT is commonly on the left,
Convergencia on the center-left, while PVEM and PANAL could be placed anywhere on
the right to the center. At the sub-national level, most parties have aligned with each
other in various states for gubernatorial elections, suggesting that evidence of ideological
coherence of Mexican parties at the national-level masks much unexplored variation in
the Mexican states (Reynoso 2010).99
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Convergencia changed their name to Movimiento Ciudadano (Citizen Movement) just
prior to the 2012 general elections.
99
For example, PAN and PRD have formed coalitions in a number of states, PVEM has
allied with PAN, PRI, and PRD in different elections, and while PT and Convergencia
often align with the PRD at the national level, they have aligned with rival parties in
various sub-national elections. For some more background, see Reynoso (2010).
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This fluidity in the ideological underpinnings of the major parties is also evident
in the movement of individual members across parties, regardless of ideological
proximity. There are several key historical events in the development of the Mexican
party system that can explain certain party switches, although a substantial number of
party switches are unrelated to these major fissions. For example, the founding of the
PRD was largely related to major divisions in the PRI over policy, ideology and
presidential candidate selection (Bruhn 1997) and thus it should be evident that a number
of PRD members would have former membership in the PRI. Table 7.1 examines the
previous party identification of sitting legislators who have served in the Chamber of
Deputies from 1997-2009 and does demonstrate that at least 52 legislators from the PRD
during this period were former PRIistas.100 However, just a focus on this historical split
that helped spawn the current party system masks a substantial amount of movement
across multiple parties. First, a number of legislators elected under the PAN have also
been former members of the PRI, and there is also evidence of switching between the
PRD and the PAN. Convergencia was formed as a splinter group from the PRI (Reveles
Vázquez 2006), and thus it is not surprising to see that many members of this party are
also former PRI members.
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52 is likely understating the extent to which members of the PRD used to be in the
PRI, since the data is from official biographies, and candidates often have an incentive to
hide former party affiliations. See the discussion of the data collection in the next section
for more details.
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Table 7.1: The prior partisan affiliation of sitting
legislators, 1997-2009
Previous Party ID
Party ID while in
office PRI PAN PRD PVEM PT Other
PRI
1
1
PAN 25
2
1
5
PRD 52
9
3
2
PVEM 7
PT 2
3
3
Convergencia 14
1
3
Other 5
4
N=143. Suplentes excluded from the table. For legislators
with more than one previous party ID, I took the most recent
affiliation, except for one deputy whose most recent prior
affiliation was with the PCD but was previously in the PRI
and elected under the PRD. Other category includes PANAL,
PASC, PARM, PFCRN, PMP, PMS, PMT, PRT.
Changes in party affiliation among sitting legislators is rare in Mexico, and most
switches involve legislators declaring independence rather than affiliating with another
party, as can be seen in Table 7.2. However, there is still evidence of ideological fluidity
among switches within the Chamber of Deputies, as six PAN deputies during these four
legislative terms switched to PRD or PT.
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Table 7.2: Party switching within the Chamber of Deputies, 1997-2009
New Party ID
Party ID
when elected
to office PRI PAN PRD PVEM PT Convergencia PASC Independent
PRI
3
27
PAN
3
2
3
6
PRD 4
3
2
4
PVEM 1
1
2
PT 1
1
1
2
Convergencia
1
PASC
1
N=68. Suplentes excluded from this table. Deputies who declared themselves
independent but then joined another parliamentary group are coded with the group.
Events surrounding the 2006 elections witnessed a number of intra-party disputes
that had a major impact on the party system, although these changes had little effect on
the stability of the three major parties. The consequence of these events can be seen in
Table 7.3, primarily with a major split in the PRI that led to the founding of PANAL, and
a split within the PRD that led many members of that party to switch affiliation towards
PT and Convergencia.
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Table 7.3: Party switching among federal deputies after they leave office, 1997-2009
Future Party ID after leaving office
Party ID when
elected to
CONV-PT PAN-PRD
office PRI
PAN PRD PVEM PT Convergencia PANAL Ind. Coalition coalition Other
PRI
16
19
2
3
7
28
4
1
2
5
PAN 10
3
1
6
2
19
2
3
PRD 7
8
4
11
10
3
8
2
9
PVEM
1
1
4
2
PT
1
5
1
1
4
Convergencia
1
1
PANAL
1
Other
1
N=219. Suplentes excluded from this table. A future independent either renounced their party, or were expelled.
If a future switch was to a coalition with a major party (PRD, PAN, or PRI), it is coded under the major party. If
there are multiple switches, I code only the most proximate switch. Other includes PAG, PARM, PAS, PASC,
PCD, PFD, PLM, PSD, PUP, PJS.

The split in the PRI that led to the founding of PANAL in 2006 involved a
leadership dispute between the President of the PRI and eventual PRI presidential
candidate, Roberto Madrazo, and the leader of the national teacher’s union, the National
Union of Education Workers, (SNTE), and secretary general of the PRI, Elba Esther
Gordillo. In 2003, Gordillo was elected head of the PRI caucus in the Chamber of
Deputies, but had a conflict with Madrazo rooted in disagreements over the legislative
agenda and over Madrazo’s desire for the presidential nomination. In 2004, this conflict
culminated in the removal of Gordillo as party leader (Camp 2010, 84-85; Pacheco
Mendez 2009). This removal led Gordillo to resign her position as federal deputy, and to
eventually form PANAL to compete in the 2006 elections, throwing their support behind
the PAN. For many years, the SNTE was a key component of the PRI party structure and
is one of the most powerful unions in Mexico. The teachers were a critical component of
the base organizing structures of the PRI, and in exchange for their support, often
received key elected and appointed positions at the municipal, state, and federal levels.
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While in the 1990s the SNTE officially broke its linkage with the PRI, in practice most
structures of the SNTE in the Mexican states continued to work closely with the PRI
(Muñoz Armenta 2005). A number of PRI federal deputies elected in 2003 were members
of the SNTE and at the end of the legislative session, many of these individuals declared
their independence from the PRI and subsequently ran for elected office under PANAL.
As is evident in Table 7.3, 28 deputies of the PRI that had served at some point between
1997 to 2009 left the PRI to join PANAL, with most of these individuals coming from
the 59th Legislature (2003-06).
The PRD loss in the 2006 presidential elections, and the resulting actions of their
candidate, Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO) led to an internal split within the
PRD. AMLO’s decision to claim fraud, form his own “legitimate government”, and
occupy downtown Mexico City created a severe ideological split between the more
radical factions of the PRD, who supported AMLO, and the more moderate factions, who
wanted to move beyond the severe conflict. While AMLO and his supporters never
officially left the PRD, and AMLO is again the PRD’s candidate for president in 2012,
the relationship became strained and many of AMLO’s supporters shifted their support to
PT and Convergencia. A number of members of the PRD ran under the PT and
Convergencia label in the 2009 elections, as is evident in Table 7.3, where 23 former
PRD deputies shifted their support to these other minor parties.
However, despite a number of major intra-party schisms, there are still a large
number of politicians who have switched from one party to another for reasons distinct
from the above conflicts. There is a certain degree of fluidity between PRI and PRD
evident in Tables 7.1 and 7.3, as individuals from one party join the other and vice versa
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that have little to do with the initial split in the PRI surrounding the 1988 elections. To a
somewhat smaller extent, at least among federal deputies, the same pattern exists with
PRI and PAN, with members of both parties joining the other for a variety of reasons.
What is also evident in Tables 7.1-3 is the role the minor parties play in providing space
for disgruntled members of the three major parties. While there is some evidence of
movement from minor parties to major parties, most of the movement is from members
of PRI, PRD and PAN joining PANAL, PT, Convergencia, and PVEM. In many cases,
these movements are related to candidate selection conflicts within the major parties, as I
discuss and demonstrate in more detail below.
7.3 Data and Methodology
In order to test the above hypotheses, I rely on two sources of data. The first
source comes from data collected on the career paths of Mexican federal deputies who
have served in the Chamber of Deputies from 1997 to 2009. These data come from a
variety of sources, such as official candidate lists from the federal and state level electoral
institutes, official biographies maintained by the Chamber of Deputies and the Secretaría
de Gobernación, published secondary sources on the biographies of Mexican politicians,
national and local newspapers, government websites at the municipal, state, and federal
levels, and websites maintained by the political parties and individual politicians. For the
entire 1997-2009 period, I have future career path information on 95 percent of principal
legislators (propietarios), and 73 percent of alternates (suplentes), although I limit the
subsequent analysis to propietarios. More details on the data collection process are
available in Appendix III.

216

From the career path data, I identify three possible periods of switching for each
individual legislator: a switch prior to entering office, a switch while in office, and a
switch after leaving office. Most data on prior switches come from official biographies
and CVs of sitting legislators and thus are likely to understate the extent of prior party
switching. To the extent possible, if a legislator held a prior elected office, I investigated
to determine under which party they were elected for that prior office, in case the official
biography or CV did not state prior party affiliation. Since many members of the PRD
were previous members of the PRT, PMT, or PMS prior to the formation of the PRD, I
did not code these individuals as switches. I also ignored other slight changes in official
party names among many smaller parties over time.
Party switches while in office are the easiest to identify, as this information is
available in official biographies maintained by the Chamber of Deputies, in each
legislator’s voting record, and from official requests to change party affiliation in the
Diario de los Debates, the official debate record of the Chamber of Deputies. For every
legislator that switched while in office, I searched for newspaper articles that explained
the switch in order to determine the reason behind the legislator’s decision to change
party affiliation. Included in the ‘switch while in office’ category are legislators who
switched affiliation after federal elections in July but before taking office on September
1st.
Evidence of future party switches come from official candidate lists for state and
federal offices, and local and national newspapers. Whenever evidence of a future switch
was found in official candidate lists, I searched for newspaper articles about the party
switch in order to determine the reasons behind the switch. The larger data collection
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process for future career path data also involved extensive searches for information on
the future careers of each individual legislator. If any evidence was found that the
legislator was expelled from their political party, actively supported another political
party in a future election resulting in expulsion from their current party, or renounced
their current political party, I also classified these instances as a party switch to
independent status. The evidence of future party switches is also likely to understate the
extent of party switching, but still provides an illuminating picture into the nature of
political careers and party affiliation decisions within the Mexican party system. There is
no reason to suspect that any missing data will result in bias in favor or against any of the
hypotheses. Appendix V provides a complete listing of every legislator from 1997-2009
who switched at some point in their careers and the direction of the switch.
In addition to the career path and party switching data, I also collected roll-call
voting data for each legislative term from the Gaceta Parlamentaria to examine party
discipline among switchers and non-switchers. Electronic roll calls were not implemented
in the Chamber of Deputies until the middle of the 57th Legislature (1997-2000), and
therefore, roll call data from the first legislative term is much more incomplete. There are
also some votes that are missing from the electronic record, although there is no reason to
suspect the inclusion of these votes would bias the results (Cantú, Desposato and Magar
2012).
From the roll call data, I create ideal points for each individual legislator using the
first coordinate of W-Nominate scores (Poole and Rosenthal 1997). After generating the
ideal points, I create a measure that captures each legislator’s distance from their party’s
median ideal point. Legislators further away from the party’s median ideal point (closer
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to 1) vote more often against most other co-partisans, while legislators closer to the
party’s median ideal point (closer to 0) more often vote with their co-partisans.
7.4 Results
Hypothesis 1 suggests that if legislators primarily switch parties while office, it is to
pursue their political career goals, rather than other reasons, such as to increase their
influence in the legislature (Yoshinaka 2005) or to escape party discipline (Heller and
Mershon 2008). If this is the case, then one should observe more switching at particular
points in the legislative cycle, rather than others (Mershon and Shvetsova 2008). In the
case of Mexico, I hypothesized that more legislators would switch near the end of their
terms, specifically in the last legislative session prior to new federal elections when all
legislators would be required to leave office and seek future employment elsewhere.
Switching at other points in the legislative cycle may be evidence of policy or ideological
disputes between a legislator and their party, an attempt to increase influence over the
agenda in the Chamber, or be related to the pursuit of sub-national office in states with
staggered elections.
To determine the timing of party switches during each legislative term, I divided
each three-year term into six sessions, with one session of each year encompassing the
months of August through December, and the other session encompassing the months of
January through July. This division closely follows the actual division of when the
Chamber of Deputies is in session. The Chamber of Deputies has two ordinary sessions a
year, one from September 1st to December 15th, and another from February 1st to April
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30th.101 Extraordinary sessions can also be called by the President or Congress in the
intervening periods when Congress is not normally in session. The date of each
legislator’s switch was taken from the Diario de los Debates, as all changes in party
affiliation are reported by the switching legislator and the leader of the party receiving the
legislator. Table 7.4 displays the timing of party switches during each of the four
legislative terms.
Table 7.4: Timing of switch during parliamentary cycle, Mexican Chamber of Deputies,
1997-2009
Legislative session
2nd
3rd
4th
5th
6th
1st session session
session
session
session
session Total # of
August - January - August - January - August - January - switchers
December
July
December
July
December
July
1997-2000 (LVII)
3
0
3
3
3
8
20
% of total switchers 15.0%
0.0%
15.0%
15.0%
15.0%
40.0%
2000-2003 (LVIII)
1
2
1
2
1
5
12
% of total switchers 8.3%
16.7%
8.3%
16.7%
8.3%
41.7%
2003-2006 (LIX)
0
1
1
1
2
21
26
% of total switchers 0.0%
3.8%
3.8%
3.8%
7.7%
80.8%
2006-2009 (LX)
3
1
1
1
0
4
10
% of total switchers 30.0%
10.0%
10.0%
10.0%
0.0%
40.0%

While relatively few deputies do switch parties during their term, I do find that a
plurality of legislators wait to switch until their final months in office. For the 57th, 58th,
and 60th Legislatures, about 40% of all switches took place during the last legislative
session. For the 59th Legislature (2003-2006), over 80 percent of switches took place
during the final session. This drastic increase in switches in this particular term can
almost wholly be explained by PRI deputies tied to the SNTE declaring their
independence, with most of them joining PANAL for the 2006 general election.
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The session from February 1st to April 30th used to be much shorter, but was
lengthened starting in 2005. Prior to 2005, this session ran from March 15th to April 30th.
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When to switch parties is a critical decision made by all potential switchers, and is
not just limited to the parliamentary cycle. If ambitious politicians are primarily
concerned about obtaining future office, then evidence of switching should be most
apparent prior to entering elected office, rather than during a term. Hypothesis 2
examines this possibility, and suggests that in a system without reelection, most evidence
of party switching will take place during campaign periods rather than during the
possession of an elected office. In the case of federal deputies, one should observe more
legislators who have switched parties in the past or switched parties after leaving the
Chamber, compared to switches during the legislative term. Table 7.5 displays the
results.102
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Any evidence of trends in increasing or decreasing levels of party switching across
time should be interpreted with extreme caution. Most of the data was collected from late
2010 to early 2012, and includes all available information on switching across an
individual’s career. For legislators from the 57th Legislature (1997-2000), there are nearly
12 years in which a former legislator could switch after leaving office, while legislators
from the 60th Legislature (2006-09), only have about 3 years after their term is up to
switch in order to enter the data set. Evidence of this issue can been seen in the table, as
14.9% of deputies from the 57th Legislature have switched after leaving, compared to
5.6% for deputies from the 60th Legislature. These data should not be interpreted to
suggest future party switching is declining, only that the number of opportunities to
switch is greater for deputies from the 57th Legislature compared to deputies from the 60th
Legislature. However, evidence of trends in prior switches is somewhat more reliable,
and does suggest that over time, an increasing number of legislators have previous
experience in another party different from the one under which they were elected.
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Table 7.5: Percentage of federal deputies that have switched parties
during their political career, 1997-2009
% of deputies
%
who have
switched made two or
%
%
switched
%
switched at any
more
time
prior to switched
after
switches
entering while in leaving
during
among all
office
career
office
office
switchers1
LVII (19972000)
LVIII (20002003)
LIX (2003-2006)
LX (2006-2009)
Total
# of switchers
Total sample N

5.6%

4.0%

14.9%

18.8%

22.3%

3.6%
7.2%
12.2%
7.2%
143
2000

2.4%
5.2%
2.0%
3.4%
68
2003

11.8%
13.6%
5.6%
11.5%
219
1910

14.8%
19.8%
17.6%
17.7%
355
2003

13.5%
17.2%
10.2%
16.1%
57
355

Percentages exclude suplentes. 1: These figures do not include switches to Independent,
returns to a party of which the deputy was previously a member, or formal changes in party
name

What I find in Table 7.5 provides evidence in support of Hypothesis 2. Overall,
about 7 percent of all legislators have switched parties at least once in their past, and
nearly 12 percent of deputies across the four legislative terms under study have switched
to another party after leaving the Chamber. These figures compare to only about 3
percent of deputies who switched while serving in the Chamber of Deputies. Thus, of the
total 355 federal deputies for which I have evidence of switching, only 68, or 19 percent,
switched while in office, with the remainder switching parties prior to or after serving in
the Chamber.
However, not very many deputies switch more than once in their political careers.
Since party switching can be extremely costly for individual politicians in a stable party
system, multiple switches should be relatively rare, as suggested by Hypothesis 4. Indeed,
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I find that among party switchers, only about 16 percent have switched two or more
times, and among all deputies, only about 3 percent have done so.103
Hypothesis 3 posits that most party switches will be due to conflicts over
candidate selection and ballot access, as politicians reevaluate their party affiliation to
pursue their political career, rather than other factors, such as intra-party ideological or
policy disputes, or related to power within the Chamber. In order to test this hypothesis, I
classified each party switch while in office and each future party switch into 1 of 7
categories.104 Switches were classified as 1) conflicts over ballot access and candidate
selection, 2) a legislator demonstrating active support for a candidate of another party, 3)
an intra-party split that led a group of legislators to form a new party, or join an existing
party, 4) an individual switch due to conflicts over policy, ideology, or a specific vote in
the Chamber, 5) a switch related to influence in the legislature, 6) some other reason (see
Table 7.6 notes for details), and 7) switches for which I was unable to determine the
reason. Table 7.6 displays the results.

103

57/355 = 16.1 percent. 57/2003 = 2.8 percent.
Reasons behind prior party switches were much more difficult to come by, and
therefore I have decided not to include the evidence I do have available for prior
switches.
104
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4
1
4

2

7
34
3
19

2
4

9
35

5
44

1
1

18
20

11

2
10

1
2

1

3

2

1

1

5
2
1

1b
2c

3
6

7
9

a

1

1a
2a

10
27

26
66

12
56

20
70

A: expelled from PAN for corruption. B: Based on coalition agreement between PRI and PVEM, seat belonged to PVEM, but
legislator was a priista and only registered under PVEM to comply with agreement. C: One legislator was previously member of
PT but joined PASC while in office to preserve parliamentary representation of PASC. After leaving office, returned to the PT.
Another legislator renounced PANAL while he was under investigation for corruption.

1997-2000
Switch during term
Switch after term
2000-2003
Switch during term
Switch after term
2003-2006
Switch during term
Switch after term
2006-2009
Switch during term
Switch after term

(1)
(2) Support
Ballot gubernatorial/ (3)
(4)
(7)
Access/ presidential/ Intra- Policy/
(5)
(6)
Don't
candidate other party party Ideology/ Parliamentary Other know/ Total # of
selection
candidate
split Voting
influence
reason unclear switchers

Table 7.6: Reasons to switch parties, Mexican Chamber of Deputies, 1997-2009

Many of these categories overlap to a certain extent, and can be related to the
career ambitions of legislators in various ways. For example, categories 1 and 2 are both
related to individuals seeking a future office. However to be classified in category 1, I
needed evidence that a deputy was competing for an elected office and switched to obtain
ballot access. In category 2, a deputy likely switched to throw their support behind
another candidate who thought they could provide them with an appointed position after
they won the election, rather than compete individually for an elected post. For category
3, most individuals classified in this category are former members of the PRI tied to the
SNTE who then left the PRI to join PANAL, or former members of the PRD who
supported the more radical wing of the party and joined or ran for office under
Convergencia or PT after 2006. In both of these major splits within PRI and PRD, most
of the party switchers secured candidacies in the new party, and thus one could make the
argument the switches were made to pursue individual career goals, rather than for
ideological or political reasons related to the larger split in these major parties. Since it is
impossible to really know the personal reasons behind a party switch, and particular
switches such as PRI to PANAL, and PRD to Convergencia/PT post-2006 are part of
larger intra-party disputes, I decided to classify these switches in category 3 rather than
categories 1 or 2.
While party switches over individual votes or ideological issues are rare, they do
occur. For the few individuals that were classified in category 4, the switches were
related to a particularly controversial vote over the federal budget in 1999, or to
disagreements over the PAN-PRD coalitions in sub-national elections in 2010 and 2011.
Individuals who were classified in category 5 were known to have switched parties to
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maintain the PT’s representation in the Senate, and the PASC’s representation in the
Chamber of Deputies. These switches took place among other left parties in order to
ensure these smaller party caucuses maintained their parliamentary rights.
What I find in Table 7.6 is consistent with Hypothesis 3, that most party switches
are related to conflicts over candidate selection and ballot access. The evidence that most
switches are the result of candidate selection conflicts is strongest among future party
switches, while legislators who switch during their term in office tend to switch for a
wider variety of reasons. 63 percent of party switching deputies from the 57th and 58th
Legislatures switched because of candidate selection conflicts after leaving office, while
52 percent of party switching deputies from the 59th Legislature and 70 percent of
deputies from the 60th Legislature switched for the same reason. The next most common
reason to switch parties, at least for the 57th through 59th Legislatures, relates to intraparty splits. If one ignores the unclassified party switches for switches that occurred
while in office (category 7), it is also evident that a plurality of switches during the 57th,
58th, and 60th Legislatures were the result of candidate selection conflicts. The only
exception to this trend is the high number of PRI deputies tied to the SNTE who left the
party in the 59th Legislature (as seen in category 3 for the 2003-2006 term).
Finally Hypothesis 5 suggests that one should see little differences in party
discipline between party switchers and non-switchers since most switches are about
career goals, not policy or ideological divisions (as also demonstrated in Table 7.6). In
order to test Hypothesis 5, I compared the mean ideal point distance from each individual
party’s median ideal point between switchers and non-switchers. If party switches were
primarily about ideological, policy or discipline issues, then one would expect that
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individuals who have switched during office or switched after leaving office would be
less disciplined than other members of their party, since their current party affiliation
would not accurately reflect their underlying policy preferences. For legislators who have
switched prior to reaching office, one might expect these individuals to be more
disciplined than other members, since if policy or ideology was important in the decision
to switch, they theoretically would switch to a party closer to their ideal policy
preferences. However, if party switching is largely unrelated to policy or ideology, as I
suggest in this paper, then we should see little evidence of differences in party discipline
between switchers and non-switchers.
Table 7.7 compares the mean distance of each legislator from their party’s median
ideal point between switchers and non-switchers for switches prior to entering office,
during office, and after leaving office. I find virtually no differences in party discipline
between switchers and non-switchers, nor do I find consistent trends across legislative
terms. Sometimes switchers are closer to their party’s median ideal point, and sometimes
they are further away. The only case in which I find a large difference between switchers
and non-switchers took place in the 57th Legislature, where I find that party switchers are
more than twice as far away from their party’s median ideal point compared to nonswitchers. In this instance, a small number of deputies from the PRD and PT switched
parties while in office after a controversial budget vote, one of the very few instances in
four legislative terms where there is evidence that deputies switched parties over conflicts
related to policy and party discipline. With the exception of this one instance during the
1997-2000 legislative term, the evidence generally supports Hypothesis 5.
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Table 7.7: Party Discipline Among Party Switchers,
Chamber of Deputies 1997-2009
Mean Distance from Party's Median
Ideal Point
LVII LVIII LIX LX Overall
Prior Party Switch
No 0.05
Yes 0.04
Party Switch during Term
No 0.05
Yes 0.12*
Future Party
Switch
No 0.05
Yes 0.06

0.12
0.10

0.14 0.15
0.12 0.12

0.12
0.11

0.12
0.14

0.15 0.16
0.12 0.18

0.12
0.14

0.12
0.14

0.16 0.14
0.11 0.13

0.12
0.10

*difference is significant at the p<.001 level according to
a two-tailed t-test. Values compare the mean distance of
a deputy from their party's median ideal point generated
using W-Nominate.
7.5 Conclusion
This chapter began with the question: why do politicians join political parties? The
empirical evidence presented above suggests that ambitious politicians join parties
because they serve their career interests. When parties no longer serve that function for
an individual member, they may leave their old party in search of a new one that will
better serve their office-seeking goals. The results of this chapter suggest that party
switching occurs at specific points in a politician’s career, generally right before they
seek a future office. It is relatively rare for Mexican legislators to switch parties in the
middle of their term, or to display any type of disloyalty to their current party since this
type of behavior is unlikely to be advantageous in obtaining a future political post.
Examining the reasons behind party switches throughout the careers of federal deputies,
these individuals most often switch for reasons directly related to obtaining ballot access
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or future office, and only rarely switch because of policy or ideological disagreements
with their parties.
This study of party switching in the Mexican context also suggests three broader
conclusions about the nature of the party system. First, it seems likely that certain
institutional features of the political environment encourage party switching. The
prohibition on reelection provides a level of uncertainty for nearly all ambitious
politicians regarding their future careers that encourages them to constantly reevaluate
their party affiliation in order to survive in a complex political environment. Centralized
control over candidate selection also removes some individual control over where an
ambitious individual can reasonably seek a future office, regardless of their own desires.
This lack of control over one’s own career can occasionally create intra-party conflicts,
leading to switching one’s party affiliation.
Second, the nature of switching in the Mexican context also illuminates several
features about the continuing presence of minor parties in the party system. While the
proportional representation component of the electoral system has independent effects on
the ability to sustain small parties, a study of party switching also suggests why many of
these parties formed, what their goals are, and who their members are. Nearly all the
minor parties in the Mexican party system are ideologically ambiguous, suggesting that
one of their primary functions is not so much to represent distinct policy or ideological
interests not represented by the major parties, but to serve as office-seeking vehicles for
politicians that have not been successful at pursuing their careers in the major parties.
Finally, the tendency of the major parties to accept members from other parties
across the ideological spectrum, as well as the tendency of major party members

229

switching to a wide range of minor parties, suggests that one of the primary functions of
parties is to serve as office-seeking cartels for their members. If this is the case, that the
major parties privilege office-seeking over policy-seeking, especially in an environment
where individuals cannot be reelected but political parties can, it calls into question the
ability of the parties to provide distinct choices to voters and also the ability of voters to
hold parties accountable for their actions.

230

Chapter 8: Conclusions and extensions
This dissertation has attempted to answer three related questions. First, how do politicians
pursue their goals when reelection is not viable? Second, do electoral institutions
influence the pursuit of political ambition? And finally, what are the consequences of
pursuing a political career in such a highly complex electoral environment without
reelection? These questions are important because reelection plays such a critical role in
many theories of political behavior, and not only the possibility of reelection but the
desire to seek reelection to the same office is key in many theories of political ambition
and its consequences. However, much of this theory has been developed based on the
U.S. experience, and exported with only minor changes to other countries, ignoring how
complex political careers can be in many other environments, nor recognizing how
unlikely reelection can be in many other environments. Furthermore, existing theories of
political ambition have largely ignored how electoral rules can shape and constrain the
political opportunities available to ambitious politicians, and how these constraints can
shape behavior. This study begins to fill a gap in the theoretical literature on political
ambition by developing a theory that better explains observed career trajectories in
environments where continuous reelection to the same office is rare, and provides a
substantial amount of novel empirical support for the theory. In the rest of this
concluding chapter, I summarize the main argument and findings, and identify areas of
future research.
Chapter 2 develops a theory of political ambition that explains why it is rational
for some political actors to occasionally move down the career ladder, before moving up
at a later date. In the context of no reelection, politicians in elected office must decide at
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the end of every term where they will pursue future office. Unlike in other environments
with reelection, where politicians choose between staying in the same office or moving
up, and if they want to pursue higher office, when they decide to move up becomes the
critical choice. Without reelection, the decision of where to pursue a future political
career becomes the much more important question, since the ‘when’ has already been
decided. In making this decision, ambitious politicians then calculate the costs and
benefits of each potential future office, as well as the probability of obtaining that office
after their current term is over. In many cases, a politician may realize the probability of
winning a higher office is extremely low, while winning a lower office is much higher,
leading the ambitious actor to step down the career ladder. The key point is that actors in
this environment still possess progressive ambition and the desire to obtain a higher
office. They are not ‘regressively’ ambitious, but may only appear that way based on
their decisions of where to pursue future office in the short term. Federal legislators who
compete for city council seats, or governors who compete for mayoral seats still possess
progressive ambition, but in the short term, these individuals must occasionally move
down the career ladder in order to move up at a later date. Based on this particular
insight about the nature of political careers in a context of no reelection, I then highlight
how individual behavior and previous experience, the electoral and partisan environment,
and variation in electoral rules and candidate selection methods will influence the
strategic-decision making calculus of ambitious politicians.
The theoretical discussion in Chapter 2 identifies a number of empirical
implications, which I then expand upon and test in the following 5 chapters. In Chapter
3, I examined how changes in electoral competition altered the way ambitious actors
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pursued political careers. As competition increased in Mexico, political parties
increasingly drew upon more experienced, professional and locally-connected candidates
to compete for political office. I found that under competitive elections, individual federal
deputies were more likely to have previous elected office experience at the local level,
specifically as city councilors, mayors and state legislators, than under non-competitive
elections. Furthermore, more competitive elections provided greater incentives for
individual politicians and the parties to engage in behavior to increase credit-claiming for
policies and services in the hope of attracting greater vote shares. I found that after
elections became more competitive, federal legislators increasingly sponsored more bills,
were able to get more bills passed, while at the same time transformed the Mexican
Congress into an important policy-making body that was able to block more Presidential
initiatives than under non-competitive elections. I also found that increasing competition
pressured the parties to increasingly use the budget process to direct more federal
resources to the local level.
Chapter 4 examined the career paths of Mexican federal deputies and found
patterns and behavior consistent with the theory described in Chapter 2. I found that
many federal legislators enter office with previous experience in administrative and party
positions, and a wealth of experience in local elected office, such as state legislators, city
councilors and mayors. A few deputies also entered the Chamber with higher office
experience, such as previous senators, governors, and cabinet ministers. When deputies
leave office, I found that a number of them do attempt to pursue higher office, such as
competing for the Senate, for governor, or mayor, but many federal legislators also move
to lower office, such as state legislator, lower level political or partisan appointments, or
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even city councilor. Why would federal legislators seek a lower office after their term in
the Chamber of Deputies? The theory developed in Chapter 2 suggests that legislators
will seek future office where their expected utility from holding that office is the highest.
Consistent with this theory, I find that federal legislators are much more successful at
winning lower elected office, such as state legislator or city councilor, compared to
federal legislators who want to be senators, governors or mayors. However, these
findings do not mean that federal legislators are not progressively ambitious. I find that
based on their previous experience, deputies often seek the next highest position on the
career ladder. For example, former mayors in the Chamber often attempt to either return
to the same position or compete for governor, former senators and state-level cabinet
ministers in the Chamber often go on to compete for governor, and former state
legislators most often go on to compete for mayor. Overall, federal deputies do seek more
prestigious and visible positions after leaving the Chamber, with many attempting to run
for either mayor or senator.
Finally, I found in Chapter 4 that partisanship and electoral rules often shape the
career paths of federal deputies. Deputies who share partisanship with the President or
their state’s governor are much more likely to seek an appointed position at the respective
level, as I argue that shared partisanship with federal and state executives reduces the cost
of seeking these positions, and increases the probability of winning these offices.
Furthermore, electoral rules act as constraints on the career paths of deputies. Federal
deputies elected in single-member districts are more likely to have previous experience in
state-level elected office and appointed office, while deputies elected through
proportional representation are more likely to have experience in national-level office.
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This previous experience influences the range of viable opportunities available to each
deputy, as more SMD deputies seek future experience in elected office and at the statelevel, while PR deputies are more likely to seek a future career at the national level.
Chapter 5 turns to examine how the pursuit of a political career in Mexico
influences the behavior of deputies while in office as it relates to amending the annual
federal budget. Chapter 3 demonstrated that the Chamber of Deputies has increasingly
amended the federal budget as submitted by the Executive branch, and that individual
deputies have increasingly sponsored amendments to the budget to target specific
constituencies. Chapter 5 found that this behavior is tied to political ambition. I found
that federal deputies in pursuit of a future sub-national office were more likely to pursue
a strategy of sponsoring budget amendments that targeted municipalities and states, while
deputies seeking a future national office were much less likely to engage in this behavior
at all. In addition, I found that governors were in a strong position to influence individual
legislative behavior regarding the budget, as governors have a keen interest in the
outcome of budget negotiations, and are in a position to provide future political
appointments and influence candidate selection in a deputy’s home state. Legislators
without gubernatorial sponsors were much more likely to engage in the credit-claiming
activity of sponsoring budget amendments, given that these individuals were more likely
to face uncertain political futures in their home states. Chapter 5 also found that electoral
rules and the way they constrain the career paths of deputies influenced individual
behavior regarding the budget. SMD deputies with their much stronger local connections
to their constituency were much more likely to sponsor budget amendments regardless of
where they pursue future office. However, PR deputies had much greater leeway in their
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behavior, with PR deputies who sought future sub-national careers sponsoring more
locally-targeted budget amendments than PR deputies seeking future national office.
Chapter 6 examines bill sponsorship behavior within the Chamber, and bill
sponsorship is related to the career goals of individual legislators. I argue in this chapter
that deputies will use bill sponsorship to claim credit with attentive publics, including
other political elites, as one strategy to increase their chances of obtaining some future
political post. While the results of this chapter are somewhat more modest, I do find
evidence that is consistent with the theory developed in Chapter 2. I found that much
sponsorship behavior in the Chamber is related to individual characteristics, such as
education, as well as institutional position within the Chamber. However, I do find that
deputies who lose gubernatorial sponsors in their home state do tend to sponsor fewer
bills, which leads to speculation that a certain amount of bill sponsorship activity in the
Chamber is related to pursuing the policy goals of state-level actors who may control the
political futures of federal legislators. I also found that deputies who seek a future
legislative office do sponsor more bills, suggesting that federal deputies may be
attempting to develop specialized skills and signal to other party elites that they will
make a good future legislator, either at the state-level or in the Senate.
The final empirical chapter changes the focus from legislative behavior to the
party system by examining the implications of pursuing a political career without
reelection on political parties. At the end of every term in office, a Mexican politician
must decide where to pursue future office. In addition, since they cannot pursue a static
career in the same position, the incentives to remain in the same political party over time
are also reduced. Therefore, politicians in this environment also have the opportunity to
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reevaluate their party affiliation at the end of every term as it relates to their probability
of winning some future office, and the costs and benefits of winning said office. I argue
that this particular confluence of factors leads to the seemingly contradictory behavior of
extremely loyal and disciplined legislators while in office, up until the point when federal
deputies realize that their party ID is hindering their political ambitions, leading to party
switching during periods of electoral campaigning. I found in this chapter that most party
switching takes place at specific points in time in the careers of federal deputies.
Specifically, more federal deputies have switched parties before entering or after leaving
the Chamber, and if they do decide to switch as a sitting legislator, they most often switch
in the few months prior to the end of their term. I also found that while federal deputies
change their party affiliation for a variety of reasons, most tend to switch for reasons
related to their career goals and specifically as a result of conflicts over candidate
selection. Party switching in the Mexican context is highly related to the office-seeking
ambitions of legislators, with little evidence that deputies commonly switch over
ideological or policy conflicts with the party leadership. Not only did I find that few
legislators switch for ideological reasons, but I also found that party switchers are just as
disciplined as non-switchers during their term in office, suggesting that switching has
little to do with policy conflicts and much more to do with ambition.
In general, the evidence in Chapters 3 through 7 provide substantial empirical
support for the ‘Snakes and Ladders’ theory of political ambition described in Chapter 2.
A number of general conclusions can be drawn from the empirical evidence presented.
The most obvious conclusion, as many studies of ambition have previously argued, is that
representatives are loyal and responsive to those who control their future careers.
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Whether those individuals are voters, party elites, other elected officials, or other
influential elites, the evidence presented in this work suggests Mexican federal deputies
respond to those who can provide them with future office. In addition, as the theory of
ambition in Chapter 2 highlighted the importance of the decision of where to pursue
future office, the evidence also suggests that where individual deputies choose to pursue
their careers matters. Not only does this individual choice influence the career paths of
deputies, but it also affects their behavior while in office, to whom they are most loyal
and responsive, and the type of representation the constituents of these elected officials
receive. Finally, as a result of deputies making individual short-term decisions of where
to pursue future office, the representative nature of the political party system is likely to
be affected due to frequent switching across seemingly programmatic partisan lines in the
pursuit of political survival.
A more controversial conclusion that one may draw from the previous chapters is
that the role of reelection in many theories of legislative behavior needs to be reexamined. For example, in Mayhew’s (1974, 49-73) classic account of the U.S. Congress,
he assumes members are single-minded reelection seekers that engage in three primary
activities to influence their reelection chances: advertising, credit claiming, and position
taking. Mexican legislators engage in the same types of activities, but clearly do not do so
to seek reelection. In fact, if legislators who cannot seek reelection engage in similar
types of activities as legislators who continuously seek reelection to the same office, then
assuming the goal of reelection as the motivation for certain types of behavior to create
an “electoral connection” may not be particularly helpful in explaining patterns of
behavior. Instead, if one is interested in generating more generalizable theories about
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legislative politics, it might be more useful to identify to whom do legislators rely on to
get elected, and to whom must they be responsive in order to continue their career. The
difference between a focus on just reelection versus a slightly more complicated focus on
candidate selection and ambition may be subtle, but may also provide a more fruitful
avenue for developing theoretical models of legislative behavior.
8.1 Research extensions
The completion of this study has lead to the realization that the theoretical and empirical
work conducted here is only the beginning to understanding political careers and their
consequences in political environments where reelection is unlikely. Here, I highlight two
general topics of study where future research should be conducted. First, there are a
number of potential opportunities to extend this work to other areas of legislative politics
as they relate to Mexico, some with existing data already collected, and others with new
data. Second, the method adopted in this work of mapping out political careers can be
applied to other related areas to further our understanding of political behavior and
ambition.
8.1.1 Mexican legislative politics
One initial task to extend this work is to apply the theory developed here to the
Senate. The Mexican Senate has become an extremely influential institution with the
advent of democratization, since it shares many of the legislative powers of the Chamber
of Deputies (except for its involvement in the spending portion of the budget) and is
made up of many more experienced legislators than the Chamber. In addition, senators
occupy a higher position on the career ladder compared to federal deputies, and it may
provide an interesting complement to this study to examine a different group of
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politicians at a different stage in their political careers to test and refine some of the
implications of the theory.
Collecting data on senators and their behavior will also allow for the development
of a number of interesting future research projects regarding bicameralism and the
strategic behavior of Mexican legislators. While bicameralism in Mexico has largely been
ignored, it is an important feature of Mexican politics that deserves attention. Much like
in the U.S., senators and deputies represent different constituencies and are loyal to
different elites, which has consequences for the passage of important legislation. While
many observers of Mexican politics consider party leaders and party organizations to be
the most influential actors in the policy-making process, a focus on parties as monolithic
actors cannot explain why legislation originating in the Chamber of Deputies is killed in
the Senate, or vice versa. A deeper understanding of bicameral politics can provide an
illuminating peek into divisions within the major political parties and can examine how
and why party leaders in each chamber are sometimes unable to coordinate over policy.
Furthermore, a fascinating feature of Mexican legislative politics involves crosschamber co-sponsorship of legislation and budget amendments. Deputies can introduce
bills in the Senate, and senators can introduce bills into the Chamber of Deputies.
Furthermore, bills introduced in one chamber often include sponsors from both. Even
though the Chamber of Deputies has exclusive authority over the spending portion of the
federal budget, this does not mean the Senate has no influence as many senators are
involved in sponsoring budget amendments introduced in the Chamber. Some of this
behavior is puzzling, especially when legislators from one chamber introduce legislation
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in the other, rather than in their home chamber. Explaining this cross-chamber
sponsorship behavior may also highlight some interesting features of the party system.
Another way to extend the current study would be an examination of constituency
service among federal legislators. The best way to study this would be through a survey
of a sample of legislators that includes sufficient variation by partisanship, geography and
mode of election, combined with some observation of their district offices. While the
prohibition on reelection might lead observers to think federal legislators have no
incentive to engage in constituency service, many of them do and it is considered an
important aspect of their jobs. However, no studies exist that study this behavior
empirically, or provide a theoretical explanation for why they would engage in this type
of service. Mexican legislators do have a “home style” and it deserves further study.
What legislators do in committees also needs to be examined. While party control
over who sits on which committee is strong in Mexico, and party leaders can remove
individual members temporarily or permanently if they do not represent the party’s
interests, committee work is still an important aspect of Mexican politics that has not
received enough attention. I originally had planned to study an aspect of participation in
committees for this work, but quickly realized that much of the available data is
somewhat unreliable, and that there is little transparency in what goes on within these
meetings. Future study of committee work would likely need to combine on-site
observation as well as in-depth interviews with members of each committee under study.
The theory presented in Chapter 2 also suggests that obtaining leadership
positions within the Mexican Congress is likely to be related not only to legislator
experience, but also their future career goals. There are some previous studies that have
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examined leadership within the Chamber of Deputies (Aparicio and Langston 2009;
Kerevel 2010), but there have not yet been any studies that examine how leadership
promotes the future careers of legislators.
The data gathered for this study also provides an opportunity to further examine
how legislator experience and future career goals relate to the content of legislation they
sponsor. Examining the content of legislation will provide a window into the type of
substantive representation citizens receive from their representatives.
Finally, the initial discussion of pork-barreling in the Chamber of Deputies in
Chapter 5 highlights a number of potential avenues for future research. It is possible to
compare the budget submitted by the executive to the final budget approved by the
Chamber in order to determine what specific changes were made by legislators. This
initial examination would strengthen some of the conclusions drawn in Chapter 3
regarding the changing focus on local and state constituencies over time during the
budget process. It may also be possible to link changes in the budget to individual
amendments, providing a measure of pork-barreling “success” for individual deputies.
One limitation of the current examination of pork-barreling is the small number of
amendments introduced from 1997-2006. The 61st Legislature (2009-2012) introduced
more than twice as many budget amendments as submitted during the 60th Legislature,
suggesting that adding in the most recent legislative term will provide some more
leverage on examining pork-barreling behavior. The amendments studied here also do not
capture amendments to the budget made on the floor during the debate and passage of
budget, which if incorporated into the analysis may provide interesting new information.
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8.1.2 Candidate selection and extra-legislative networks
The way in which candidates are recruited and selected by political parties is a
critical component of any political system, and understanding the way in which
candidates are selected can provide valuable insight into individual behavior, the nature
of the party system, and executive-legislative relations (Siavelis and Morgenstern 2008).
Throughout this work, I have mentioned the importance of candidate selection procedures
as they related to differing behavior and careers between SMD and PR deputies, how it
influences the political careers of legislators, how candidate selection conflicts can lead
to frequent party switching, and how it influences to whom legislators are loyal.
However, I have not presented any individual-level data on methods of candidate
selection. A further examination of candidate selection is warranted as it may provide
invaluable insights into why legislators behave the way they do.
One potential avenue for future research on candidate selection would attempt to
identify the way in which each legislator was selected, either through designation by a
party leader, through a vote in a party assembly, through opinion polls, or through a
competitive primary election. While collecting this data for the period under study would
be extremely time consuming and difficult, it may be a valuable undertaking for at least a
single legislative term in order to determine what, if any, influence selection procedures
have on how federal deputies behave in office. One recent study has attempted to map out
selection procedures for a subset of legislative elections (Freidenberg 2010), suggesting
that it is possible to engage in this task. Furthermore, the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE)
has some information on selection procedures for more recent elections, suggesting that
in the future it may be easier to identify the procedures used to select candidates in each
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district by party. An examination of all cases presented to the Federal Electoral Tribunal
(TEPJF) related to candidate selection conflicts is also likely to provide an interesting
peak into candidate selection procedures within each political party.
Another more indirect way of examining candidate selection is through
developing a typology of officeholders based on their backgrounds. Siavelis and
Morgenstern (2008, 10) identify four general types of candidates: the party loyalist, the
constituent servant, the group delegate, and the entrepreneur. For the Mexican case, a
fifth candidate type may also be present: the technocrat (Camp 2010). I have begun to
identify individual deputies as one of these types based on their career backgrounds, as it
is likely that candidate types will influence the behavior of deputies. Entrepreneurs, or
independents or outsiders with only a tenuous relationship to a political party, are likely
to behave much differently than party loyalists, also pursue different types of future
careers, and potentially be more likely to switch parties. Group delegates, depending on
the group they represent, such as a particular union, are likely to focus more of their
attention on certain policy areas or on directing resources to a particular constituency, and
probably more likely to seek a future career where they can continue to represent their
group. Constituent servants may be more likely to try and pursue a future elected office,
or develop their careers in a single municipality, and spend their time in congress
attempting to benefit those constituents. Technocrats may be highly specialized in certain
policy areas, which will influence their behavior in congress, and they may be more
likely to pursue future administrative careers. Party loyalists make up the largest
component of Mexican federal deputies, and are likely to display the widest variation in
their career paths, moving frequently from partisan, administrative, and elected offices.
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While identifying individual deputies as one of these five types is fraught with potential
problems, it is also a worthwhile endeavor as it will likely explain some variation in
legislative behavior and careers that is currently relegated to the error term. In addition,
the identification of entrepreneurs or outsiders is likely to provide some interesting
insights into the party system and why parties select different types of candidates in
different districts.
A final and potentially exciting future avenue of research into candidate selection
would be to adopt a social networks approach to studying the extra-legislative networks
of individual deputies. While not discussed much in this work, Mexican politicians are
members of dense formal and informal networks (Camp 2002) that are likely to have
direct and important influence on how legislators are selected as candidates in the first
place, to whom they are responsive while in office, and the range of opportunities for
future careers after leaving the Chamber. A recent and growing trend in legislative
politics is the study of intra-legislative social networks, primarily through examining
cosponsorship patterns (Crisp, Kanthak and Leijonhufvud 2004; Fowler 2006a; 2006b
Alemán and Calvo 2010; Alemán forthcoming; Tam Cho and Fowler 2010; Calvo and
Leiras 2010; Kirkland 2011; Bratton and Rouse 2011). However, very few scholars have
examined how networks with actors outside the legislative arena influence behavior
inside a legislature (although see Victor and Koger 2011). Especially in political
environments where legislative careers are short, it is likely that extra-legislative
networks are likely to be more important predictors of legislative behavior, rather than
examining why legislators co-sponsor with some legislators but not others.
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Appendix II. Categories of funding requests
agricultural producers: This category comprises requests that target specific producers of foodstuffs, such as
beans, sugar, wine, tequila, cactus, citrus fruit, rice, and corn.

aid to workers: This category includes requests to either increase pensions or salaries for specific groups

of workers, nearly all of them unionized, such as health care workers, teachers, fishers,
and ex-railroad workers.
arts and culture: This category includes funding for the arts and other culturally relevant projects, such as
museums, art centers, and funding for the excavation of various archeological ruins.

agricultural and This is a more general category where deputies request a package of projects to support
rural development: agriculture and rural economic development
economic development: This category primarily includes requests relating to small and medium businesses, as well
as requests to encourage tourism.

education: Education funding can include general federal expenditures towards specific levels of
education, to building and aiding a particular school or university

environment: This category includes a variety of projects related to conservation and environmentallyfriendly development.

govt spending priorities: This category primarily consists of requests to alter the funding formula for transfering
health care:
human rights and minorities:
migrants and ex-braceros:

misc govt spending:
mixed requests:
public works:

federal money to states and municipalities, as well as requests to generally reduce
government spending and to prevent the privatization of government parastatal
This category includes general requests to increase government health care spending, as
well as money to build hospitals and funding for different types of medical research and
treatment
This category includes funding designed to benefit government human rights
organizations, and disadvantaged groups like women, indigenous, the disabled and the
elderly.
Request to aid the braceros (Mexican migrants who worked in the U.S. from 1942-64) are
fairly common. Deputies also request funds to be directed towards consulates in the U.S.
as well as other government programs designed to help Mexican nationals in the U.S. and
recently returned migrants.
Spending related to government salaries, the judicial branch, public broadcasting, military,
transparency, and during the LVII Legislature, requests related to the bank bailout
(FOBAPROA)
This category includes requests that combine two or more of the other categories in this
list, as well as requests for natural disaster relief, civil society promotion and issues
related to the oil sector (mostly communities affected by oil spills and environmental
Funding for various public infrastructure projects such as bridges, dams, ports, parks and
beaches.

science and technology Funding directed towards government programs that promote science and technology
funding: research
security and defense: Funding requests related to public security issues and support for public security agencies.
social services/welfare: Funding for social security programs, unemployment programs, and poverty reduction
programs

transportation: This category primarily includes requests to build, pave, or maintain roads, but also
includes requests related to airports and trains.

utilities: This category includes requests related to water, electricity and gas.
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Appendix III. Compiling the career path data
Putting together career path data on Mexican federal legislators is an arduous task. In
order to build the data set, I had to rely on a large variety of sources, some of them
specific to an individual legislator. In this appendix, I describe the major sources used
and then how I went about building the data set. Since political careers are constantly
developing and a large majority of the legislators in my dataset are still active in public
life, the conclusions drawn from the data are largely going to be time-specific to the
period in which the data was collected. I began collecting the career path data in August
2010 and finished in September 2011. Much of the dissertation was then written between
September and December 2011. From January to March 2012, I then went through the
entire career path data to examine legislators where I was missing information and
managed to fill in some holes.
The process of creating the database started with a list of the 2,345 legislators for
which I planned to collect information. I then went through the list one individual at a
time, and examined some or all of the sources listed below until I had a generally
complete chronology of their career, or I exhausted all the sources at my disposal.

1. Candidate lists from state-level electoral institutes
The first task to building the data was to gather candidate lists for all municipal, statewide
and federal elections that took place between 1997 and 2011. From these lists, I was able
to determine where individual legislators had competed for future elected office. To
collect this information, I took advantage of the spread of transparency laws across the
Mexican states, and filed information requests with each electoral institute. Many
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candidate lists for recent elections are available online, but for earlier elections, I had to
file the requests and wait for a response. Occasionally I had to travel to pick up the
information in person, in several other cases I received the lists through the mail, and in
the remaining cases I received electronic files from the electoral institutes. Since a large
number of the lists I have only in hard copy, or as scanned images, the search through the
lists was extremely long and tedious since I could not just electronically search the
document for an individual’s name.

2. Sistema de Información Legislativa (SIL)
http://sil.gobernacion.gob.mx/portal
The SIL website, maintained by the Secretaría de Gobernación, possesses a wealth of
information about deputies, senators, and legislative business from the 57th Legislature to
the present. SIL was my primary source for background information on each deputy, and
occasionally it would provide some information on where they sought future office.

3. Biographical sources
The following publications were useful for finding background information on a number
of legislators who, for whatever reason, did not have information available in the SIL.
The Pérez Franco book was particularly useful for information on PANista legislators.
Camp, Roderic Ai. 2011. Mexican Political Biographies, 1935-2009, Fourth ed. Austin:
University of Texas Press.
Centro de Documentación, Información y Análisis. 2008. Legislaturas XXVII-LX (19172009): Diputados Integrantes. México, D.F.: Cámara de Diputados, LX Legislatura.
González Oropeza, Manuel. 1994. Los diputados de la nación. México D.F.: Cámara de
Diputados del Congreso de la Unión.
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Greyson, George. 2002. A Guide to the Leadership Elections of the PRI, PAN, & PRD.
Policy Papers on the Americas, CSIS Americas Program.
Instituto de Estudios para la Transición Democrática. 1999. Diputados y senadores:
quién es quién en el Congreso. México, D.F.: IETD.
Instituto de Estudios para la Transición Democrática. 2002. Diputados y senadores:
quién es quién en el Congreso. México, D.F.: IETD.
López Díaz, Pedro. 2006. La clase política mexicana: diccionario. México: La Jornada.
Musacchio, Humberto. 2002. Quién es quién en la política mexicana. México, D.F.:
Plaza y Janés.
Pérez Franco, Aminadab Rafael. 2008. Indice biográfico de legisladores federales del
Partido Acción Nacional, 1946-2008. México: Tatevari ediciones.
4. Leave of absence requests (solicitudes de licencia)
I collected all leave of absence requests submitted by individual deputies to the Chamber
leadership as part of creating a variable that measures the number of days served for each
individual legislator. Most of these letters do not contain useful information, but
occasionally a deputy will specify why they are leaving office (such as receiving an
appointment in the state government, or to compete for another office), which I then
incorporated into the data set.

5. Individual CVs from current officeholders
If I found any former legislator who held a current public office in a local, state, or
national office, I filed an information request to obtain a CV of the individual if it was not
already available online.
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6. Newspapers and Magazines (national and selected regional)
I relied on a lot of newspaper articles to fill in gaps on legislators who attempted to
compete for positions, but either failed to gain ballot access or lost internal party
competitions for leadership posts. Newspapers were also helpful for finding information
about individuals who did not seek future elected posts. El Universal and La Jornada
were especially useful, but I searched archives of many other newspapers as well.
El Imparcial
El Informador
El Porvenir
El Siglo de Torreón
El Universal
Excelsior
La Crónica
La Jornada (national and regional publications)
Milenio
Organización Editorial Mexicana (www.oem.mx, includes several regional papers)
Proceso
Reforma
Vanguardia
7. Internet searches
I conducted internet searches on every individual in my data set. To conduct a thorough
search, I performed multiple searches with variations on the deputy’s name, including
any known nicknames. If it was not clear from a particular search result that the
individual I found was the former deputy, I did not use the information. In many cases,
these searches turned up newspaper stories I was not able to find through searching
individual archives. The internet searches were also very useful in turning up cases filed
with state and national level electoral institutes that involved the individual in some
dispute. Many of these cases were about disputes over candidate selection, providing
important information for my data set. In addition, I found through the searches
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information on individuals who held current posts in party organizations and government
bureaucracies.

8. Other sources
The following two sources were useful in corroborating information about individuals
who had held state legislative or mayoral positions.
Cámara de Diputados, Integración de las legislatures de los estados,
http://www.diputados.gob.mx/cedia/biblio/archivo/edos/
Enciclopedia de los municipios y delegaciones de México, http://www.elocal.gob.mx/work/templates/enciclo/

252

Appendix IV: Tables used to generate Table 4.5 in Chapter 4.
Table IV.1: Career Paths and Progressive Ambition of Mexican Federal
Legislators, 1997-2009
Immediate office
sought/obtained
City Councilor
Mayor
State Legislator
Federal Legislator
Senator
Governor
Federal Bureaucracy
National Party
Federal Executive
State Bureaucracy
State Party
State Cabinet
Interest Group
Non-political position
Retired/died/banned from office
Total Percentage
N

Federal
Legislator
0.0%
21.4%
7.1%
3.6%
7.1%
7.1%
10.7%
14.3%
0.0%
10.7%
7.1%
3.6%
7.1%
0.0%
0.0%
100%
28

Previous Federal Level Post
Federal
Senator
Bureaucracy
2.7%
0.6%
8.2%
10.7%
11.0%
16.1%
0.0%
1.8%
6.9%
9.5%
30.1%
4.8%
12.3%
22.0%
9.6%
11.9%
0.0%
1.2%
4.1%
8.3%
2.7%
4.8%
4.1%
3.0%
6.9%
1.2%
1.4%
1.8%
0.0%
2.4%
100%
100%
73
168

Propietarios only

Table IV.2: Career Paths and Progressive Ambition of
Mexican Federal Legislators, 1997-2009
Immediate office
sought/obtained
City Councilor
Mayor
State Legislator
Senator
Governor
Federal Bureaucracy
National Party
State Bureaucracy
State Party
State Cabinet
Interest Group
Non-political position
Total Percentage
N

Previous Post
Interest
Non-political
Group
office
0.8%
0.9%
9.0%
28.0%
12.0%
7.5%
18.1%
13.1%
4.5%
5.6%
3.8%
9.4%
3.8%
4.7%
5.3%
5.6%
3.8%
4.7%
2.3%
4.7%
33.8%
0.9%
3.0%
15.0%
100%
100%
133
107

Propietarios only
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National
Party
1.5%
7.2%
13.9%
3.6%
14.9%
9.7%
6.2%
15.4%
3.1%
6.7%
4.6%
3.1%
4.6%
4.6%
1.0%
100%
195
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Immediate office sought/obtained City Councilor
City Councilor
3.8%
Mayor
16.5%
State Legislator
20.3%
Federal Legislator
2.5%
Senator
8.9%
Governor
1.3%
Federal Bureaucracy
22.8%
National Party
7.6%
Federal Executive
0.0%
State Bureaucracy
7.6%
State Party
2.5%
State Cabinet
0.0%
Interest Group
5.1%
Non-political position
0.0%
Retired/died/banned from office
1.3%
Total Percentage
100%
N
79
Propietarios only

Mayor
0.0%
29.5%
10.9%
2.3%
8.5%
14.0%
6.2%
2.3%
0.0%
9.3%
7.8%
3.9%
0.0%
3.1%
2.3%
100%
129

Previous State Level Post
State Legislator Governor State Bureaucracy State Party State Cabinet
2.9%
0.0%
4.6%
2.8%
0.0%
22.8%
0.0%
17.6%
16.3%
11.9%
12.7%
0.0%
16.5%
16.3%
7.5%
2.3%
0.0%
0.4%
2.2%
1.5%
14.1%
66.7%
4.6%
14.4%
13.4%
2.3%
0.0%
2.3%
6.3%
23.9%
8.1%
0.0%
16.9%
12.2%
7.5%
3.8%
33.3%
3.1%
5.6%
3.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.4%
0.3%
1.5%
13.5%
0.0%
18.0%
7.8%
6.0%
7.8%
0.0%
5.0%
6.3%
6.0%
3.8%
0.0%
3.5%
1.9%
11.9%
3.8%
0.0%
3.1%
3.5%
3.0%
1.4%
0.0%
3.1%
3.5%
3.0%
0.9%
0.0%
1.2%
0.6%
0.0%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
347
3
261
319
67
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Appendix V. Table V.1: Party Switchers from the LVII Chamber of Deputies (1997-2000)
Party
Year of
Elected
Party
Year of Future
Prior Party Prior Party Under for Switched To Future Party
Party
Deputy
Affiliation
Switch
LVII during LVII Affiliation
Affiliation
PASC/PSD/ ~2008/2009/2
Acosta Zavala, Gerardo
PT
PRI
PRD
010
Albores Guillen, Roberto Armando
PRI
IND
2006
Alejo Domínguez, Cupertino
PRI
PANAL
2006
Alvarado Gudiño, Ruperto
PRI
CONV
2009
Alzina Campos, Edmundo Augusto

PRI

n/a

PRD

CONV

2001

Arceo Corcuera, Alvaro
Armenta Beltrán, Ricardo
Aubry Orozco, María del Socorro
Barajas Olea, Roselia Margarita
Barboza Llamas, Maximiano
Barraza Ayala, Israel

PRI
PRI

1997
1997

PRD
PRD
PRD
PRD
PRD
PRD

PVEM
CONV
CONV
PAS

2010
2000
2003
2003

PRI/CONV/
PANAL

2000/2002/
2011

PAN
PAN
PRD
PRI
PRD
PRI

IND
PRI/PAN
PJS
PVEM
PANAL

2010
2003/~2005
~2002
2002
2006

Carrillo Zavala, Alfonso

PRI

PRD coalition

~2006

Castellanos Gallegos, Carmita

PRI

Castillo Juárez, Laura Itzel
Ceballos Trujeque, Ana Lila

PRD
PRD

CONV/
PANAL/PAN
PT
PAS

2003/2006/
2009
2009
2003

Chabolla García, Rogelio

PAN

PCD/PT/
CONV

2000/2003/
2009

Chedraui Obeso, Irma
Cifuentes Negrete, Alberto
Colín Lira, Rosa
Contreras Rivera, Martín
Damián Huato, Pioquinto
De la Rosa Blancas, Ángel
De Souza Mayo Machorro,
Francisco
Deniz Macías, José Adán
Dzul Noh, Baldemar
Ebrard Casaubón, Marcelo Luis

PRI
PAN
PRI
PAN
PRD
PRD

PAN
IND
PANAL

~2004
2003
2006

PT
PAN-PVEM
coalition
PCD
PAS
PCD/PRD

2003

Bátiz Vázquez, Bernardo

1992 (left
PAN for
PFD/PAN
PFD), 1994
(join PRD)

Berganza Escorza, Francisco Javier
Bueno Torio, Juan
Buganza Salmerón, Gerardo
Cabello Sánchez, Antonio
Canedo Vargas, Jorge
Capuchino Herrera, Elba Margarita
Cárdenas Fonseca, Manuel

PRD

PAN
PRI

PRI
PRI
PRI

1994

1994
1997
1996

PT

IND

PT (PCD,
but no parl.
Rep.)

PRD

PRI

1995
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PAN
PAN
PVEM

PT
PT
IND

2000
2000
2001
2000/2002

Appendix V. Table V.1: Party Switchers from the LVII Chamber of Deputies (1997-2000),
cont'd
Party
Year of
Elected
Party
Year of Future
Prior Party Prior Party Under for Switched To Future Party
Party
Deputy
Affiliation
Switch
LVII during LVII Affiliation
Affiliation
Esquivel Farías, Susana
PRI
1989
PRD
Fuentes Larios, Juan Ignacio
PAN
IND
2001
Galván Gascón, Víctor Armando
PRD
PRI
García Camarena, Leonardo
PDM
1993
PAN
García Guzmán, Emilia
PRI
PAN
2009
García Sainz Lavista, Ricardo
PRI
1997
PRD
Garza Vázquez, Miguel Ángel
PVEM
PT
González Cuevas, Isaías
PRI
PLM
2003
González Davar, Juan José
PRD
PRI
~2004
González Márquez, Emilio
PDM
1991
PAN
González Sánchez, Alejandro
PRI
PRD
2000
Guajardo Anzaldúa, Juan Antonio
PAN
1994
PRD
PT
2002
Guzmán Reyna, Justiniano
PRD
PRI
PSD
2009
Ibarra Pedroza, Juan Enrique
PRI
PT
2005
Jiménez Flores, Elsa Patria
PRD
CONV
2003
Joaquín Coldwell, Addy Cecilia
PRI
PAN
2005
Ku Herrera, Enrique
PRI
PANAL
2006
Lagunas Angel, Antonio
PRI
1989
PRD
León Díaz, Jorge
PRD
PT
Lonche Castellanos, César
PRD
IND
PARM
2000
López Cruz, Víctor Manuel
PRI
PRD
~2003
López Romero, Armando
PRD
PT
Luna Calvo, Martha Irene
PRI
1997
PRD
PRI
Luna Kan, Francisco Epigmenio
PRI
1996
PRD
Maciel Ortiz, María Mercedes
PRD
1993
PT
Magaña Guerrero, Pedro
PRD
PT
2000
Maldonado Bautista, Jesús Samuel
PRI
1989
PRD
Martínez Almazán, Raúl
PRI
CONV
~2002
May López, María del Socorro
PRI
PT
n/a
Mendoza Ayala, Eduardo
PAN
PRI
2003
Mendoza Ayala, Rubén
PRI
1995
PAN
IND/PRD
2009/2012
Monreal Avila, Ricardo
PRI
IND
PRD/PT
1998/2008
Montaño Yamuni, Joaquín
PAN
IND
2010
Morales Vázquez, Carlos Orsoe
PRI
1995
PRD
Moreno Garavilla, Jaime Miguel
PRI
CONV
2001
Muñoz Ledo, Porfirio
PRI
1989
PRD
IND
PARM/PT
2000/2009
Navarro Quintero, Miguel Angel
PRI
PRD/PAN
2005/2009
Núñez Jiménez, Arturo
PRI
PRD
2005
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Appendix V. Table V.1: Party Switchers from the LVII Chamber of Deputies (1997-2000),
cont'd
Party
Year of
Elected
Party
Year of Future
Prior Party Prior Party Under for Switched To Future Party
Party
Deputy
Affiliation
Switch
LVII during LVII Affiliation
Affiliation
O´Farrill Tapia, Carolina
PRI
1997
PVEM
IND
CONV
2003
Ontiveros y Romo, Ricardo Arturo
PAN
CONV
~2004
Ordaz Montes de Oca, Salvador
PRI
PLM
2000
Ordorica Saavedra, Alejandro
PRD
IND
PARM
2000
Victoriano
Padilla Sánchez, Enrique
PRI
PAN
n/a
Paoli Bolio, Francisco José
PMT
1991
PAN
IND
2009
Parra Rodríguez, Gilberto
PRD
PT
2009
Patiño Pozas, Luis
PT
PRD
n/a
Peñaloza García, Bonfilio
PRD
PRI
PVEM
2003
Pérez de Alva Blanco, Roberto
PRI
PANAL
2006
Pérez García, Manuel
PRI
1989
PRD
Rangel Hernández, Armando
PAN
IND
2007
Robles Colín, Leticia
PRD
PRI
2010
Rodríguez Aguirre, Felipe
PRD
PT
~2009
Rodríguez Prats, Juan José
PRI
1994
PAN
PT-CONVRojas Arreola Gonzalo, Pedro
PRD
2003
PVEM
Bárbaro
coalition
Rubiano Reyna, Miguel Antonio
PRI
PRD
~2010
PT/return to
Sánchez Campos, José Luis
PRD
2000/(n/a)
PRD
Segura Rivera, Bernardo
PRI
1996
PRD
Soberanis Sosa, Eraclio
PRI
CONV
2006
Sodi de la Tijera, Demetrio Javier
PRI
1994
PRD
PAN
2006
Valdés Arias, Sergio
PRI
PRD
PAN
2000
Vázquez Osorno, Violeta Margarita
PRD
PT/PAN
2003/2006
Vega Murillo, Wintilo
PRI
PSD
2008
Velasco Oliva, Jesús Cuauhtémoc
PRD
CONV
2000
Vucovich Seele, Alma Angelina
PAN
1997
PRD
PARM/PAS
2000/2001
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Appendix V Table V.2: Party Switchers from the LVIII Chamber of Deputies (2000-2003)
Deputy
Aldana Burgos, Luis Artemio

Prior
Year of Party Elected
Party
Party
Prior Party Under for Switched To
Affiliation Switch
LVIII
during LVIII
PAN

Alvarado García, Edgar Eduardo
Anaya Gutiérrez, Alberto

PAN
PMS

1990

1997

PRD
PAN
PAN
PRI

Buenfil Montalvo, Edilberto Jesús

PRI

Bueno Campos, Roberto Eugenio

PAN

Buenrostro Díaz, Gustavo César
Jesús
Castellanos Hernández, Félix

PRD

Círigo Vázquez, Víctor Hugo
Cosío Gaona, Salvador
Cota Montaño, Rosa Delia
Cruz Andrade, Mario
Dip Rame, Elías
Elías Cardona, Alfonso Oliverio
Esquivel Martínez, Hilario
Estrada Colín, Ismael
Galarza González, Adrían Salvador

PRD
PRI
PT
PRD
PRI
PRD
PAN
PRI
PAN

1999
1989

PRI

1998

Gandarilla Carrasco, Víctor Manuel

PRD

2000

PRI

1997

PFCRN

~1998

PRD
PRI
PAN
PRI
PRI
PAN
PRI
CONV
PAN
PRI
PRI

López Escoffie, Silvia América

PAN

Manterola Sáinz, Pedro
Martínez Aldana, Tereso

PRI
PAN

Martínez Bárcenas, Celia

PRI
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2006

IND/CONV
2006/2008
PAN/ (return to
2007/2009
PRD)
CONV
2009
PRD/CONV 2006/2008
PRD
~2004
PRD coalition
IND

PRI
PRI

2010

PANAL
2006
PRD/ (return to
2006/2009
PRI)
CONV/PRI/PT/ 2004/2006/
PRD
2009/2010

PT

Castillo Cruz, Bonifacio

Garcés Martínez, José Delfino
García Vera, Jorge Luis
García Zalvidea, Juan Ignacio
González Aguilera, José Luis
González Molina, Concepción
González Nájera, Rosalío
Hernández Hilaria, Justino
Herrera y Bruquetas, Angel Enrique
Huerta Díaz, Mauro
Jiménez Olan, Neftalí
López Cruz, Esther

IND
PRD

PAN

PRI
PRI

IND
PRD/ (return to
2004/2010
PAN)
IND/ (return to
2006/2008
PRI)

PRI
PRI

Year of
Future Party
Affiliation
2007

PT

Andrade Sánchez, Justino Eduardo
Antunes Flores, Zeferino
Arnaud Carreño, Pablo de Jesús
Bañales Castro, José
Barrón Fonseca, José Jaime

Future Party
Affiliation

PVEM

PVEM

2003

PFD
~2009
CONV
~2006
IND
2003
PRD/ (return to
2006/2010
PRI)
PANAL
PRD/PRI
PAN
CONV
PRD
PANAL

2006
2004/2007
n/a
~2008
2006
2006

PRD

~2008

PRD
PVEM

IND (PRD)

CONV-PT
coalition
PAN
PRI

~2009
2009

PRD

2001

2007

Appendix V Table V.2: Party Switchers from the LVIII Chamber of Deputies (2000-2003),
cont'd

PRI

Year of
Future Party
Affiliation
~2009

PRI

2006

PRI
PRI
PRD
PRD
PT
PRI

PANAL
PANAL

2006
2006

IND
PRD
PRD

2010
2009
2004

PRD

PT

2009

Ochoa Camposeco, Victor Manuel

PRD

Mexico Posible

2003

Olvera Castillo, Amado
Orozco Alfaro, J. Jesús
Ortíz Ortíz, Héctor Israel
Padilla Silva, J. Clemente

PAN
PRI
PRI
PAN

IND
PRD
PAN

2003
2003
2004

Deputy
Martínez Cue, Fernando Josaphat
Martínez Veloz, Jaime Cleofas
Mayáns Canabal, Humberto
Domingo
Meléndez Pérez, Enrique
Montelongo Gordillo, Maricruz
Morales Reyes, Rogaciano
Moreno Bastida, Ricardo
Narro Céspedes, José
Nogueda Ruiz, Juan José
Nuñez Monreal, Magdalena del
Socorro

Peredo Aguilar, Rosalía
Piñeyro Arias, Antonia Irma
Regis Adame, Juan Carlos
Reyes Roel, César Patricio
Riojas Santana, Gustavo

Prior
Year of Party Elected
Party
Party
Prior Party Under for Switched To
Affiliation Switch
LVIII
during LVIII
PAN
PRD
PRI
PRD
PRI

PRI

PRT

PARM

1989

n/a

PT

n/a

PRI
PT
PAN
PSN

Ríos Alarcón, Francisco

PRI

Rodríguez Cabrera, Rufino
Rodríguez Ferrusca, Javier
Rodríguez Lozano, Amador
Rodríguez Pasos, Jorge Alberto
Romero Reyna, Valdemar
Rosas López Elizabeth
Salgado Macedonio, J. Félix

PRD
PAN
PRI
PT
PAN
PRI
PRD

PRI

1996

PFCRN

1991

Sánchez López, Héctor
Santibañez García, Luis Miguel
Servín Maldonado, Rafael
Simental García, Bertha Alicia
Sotelo Rosas, David Augusto
Soto Martínez, José

PRD
PRI
PARM
PRI

1989
~1990
1999
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PAN
PRD
PSN
PRD
PRI

PRD

IND

Future Party
Affiliation

PRD
PAN/Partido
Socialista
PANAL
PRD
IND

IND

2006/2010
2006
2009
2010

PAN/ (return to
~2007/2010
PRI)
PRI or IND
~2004
CONV
2006
PT
2001
PSD
~2009
PRI
2005
CONV
~2007
PUP/PASCPSD/PANAL
PVEM

2004/2005/
2010
2004

CONV

2007

Appendix V Table V.2: Party Switchers from the LVIII Chamber of Deputies (2000-2003),
cont'd
Deputy
Soto Reséndiz, José Ramón
Torres Mercado, Tomás
Torrijos Mendoza, Miguel Angel
Uriarte Rico, Olga Margarita
Urias Germán, Gregorio
Vaca Betancourt Bretón, José Sergio
Rodolfo
Varón Levy, Eddie James
Vidal Pérez, Julio César

Prior
Year of Party Elected
Party
Party
Prior Party Under for Switched To
Affiliation Switch
LVIII
during LVIII
PAN
PRI
1997
PRD
PVEM
2000
PAN
PRI
PRI
1989
PRD
PAN
PRI
PRI

Zamora Cruz, Adolfo

PRI
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IND
PVEM

Year of
Future Party
Affiliation
2009
2010/2012

PANAL

2006

Future Party
Affiliation

CONV/ (return
2004/2010
to PAN)
IND
~2006
PRD
2006
PAN-PANAL
2007
coalition

Appendix V Table V.3: Party Switchers from the LIX Chamber of Deputies (2003-2006)
Deputy

Party
Party
Year of
Future
Prior Party Year of Prior Elected Switched
Future
Party
Affiliation Party Switch Under for To during
Party
Affiliation
LIX
LIX
Affiliation

Aguilar Bueno, Jesús

PRI

Aguirre Rivero, Angel Heladio

PRI

Agúndez Montaño, Narciso

PRI/PAN/
PT

1995/1995/
~2003

PCD

2001

Alvarado Villazón, Francisco Xavier
Alvarez Romo, Leonardo

IND
PRD
coalition

2010

PSD

~2008

PRD
PVEM
PVEM
IND/
PVEM
PANAL

Arce Islas, René

PRD

Arechiga Santamaría, José Guillermo

PRI

Argüelles Guzmán, Jacqueline Guadalupe

PVEM

PANAL

~2008

Avila Camberos, Francisco Juan

PAN

2009

Avilés Nájera, Rosa María

PRD

IND
PT/CONV
(but still
PRD)
PRI
PANAL

2006

Barrera Zurita, Baruch Alberto
Boltvinik Kalinka, Julio

IND

PAN
PRI

n/a

2009/2011
2006

2009
2010

PRD

Briones Briseño, José Luis

PRI

Bustillos Montalvo, Juan

PRI

Calderón Centeno, Sebastián

PRI

1999

PAN

Camacho Solís, Víctor Manuel

PRI/PCD

1995/2000

PRD

IND

PRD/PAN 2007/2010

Camarillo Zavala, Isidro

PAN

IND

Campa Cifrián, Roberto Rafael

PRI

IND

PANAL

2006

PVEM

2007

IND

PANAL

2006

Candelas Salinas, Rafael

PRI

2000

PRD

Canul Pacab, Angel Paulino

PRI

Cárdenas Sánchez, Nancy

PRD

PSD

2009

Carrillo Guzmán, Martín

PRI

IND

PANAL

2006

PAN

IND

PANAL

2009

PRD
PT (but
still PRD)

2012

Clouthier Carrillo, Tatiana
Colín Gamboa, Roberto

PDM

1994

Córdova Wilson, Ariel Baltazar
Cota Cota, Josefina

PRI
PRI

1999

Cruz Martínez, Tomás
Cruz Silva, Isabel Carmelina
De la Vega Asmitia, José Antonio Pablo

PRD

CONV (but
still PRD?)

2009

PRI

IND

2010

PAN

2009

IND

2011

2000

PAN

PRI

2003

PRD

PRI

Echeverría Pineda, Abel

PRI
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2006

PRD

PRI

Díaz Nieblas, José Lamberto
Díaz Palacios, Socorro

PAN

Appendix V Table V.3: Party Switchers from the LIX Chamber of Deputies (2003-2006),
cont'd
Deputy
Espino Arévalo, Fernando
Flores Mendoza, Rafael

Party
Party
Year of
Future
Prior Party Year of Prior Elected Switched
Future
Party
Affiliation Party Switch Under for To during
Party
Affiliation
LIX
LIX
Affiliation
PANAL/
PRI
2003
PVEM
2006/2009
PRI
PRI
~1998
PRD

García Domínguez, Miguelángel

PRI

2002

PRD

González Roldán, Luis Antonio

PRI

n/a

PVEM

González Ruiz, Alfonso
González Salas y Petriccioli, María
Marcela
González Schmal, Jesús Porfirio

PRI
PRI
2003
PAN/PDM/ 1993/1997/
PRD
2001

Gordillo Morales, Elba Esther

IND

PRD

PANAL

~2009

PANAL

2006

PRI

2009

PANAL

2005

PAN

2010

CONV
PRI

Guajardo Anzaldúa, Juan Antonio

PAN/PRD

1995/2002

PT

Guillén Quiroz, Ana Lilia
Guizar Valladares, Gonzalo
Gutiérrez Corona, Leticia

PRI

1989

PRD
PRI
PRI

IND

Hernández Ramos, Minerva

PRD

PAN

2010

Huizar Carranza, Guillermo
Ibáñez Montes, José Angel
Jiménez Sánchez, Moisés
Kahwagi Macari, Jorge Antonio
Leyson Castro, Armando

PRD
PRI
PRI
PVEM
PRI

PT
PANAL
PANAL
PANAL
PAN
PRD
coalition

2007
2006
~2006
2006
2007

Lujambio Moreno, Julio Horacio

PRI

2003

Magaña Martínez, Sergio Augusto

PRI/PAN

2001/2003

PRD

Maldonado Venegas, Luis

PRI

~2003

CONV

Martínez Alvarez, Jesús Emilio

PRI

2001

CONV

Maya Pineda, María Isabel

PAN

2000

PRI

Mejía Haro, Antonio

PRI

1998

PRD

Méndez Galvez, Alberto Urcino

PVEM

PRI
PRI

1995

PAN

Meza Cabrera, Fidel René
Montiel Fuentes, Gelacio

PRI

1998

PRI
PRD

Morales Rubio, María Guadalupe

PAN

2002

PRD
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2009

PASC/ 2007/2009/
PAN/PRI
2010
PAN
2009

PAN

Mendívil Morales, Guadalupe
Mendoza Ayala, Rubén

IND
IND

IND/PRD 2009/2012
IND

PRD/PAN 2007/2009

Appendix V Table V.3: Party Switchers from the LIX Chamber of Deputies (2003-2006),
cont'd
Deputy
Moreno Garavilla, Jaime Miguel
Moreno Ramos, Gustavo
Moreno Valle Rosas, Rafael
Muñoz Muñoz, José Alfonso
Nahle García, Arturo
Nava Altamirano, José Eduviges
Obregón Espinoza, Francisco Javier
Ochoa Fernández, Cuauhtémoc

Party
Party
Year of
Future
Prior Party Year of Prior Elected Switched
Future
Party
Affiliation Party Switch Under for To during
Party
Affiliation
LIX
LIX
Affiliation
PRI
2001
CONV
PRI
IND
PANAL
2006
PAN/PANPRI
2006/2010
PRD
coalition
PRI
IND
PRI
PRI
2001
PRD
2009
coalition
CONV-PT
PRI
2009
coalition
PAN
1999
PRD
PT
2006
PRI

1999

Orantes López, María Elena

PVEM
PRI

PRD
coalition

2012

Orozco Gómez, Javier

PRI

1988

PVEM

Ortiz Pinchetti, José Agustín Roberto

PRI

1969

PRD

CONV

~2009

PRI

PVEM

2007

Pavón Vinales, Pablo

PRI

PAN

2010

Penagos García, Sergio
Perdomo Bueno, Juan Fernando
Pérez Cárdenas, Manuel

PAN
CONV
PAN

IND

2010

Pano Becerra, Carlos Osvaldo

PRI
PRI

2002
1999

Pérez Zaragoza, Evangelina

PAN

Ramos Salinas, Oscar Martín

PRI

IND

2009

IND

PANAL

2006

Rangel Hernández, Armando

PAN

Reyes Retana Ramos, Laura
Rincón Chanona, Sonia
Rodríguez Anaya, Gonzalo
Ruiz Esparza Oruña, Jorge Roberto
Ruiz González, Tomás José

IND

2007

PRI
PRI
PRI
PAN
PRI

IND
IND

PRD
PANAL
PAN
PANAL
PANAL

2006
2006
2008
2007
2006

IND

Sagahón Medina, Benjamín

PRI

IND

PVEM

2006

Sánchez Hernández, Alfonso
Sandoval Urbán, Evelia

PRI
PRI

IND
IND

PANAL
PANAL

2006
2006

Serrano Crespo, Yadira

PRD

IND

2011

Serrano, Jiménez, Emilio

PRI

PRD
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Appendix V Table V.3: Party Switchers from the LIX Chamber of Deputies (2003-2006),
cont'd
Deputy

Party
Party
Year of
Future
Prior Party Year of Prior Elected Switched
Future
Party
Affiliation Party Switch Under for To during
Party
Affiliation
LIX
LIX
Affiliation

Silva Valdés, Carlos Hernán

PAN

2003

PRD

Tentory García, Israel

PRI

2001

PRD

Torreblanca Galindo, Carlos Zeferino

PRD

PAN

2012

Trujillo Fuentes, Fermín

PRI

PANAL

2008

Ulloa Pérez, Gerardo

PRD

CONV

2009

PRI
PAN-PRD
coalition
PSD
PRD
coalition

2007

PANAL

2006

PAN

2010

PANAL

2006

Valencia Monterrubio, Edmundo Gregorio
Vázquez García, Quintín
Vázquez Saut, Regina

PAN
PRI
PAN

IND

Vega Carlos, Bernardo

PRI

IND

Vega Murillo, Wintilo

PRI

Vega y Galina, Roberto Javier

PRI

IND

PRI
PRI

IND

Yunes Linares, Miguel Angel
Zanatta Gasperín, Gustavo

PRI

PAN

2000

2002

Zebadúa González, Emilio

PRD

Zorrilla Fernández, Guillermo

PRI

Zúñiga Romero, Jesús

PRI
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IND

2010
2008
2006

Appendix V Table V.4: Party Switchers from the LX Chamber of Deputies (2006-2009)
Party
Prior
Year of
Party
Year of
Elected
Future Party
Deputy
Party
Prior Party
Switched To
Future Party
Under for
Affiliation
Affiliation Switch
during LX
Affiliation
LX
Abad de Jesús, Juan
PAN
2000
CONV
Aguilar Jiménez, Rubén
PRT
~1990
PT
Aguilera Rico, José Luis
PRI
2002
CONV
PAN-PRD
Aispuro Torres, José Rosas
PRI
2010
coalition
Almonte Borja, Ramón
PRI
2004
PRD
Altamirano Toledo, Carlos
PRI
dk
PRD
Armendáriz García, Pedro
PRI
2001
PAN
PMP-PASArvizu Rivas, Aída Marina
2005
PASC
PDS
Bellizia Rosique, Pascual
PRI
2002
PVEM
Bermúdez Viramontes, Andrés
PRD
~2004
PAN
Bravo Padilla, Itzcóatl Tonatiuh
IND
1994
PRD
Buganza Salmerón, Gerardo
PAN
IND
2010
Cárdenas Fonseca, Manuel
PRI
2006
NA
Cárdenas Hernández, Raymundo
PRD
IND
2010
Cárdenas Márquez, Elías
PRI
1999
CONV
Carrasco Altamirano, Diódoro Humberto
PRI
2006
PAN
Castellanos Hernández, Félix
PT
CONV
Castillo Romero, Patricia Obdulia de Jesús
Castro de la Rosa, Osiel
Cervantes Rodríguez, Aurora
Conde Rodríguez, Elsa de Guadalupe
Dagdug Lützow, Moisés Félix
Dávila Esquivel, Humberto
De la Torre Jaramillo, Eduardo Sergio
De la Torre Sánchez, José

PRI
PRI
PRI
PMP
PRI
PRI
PMP
PRI

Del Toro, Mario Enrique

PRI/PAN

Díaz Garibay, Felipe
Espejel Lazcano, Jaime
Esteva Salinas, Alberto
Félix Holguín, Armando Jesús
Flores Maldonado, César
Franco Cazarez, Ricardo
Gálvez Rodríguez, Fernel Arturo

PRI

2001
2005
2001
2005
n/a
2006
2005
2000
~2000/
2003
1995

PRI
PRI
PRI
PRI
PRI

~2000
2000
~2005
1999
~1997

García Reyes, Beatriz Eugenia
García Vivián, Raúl
Godoy Cárdenas, Jorge
Gómez Pasillas, Jacinto
González Macías, Jesús

CONV
PAN
PRD
PASC
PRD
NA
PASC
PAN

2000
2006
2002
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2012

IND

2009

PAN

PRD
PAN
PRD
CONV
PAN
PRD
PAN
PRD
PAN

PRI
PRI
PAN

PAN

PAN
CONV
NA
PVEM

CONV/
(return to
PAN)
CONV

2009/2012
2010

Appendix V Table V.4: Party Switchers from the LX Chamber of Deputies (2006-2009), cont'd
Party
Prior
Year of
Party
Year of
Elected
Future Party
Deputy
Party
Prior Party
Switched To
Future Party
Under for
Affiliation
Affiliation Switch
during LX
Affiliation
LX
González Roaro, Benjamín Ernesto
PRI
2006
PAN
Hernández Hernández, Sergio
PRI
n/a
PRD
PANAL
2011
Hernández Silva, Benjamín
PRI
2000
PRD
Hernández Valadés, Delio
PT
PASC
PT
2009
Herrera Solís, Anuario Luis
PRI
n/a
PT
Jiménez Godínez, Miguel Ángel
NA
IND
2009
Jiménez Valenzuela, María Eugenia
PRD
IND
Joaquín Coldwell, Addy Cecilia
PRI
2005
PAN
Lizárraga Peraza, Víctor Manuel
PRI
n/a
PRD
PANAL
2011
López Lena Cruz, Humberto
PRD
CONV/IND
PANAL
2010
López Rojas, Alberto
PRD
CONV
2009
Ludlow Kuri, Lorenzo Daniel
PRI
2006
PAN
Luna Munguía, Alma Lilia
PRD
PRI
2009
Luna Rodríguez, Silvia
PRI
2006
NA
Macedo Escartín, Miguel Angel
PRI
2003
PRD
PSD
2009
Maciel Ortiz, Ma. Mercedez
PRD
1990
PT
PT-CONV
Manuell-Gómez Angulo, Dolores de María
PAN
2010
coalition
Matías Alonso, Marcos
PT
PRD
Mendoza Arellano, David
PT
n/a
PRD
Mollinedo Hernández, Agustín
PAN
PRI
2010
Monreal Ávila, Susana
PRI
1998
PRD
Morales García, Elizabeth
PVEM
PRI
Morales Manzo, Jesús Ricardo
PRD
PT/PVEM
2010/2010
Morales Vázquez, Carlos Orsoe
PRI
1995
PRD
Murillo Flores, Francisco Javier
PRI
2006
PAN
Navarro Quintero, Miguel Ángel
PRI
2005
PRD
PAN
2009
Ochoa López, Nabor
PRI
2003
PAN
IND
PRI
2009
Orcí Martínez, Juan Adolfo
PRI
2002
PRD
~1997/
Ostoa Ortega, Aníbal
PRI/PRD
CONV
1998
Pacheco LLanes, Ramón Félix
PT
~2003
PRD
PAN-PRD
Patrón Montalvo, Jesús Manuel
PRI
2010
coalition
Pedro Cortés, Santiago Gustavo
PT
PASC
Peña Sánchez, Miguel Ángel
PRI
1989
PRD
Peraza Valdez, Ismael
PRI
IND
2010
Pérez Bolaños, Ana Elisa
PRI
2006
NA
Piñeyro Arias, Irma
PRI
2006
NA
Pulido Pecero, Pedro
PRD
2005
PAN
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Appendix V Table V.4: Party Switchers from the LX Chamber of Deputies (2006-2009), cont'd
Deputy
Ramos Becerril, Rafael Plácido
Rasgado Corsi, Gloria
Rivera Villanueva, Erick Marte
Rodríguez Prats, Juan José
Rodríguez Uresti, Enrique
Salgado Amador, Manuel Salvador
Samperio Montaño, Juan Ignacio
San Martín Hernández, Juan Manuel

Party
Prior
Year of
Party
Year of
Elected
Future Party
Party
Prior Party
Switched To
Future Party
Under for
Affiliation
Affiliation Switch
during LX
Affiliation
LX
PRD
CONV
PRD
IND
2010
PRI
1994
PAN
PRI
1994
PAN
PRI
PRI
PRI

2006
n/a
n/a

Sánchez Barrios, Carlos
Sansores San Román, Layda Elena
Santos Arreola, Francisco Javier
Suárez del Real y Aguilera, José Alfonso
Tagle Martínez, Martha Angélica
Torres García, Daniel
Ulloa Pérez, Emilio
Uscanga Cruz, Robinson
Valdés Chávez, Ramón
Varela Lagunas, Tomás José Luis
Vela González, Joaquín Humberto
Velasco Oliva, Jesús Cuauhtémoc
Verástegui Ostos, César Augusto

PAN
PVEM
CONV
PRD
PRD

PRI/PRD 1996/2001
PAN
2004
PRI
PRI

1999
n/a

PRI
PRI
PRI

2004
2001
n/a

PRD
PRI

2000
1995

Zavaleta Salgado, Ruth

CONV
PRD
PRD
CONV
PRD
PRD
CONV
CONV
CONV
PT
CONV
PAN
PRD
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CONV
2009
PAG/ (return
2008/2009
to PRD)

IND

2010

CONV

2009

IND
PRD

2010
2009

IND

2009
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